

CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR 2026

UNDER EMBARGO UNTIL
15:00 CEST
8 SEPTEMBER 2026

CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR 2026

17th ANNUAL EDITION

Monitoring and Research Committee, ICBL-CMC Governance Board
Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines • DanChurchAid
Human Rights Watch • Humanity & Inclusion • Mines Action Canada
Monitor Editorial Team leaders • ICBL-CMC staff

Please cite this report as:

Cluster Munition Coalition, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2026* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2026).

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ISBN: 978-2-9701476-7-1

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Back cover photograph © Sonxay Keovongvichid/NPA, January 2026

Cover, text design, and layout by Michael Sherwin.

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).

For more information visit www.the-monitor.org or email monitor@icblcmc.org.

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CLUSTER MUNITION COALITION

The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) is an international civil society campaign working to eradicate cluster munitions and prevent further harm from these weapons. The CMC works through its members to change the policy and practice of governments and organizations and to raise awareness of the devastation that cluster munitions cause.

The CMC is committed to the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions as the best framework for ending the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions and for destroying stockpiles, clearing contaminated areas, and assisting affected communities.

The CMC calls for universal adherence to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and its full implementation by all, including:

- No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions by any actor under any circumstances;
- Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of cluster munitions;
- Efficient clearance and destruction of all cluster munition remnants in cluster munition contaminated areas; and
- Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all cluster munition and explosive remnants of war (ERW) victims.

PREFACE

CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Cluster munitions pose significant dangers to civilians for two principal reasons: their impact at the time of use and their deadly legacy. Launched from the ground or dropped from the air, cluster munitions consist of containers that open and disperse submunitions indiscriminately over a wide area, claiming both civilian and military victims. Many explosive submunitions and bomblets fail to detonate as designed when they are dispersed, becoming *de facto* landmines that kill and maim indiscriminately long after the conflict has ended and create barriers to socio-economic development.

To protect civilians from the effects of cluster munitions, Norway and a number of like-minded countries initiated a fast-track diplomatic process in late 2006 aimed at creating a new international treaty. Working in partnership with United Nations (UN) agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and civil society organizations grouped under the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), the Oslo Process resulted in the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in May 2008, which opened for signature on 3 December 2008.

The Convention on Cluster Munitions entered into force on 1 August 2010. It comprehensively prohibits the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions. It also requires destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions within eight years, clearance of cluster munition remnants within 10 years, and assistance to victims, including those injured by submunitions, as well as the families of those injured or killed, and affected communities.

The convention's First Meeting of States Parties was held in November 2010 in the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR)—the country with the highest level of contamination by unexploded submunitions. States Parties adopted the Vientiane Action Plan, a 66-point action plan to guide their work until the convention's First Review Conference. The 2015 Dubrovnik Action Plan and the 2021 Lausanne Action Plan were respectively adopted at the first and second review conferences, listing concrete steps to further implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions in the periods from 2015 to 2020 and from 2021 to 2026. This year, States Parties return to Lao PDR—which, 16 years later, remains the country with the highest level of contamination by unexploded submunitions—for the Third Review Conference to assess progress achieved under the convention and chart priorities for a new action plan.

CLUSTER MUNITION COALITION

Launched by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in November 2003, the CMC plays a crucial and ongoing facilitating role in leading global civil society action in favor of the ban on cluster munitions. With campaign contacts in more than 100 countries, the CMC works for the full universalization and implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In January 2011, the CMC merged with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) to become the ICBL-CMC, but the CMC and ICBL remain two distinct campaigns.

LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for both the CMC and ICBL on the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Mine Ban Treaty, respectively. Created by the ICBL as Landmine Monitor in June 1998, the initiative became the research and monitoring arm of the CMC in 2008 and changed its name in 2010 to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (known as “the Monitor”).

The Monitor represents the first time that NGOs have come together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor humanitarian disarmament treaties and to regularly document progress and report on problems. Established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation, the Monitor has put into practice the concept of civil society-based verification that is now employed in many similar contexts. It has become the *de facto* monitoring regime for both treaties, monitoring and reporting on States Parties’ implementation and compliance, and more generally, assessing the international community’s response to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). The Monitor’s reporting complements transparency reporting required of States Parties under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions.

The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable for the legal obligations that they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available information, covering all aspects of mine action. Although in some cases it does entail field missions, the Monitor does not send researchers into harm’s way and does not include war-zone reporting. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about the issues it is monitoring to benefit the international community as a whole. It aims to promote and advance discussion in support of the goal of a world free of landmines and cluster munitions.

The Monitor is supported by a global reporting network. Key outputs are country profiles and annual reports.¹ A Monitoring and Research Committee provides oversight of the plans and outputs of the ICBL-CMC’s research and monitoring, including all Monitor publication content, and acts as a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The Monitor Project Manager, under the ICBL-CMC, is responsible for the coordination and management of research, editing, and production of all Monitor research products.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

This is the 17th annual *Cluster Munition Monitor*. It is the sister publication to the *Landmine Monitor*, which has been issued annually since 1999.

Cluster Munition Monitor 2026 covers cluster munition ban policy, use, production, transfers, and stockpiling globally. It assesses the impact of cluster munition remnant contamination

¹ Reports, briefing papers, factsheets, maps, detailed country profiles, and other resources produced by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor are available online at www.the-monitor.org.

and casualties, and outlines progress made and challenges faced in efforts to release contaminated land, provide risk education to affected communities, and assist victims. It also reviews international financial assistance and national resources allocated towards mine action efforts in cluster munition affected countries. The report focuses on calendar year 2025, with information included through July 2026 where possible. Longer-term trends are also reflected upon where relevant, particularly in light of the Third Review Conference. Unless otherwise specified, all translations in this report were carried out by the Monitor.

As in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this report is limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. The Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search for accurate and reliable information.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations from around the world contributed to this report. It was assembled by a dedicated team of researchers and editors, with the support of a significant number of donors. The Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed to the research for this report. We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, field practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information. We are grateful to ICBL-CMC staff for their crucial assistance in the production, release, distribution, and promotion of Monitor reports.

Content produced by the Monitor was reviewed by members of the Monitoring and Research Committee comprised of five NGOs, as well as Monitor Editorial Team leaders and ICBL-CMC staff. At the time of publication, the committee's members were:

- Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (Camilo Serna), DanChurchAid (Lene Rasmussen), Human Rights Watch (Mark Hiznay and Verity Coyle), Humanity & Inclusion (Eva Maria Fischer and Alma Taslidžan), and Mines Action Canada (Erin Hunt);
- Monitor Editorial Team leaders (Ban Policy: Jillian Rafferty; Impact: Katrin Atkins and Loren Persi Vicentic; and Mine Action Funding: Ruth Bottomley); and
- Relevant senior ICBL-CMC staff (Éléa Boureux and Kasia Derlicka-Rosenbauer), and *ex officio* member Tamar Gabelnick (ICBL-CMC director).

From January through July 2026, the Monitor's Editorial Team undertook research, updated country profiles, and drafted thematic overviews for *Cluster Munition Monitor 2026*. The Editorial Team included:

- **Ban Policy:** Jillian Rafferty, Mennah Abdelwahab, Mark Hiznay, Yeshua Moser-Puanguswan, and Nicolo Scarpat;
- **Impact:** Katrin Atkins and Loren Persi Vicentic; and
- **Mine Action Funding:** Ruth Bottomley.

Mine Action Review, an independent project of Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), provided the Monitor with the contamination and land release data used in this report under a Memorandum of Understanding. NPA is a member of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC).

Anna Lim (Editorial Consultant) provided final editing in July and August 2026 with support from Éléa Boureux (Project Manager). Emma Romano and Jillian Vacha (interns) also contributed to *Cluster Munition Monitor 2026*.

Report formatting and cover design were undertaken by Michael Sherwin. Maps were created by Loreta Marcellino. Sisavath Printing Press printed the report in Lao PDR.

The front cover photograph was provided by Paul McCann/The HALO Trust. The back cover photograph was provided by Sonxay Keovongvichid/NPA. Additional photographs found within *Cluster Munition Monitor 2026* were provided by multiple photographers, cited with each photograph.

We extend our gratitude to Monitor financial contributors. In 2026, this work was made possible with funding from (list accurate as of 1 August 2026):

- Government of Australia
- Government of Austria
- Government of Canada
- Government of France
- Government of Germany
- Government of Italy
- Government of Luxembourg
- Government of New Zealand
- Government of Norway
- Government of Slovenia
- Government of Switzerland
- Holy See
- MINE-EX Foundation
- République et canton de Genève

The Monitor is also grateful for the support received from private donors.

The Monitor's supporters are in no way responsible for, and do not necessarily endorse, the material contained in this report.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BAC	battle area clearance
CBU	cluster bomb unit
CCW	1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons
CHA	confirmed hazardous area
CMC	Cluster Munition Coalition
CMR	cluster munition remnants
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
DCA	DanChurchAid
DPICM	dual-purpose improved conventional munition
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EORE	explosive ordnance risk education
ERW	explosive remnants of war
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HI	Humanity & Inclusion (formerly Handicap International)
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	internally displaced person
IED	improvised explosive device
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
ISU	Implementation Support Unit
NGO	non-governmental organization
NSAG	non-state armed group
SHA	suspected hazardous area
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UXO	unexploded ordnance

2008 CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Table Key

States Parties: Ratified or acceded as of 1 August 2026

Signatories: Signed, but not yet ratified as of 1 August 2026

States not party: Not yet acceded or withdrawal as of 1 August 2026

The Americas

Antigua & Barbuda	Guyana
Belize	Honduras
Bolivia	Mexico
Canada	Nicaragua
Chile	Panama
Colombia	Paraguay
Costa Rica	Peru
Cuba	Saint Kitts & Nevis
Dominican Rep.	Saint Lucia
Ecuador	Saint Vincent & the Grenadines
El Salvador	Trinidad & Tobago
Grenada	Uruguay
Guatemala	
Jamaica	Haiti
Argentina	Dominica
Bahamas	Suriname
Barbados	United States
Brazil	Venezuela

East & South Asia & the Pacific

Afghanistan	Nauru
Australia	New Zealand
Cook Islands	Niue
Fiji	Palau
Japan	Philippines
Lao PDR	Samoa
Maldives	Sri Lanka
Indonesia	Vanuatu
Bangladesh	Mongolia
Bhutan	Myanmar
Brunei Darussalam	Nepal
Cambodia	Pakistan
China	Papua New Guinea
India	Singapore
Kiribati	Solomon Islands
Korea, North	Thailand
Korea, South	Timor-Leste
Malaysia	Tonga
Marshall Islands	Tuvalu
Micronesia	Vietnam

Europe, the Caucasus & Central Asia

Albania	Germany	Netherlands
Andorra	Holy See	North Macedonia
Austria	Hungary	Norway
Belgium	Iceland	Portugal
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Ireland	San Marino
Bulgaria	Italy	Slovakia
Croatia	Liechtenstein	Slovenia
Czech Republic	Luxembourg	Spain
Denmark	Malta	Sweden
France	Moldova	Switzerland
Cyprus	Monaco	United Kingdom
	Montenegro	
Armenia	Kazakhstan	Serbia
Azerbaijan	Kyrgyzstan	Tajikistan
Belarus	Latvia	Türkiye
Estonia	Lithuania	Turkmenistan
Finland	Poland	Ukraine
Georgia	Romania	Uzbekistan
Greece	Russia	

Middle East & North Africa

Iraq	Palestine	Tunisia
Lebanon		
Algeria	Kuwait	Syria
Bahrain	Libya	United Arab Emirates
Egypt	Morocco	Yemen
Iran	Oman	
Israel	Qatar	
Jordan	Saudi Arabia	

Sub-Saharan Africa

Benin	Ghana	Nigeria
Botswana	Guinea	Rwanda
Burkina Faso	Guinea-Bissau	Sao Tome & Principe
Burundi	Lesotho	Senegal
Cameroon	Madagascar	Seychelles
Cabo Verde	Malawi	Sierra Leone
Chad	Mali	Somalia
Congo, Rep.	Mauritania	South Africa
Comoros	Mauritius	South Sudan
Côte d'Ivoire	Mozambique	Togo
Eswatini	Namibia	Zambia
Gambia	Niger	
Angola	Congo, Dem. Rep.	Liberia
Central African Rep.	Djibouti	Tanzania
	Kenya	Uganda
Equatorial Guinea	Ethiopia	Sudan
Eritrea	Gabon	Zimbabwe

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Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) staff members conduct a risk education session in Sekong Province, Lao PDR.

© Sonxay Keovongvichid/NPA, March 2026

MAJOR FINDINGS

Findings on casualties, contamination, clearance, and funding presented in this report relate specifically to cluster munitions. Findings on victim assistance and risk education address broader affected populations, systems, and frameworks, in accordance with needs and the convention's own requirements, including non-discrimination.

BAN POLICY

STATUS OF THE 2008 CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

- The Convention on Cluster Munitions has 112 States Parties and 12 signatories.
- The most recent country to accede was Vanuatu in September 2025, with the convention entering into force for the nation on 1 March 2026. Prior to that, South Sudan and former signatory Nigeria were the last countries to become parties to the convention, joining in 2023.
- The convention lost one State Party on 6 March 2025, when Lithuania's withdrawal took effect—marking the first time that a state has withdrawn from the convention.
- An annual resolution in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) promoting the convention was adopted in December 2025 by 138 states, including 25 states not party to the convention.
 - For the first time since the resolution was introduced in 2015, the United States (US) voted against it, joining Russia as the only states to vote against the resolution.

USE OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS

- There has been no confirmed use of cluster munitions by any State Party since the convention was adopted in May 2008.
- Cluster munitions were used by Iran, Myanmar, Russia, Thailand, and Ukraine during the reporting period. Cluster munitions were also used in State Party Mali.
 - Myanmar, Russia, and Ukraine continued to use cluster munitions during 2025 and the first half of 2026.

- Iran repeatedly used cluster munitions in Israel in 2026, while Thailand used them in Cambodia in 2025 in the context of their border conflict.
- Cluster munitions were used in northern Mali in May 2026, but it was not possible to confirm who used the weapons.
- There were also reports of cluster munition use by Israel and/or the US in Iran, by Pakistan in Afghanistan, by Houthi forces in Israel, and by Israel in Lebanon, but it was not possible to verify these claims.

PRODUCTION

- There are 18 countries—none of whom are party to the convention—that actively produce cluster munitions, maintain the capacity to do so, and/or have yet to formally commit to never produce them again: Brazil, China, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Türkiye, Ukraine, and the US.
 - Ukraine was recently added to the list following newly reviewed evidence that it conducted testing of a missile with a cluster warhead in 2019.
- The Monitor found evidence of cluster munition production during the current reporting period in: China, India, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Poland, Romania, Russia, and South Korea.
- While there is no evidence of new development or production of cluster munitions in the US, evidence suggests that the country plans to do so in the future.

TRANSFERS¹

- In September 2025, Israel signed a three-year contract to produce and transfer cluster munitions to the US.
- Evidence emerged in the reporting period suggesting that North Korea transferred cluster munitions to Russia. While the exact timeline of the transfers is unclear, North Korean-produced cluster munitions were used in Ukraine in 2025.
- Press reports indicated that Greece planned to transfer cluster munitions to Ukraine through State Party Czech Republic, though the Monitor could not confirm if this transfer was completed.
- Historically, at least 15 countries have transferred more than 50 types of cluster munitions to at least 60 other countries. Since the convention took effect in August 2010, no State Party is known to have transferred cluster munitions other than for purposes permitted by the convention.

STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION AND RETENTION

- Since the convention's adoption in 2008, a total of 42 States Parties have destroyed 100% of the cluster munition stocks that they declared, collectively destroying 1.49 million cluster munitions and 179 million submunitions. There are currently no States Parties with declared cluster munition stockpiles left to destroy.
- Only six States Parties are retaining live cluster munitions for permitted research and training purposes, of which Germany has the highest number (50 cluster munitions and 3,150 submunitions).

¹ In August 2026, as *Cluster Munition Monitor 2026* was going to print, the US Department of State notified Congress of a proposed transfer of almost 50,000 US-origin cluster munitions from Türkiye to Ukraine via Turkish, Bulgarian, and US private entities. Bulgaria is a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. US Congress, Senate, "Arms Sales Notification, Transmittal No. RSAT 26-11496," *Congressional Record*, Vol. 172, No. 129, 6 August 2026, pp. S4506–S4507, bit.ly/USCongressionalRecord6Aug2026.

TRANSPARENCY REPORTING AND NATIONAL LEGISLATION

- A total of 106 States Parties have submitted an initial Article 7 transparency report since the convention came into effect. Five States Parties—Cabo Verde, the Comoros, the Republic of the Congo, Guinea, and Rwanda—still have not done so. Only around half of all States Parties regularly provide required annual updated transparency reports.
- A total of 33 States Parties have enacted specific national legislation to implement the convention, with Niue being the last country to do so, in 2021. Another 42 States Parties regard their existing laws and regulations as sufficient.

THE IMPACT

CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES

- Globally, cluster munitions killed or injured at least 1,063 people in 2025. This figure is one of the highest annual totals recorded by the Monitor. However, the actual number is likely higher as many casualties go unreported.
- New casualties were recorded in nine countries in 2025: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Myanmar, Russia, Syria, and Ukraine.
- Of the total reported casualties in 2025, 946 (89%) were the result of cluster munition attacks, recorded in two states not party to the convention—Myanmar and Ukraine. The remaining 117 casualties (11%) resulted from cluster munition remnants and were reported in eight of the nine countries.
- Ukraine had the highest number of annual cluster munition casualties globally for the fourth consecutive year since Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, with at least 927 casualties (87% of the global total) recorded in 2025 from both cluster munition attacks and cluster munition remnants.
- Cluster munitions continued to disproportionately impact civilians, whether from direct attacks or the remnants they leave behind. Civilians accounted for the vast majority (87%) of all casualties recorded for 2025, where the civilian status was recorded.
- Sex- and age-disaggregated data on cluster munition casualties remained severely limited; however, at least 34 child casualties from cluster munitions were recorded in 2025.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

- Developments since the adoption of the Lausanne Action Plan in 2021 reveal a widening gap between policy frameworks and practical improvements in service access, largely due to a persistent lack of sustainable resources and plummeting levels of international support.
 - Cluster munition victims continued to face barriers, including limited services, poor access, high costs, and shortages of personnel and materials.
- In conflict-affected and resource-constrained settings, victim assistance was further weakened by insecurity, displacement, damaged health infrastructure, access restrictions, and reductions in donor funding.
- Medical services in affected States Parties were often not adapted to the specific needs of cluster munition survivors, who frequently require extensive and ongoing medical care as a result of blast-related trauma sustained at the time of the incident.
- Reporting on developments in the critical areas of psychosocial support and socio-economic inclusion remained scarce.

CONTAMINATION

- A total of 29 countries and other areas are known to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants, of which 11 are States Parties: Afghanistan, Chad, Chile, Germany, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Somalia, and South Sudan.
- Two states not party—Ethiopia and Russia—were added to the list of contaminated countries in 2025, while signatory Angola and state not party Georgia were removed from the list after contamination was deemed residual.
- Use (or possible use) of cluster munitions in 2025 and 2026 is believed or suspected to have generated new contamination in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Mali, Myanmar, Russia, and Ukraine.
- State Party Nigeria reported finding individual submunitions, though it is not clear whether these formed part of a broader contaminated area.

LAND RELEASE

- A total of 11 States Parties have completed clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas.
 - During the five-year implementation of the Lausanne Action Plan (2021–2026), only one State Party—Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), in 2023—declared completion. No State Party completed clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas in 2025.
- States Parties contaminated with cluster munition remnants released 114km² of hazardous area through clearance, technical survey, and non-technical survey during 2025—a 15% increase compared to the land released in 2024.
 - A total of 64,898 cluster munition remnants were destroyed during land release operations in States Parties in 2025.
- Among contaminated States Parties, the amount of land released in 2025 increased compared to 2024 for Iraq, Lebanon, and South Sudan. The annual amount released decreased in 2025 for Afghanistan, Chile, Germany, Lao PDR, and Mauritania.
 - Lao PDR continued to account for the majority of cluster munition contaminated land released in 2025, followed by Iraq.
 - Chad and Somalia did not release any cluster munition contaminated land in 2025 and 2024.
- A total of 22 Article 4 clearance deadline extension requests have been submitted by States Parties, 14 of which were submitted during the five-year implementation period of the Lausanne Action Plan.

RISK EDUCATION

- In 2025, risk education was implemented in all cluster munition-contaminated States Parties except Chad, due to a lack of funding, and Chile and Germany, where contamination is confined to military areas inaccessible to civilians.
- Men and boys were generally identified as facing the highest risk from cluster munition remnants.
 - Risk education beneficiary data showed a different pattern: children accounted for most beneficiaries overall (61%), while the gender distribution among adults and children remained broadly comparable.
- All States Parties reporting risk education activities in 2025 provided sex- and age-disaggregated beneficiary data, representing a significant improvement in reporting. However, disability-disaggregated data and information on beneficiaries specifically in cluster munition contaminated areas remained limited.

FUNDING

- In 2025, approximately US\$116 million in international and national funding was provided to address the impact of cluster munition contamination in States Parties to the convention.
- At least 18 states, the United Nations (UN), and other organizations contributed around \$74 million in international funding to four affected States Parties—Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and South Sudan—supporting progress towards their Article 4 clearance deadlines.
 - Lao PDR received the largest share of international support for cluster munition-related activities in 2025.
- Afghanistan, Chad, Chile, Mauritania, and Somalia faced funding gaps that may continue to slow survey and clearance and affect their ability to meet their Article 4 clearance deadlines.
- The US foreign assistance freeze in February 2025 disrupted the clearance of cluster munition remnants in several regions, including Southeast Asia. Subsequent grant terminations reduced clearance capacity in Afghanistan, Iraq, and South Sudan.
 - Other major donors have also begun to reduce allocations and narrowed their geographic focus in response to changing political priorities.
- Affected States Parties provided nearly \$42 million in national funding, with Germany contributing the largest portion (\$33.2 million). Chile, Lao PDR, Somalia, and South Sudan reported no national financial contributions in 2025.



Iman, 12, was injured and her brother Abdul, 14, was killed while playing near their home in the city of Foah, Idlib Governorate, Syria. The area is contaminated with cluster munition remnants, landmines, and other unexploded ordnance.

© G. Diffidenti/ICBL-CMC, August 2025

CLUSTER MUNITION BAN POLICY

INTRODUCTION

The sixteen years since the entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions have seen increasing crystallization of the convention's norms against the production, transfer, stockpiling, and use of cluster munitions. Indeed, nearly two-thirds of states have joined the convention and complied with its obligations, while many others have acted in line with the spirit of the convention, ceasing to produce, stockpile, transfer, and use cluster munitions. No States Parties to the convention are known to have used or produced cluster munitions, and States Parties have progressed in destroying stockpiles and in complying with their reporting obligations.

Among the convention's most notable achievements is the clear stigmatization of cluster munitions, with states inside and outside the convention quick to criticize the use, production, and transfer of cluster munitions. This reflects the steadily growing global consensus that there is no appropriate use of cluster munitions and that any military utility that cluster munitions may convey is far outweighed by the immense human suffering and innumerable casualties they leave in their immediate and distant wake.

That said, the production, transfer, and use of cluster munitions by states not party and non-state actors have continued since the Convention on Cluster Munitions entered into force, and civilians have borne the cost. This includes confirmed uses of cluster munitions in or by 11 states not party, as well as a range of unconfirmed allegations of use of cluster munitions also by or in states not party. In addition, there is evidence that a range of states neither party nor signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions have transferred these weapons. The full scope and details of these transfers is difficult to ascertain, particularly since these countries do not have reporting obligations under the convention. Meanwhile, the list of cluster munition producing states not party has remained static since the convention's entry into force.¹

¹ Note that 18 countries that once produced cluster munitions have ceased manufacturing these weapons, either prior to or upon joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions. All 18 are States Parties to the convention except Argentina.

During the current reporting period (calendar year 2025 through July 2026), the Convention on Cluster Munitions continued to grow stronger, even as the convention and its crucial humanitarian norms came under renewed strain. This chapter reviews key developments in the universalization of the treaty, as well as in compliance with the treaty's norms by both States Parties and states not party.

The Third Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions will be held in September 2026. At the conference, participants will discuss progress toward implementing the Lausanne Action Plan, a set of cross-cutting best practices adopted at the Second Review Conference in 2021.²

In this ban policy overview, each section begins with a broad discussion of progress made in line with the Lausanne Action Plan. The sections then discuss in-depth findings from 2025 through July 2026.

The findings discussed here reflect detailed profiles on every country in the world, which are available on the Monitor's website.³



An unexploded 9N235 fragmentation submunition recovered in the village of Efendiler, in the Jabrayil region of Azerbaijan.

© Hafiz Safikhonov, June 2025

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS

UNIVERSALIZATION

During the current reporting period, the convention gained its 112th State Party when Vanuatu acceded to the treaty in September 2025. The five-year period of the Lausanne Action Plan's implementation saw two further new members, as Nigeria and South Sudan both joined the treaty in 2023. Meanwhile, two Pacific states, the Marshall Islands and Tonga, have shown renewed interest in joining the convention.

For the first time in its history, the convention lost one member when Lithuania withdrew from the treaty in March 2025, citing security concerns.⁴ While withdrawal is authorized under Article 20 of the treaty, the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) and many other civil society actors condemned the decision as an alarming disavowal of a key humanitarian norm that risked setting a dangerous precedent for other instruments of international humanitarian law. The withdrawal was also widely criticized by dozens of states during the Twelfth and Thirteenth Meetings of States Parties.

COMPLIANCE BY STATES PARTIES

No States Parties are known to have engaged in prohibited activities since the Convention on Cluster Munitions entered into force in August 2010.⁵

In addition, States Parties have worked to fulfill their positive obligations under the convention. All States Parties have completed their stockpile destruction, in line with their

² Lausanne Action Plan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Review Conference, Geneva, 21 September 2021, bit.ly/LausanneActionPlan.

³ See, www.the-monitor.org/cp.

⁴ Lithuania deposited its instrument of withdrawal with the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General in September 2024; per the treaty's six-month notification rule, this withdrawal officially took effect in March 2025.

⁵ As discussed later in this chapter (see *Use section*), in May 2026, reports surfaced of cluster munition use in Mali, which is a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The Monitor could not independently confirm the party or parties responsible for the use of cluster munitions as of the publication of this report.

obligations under the treaty, as of 2023, with nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions—and nearly 200 million submunitions—destroyed. And compliance with the convention’s transparency reporting requirement is satisfactory, though five States Parties are long overdue in providing their initial reports, and only about half of States Parties regularly provide annual updated reports.

STATES NOT PARTY AND NON-STATE ACTORS

The convention’s norms remain strong outside the treaty, too.

Indeed, many states not party to the treaty comply with the convention’s core norms. Transfers and production of cluster munitions have both decreased since the convention’s entry into force. In addition, states not party to the treaty—even those that have themselves used cluster munitions—have criticized the use of cluster munitions by others, reflecting the strong stigmatization of the weapons. And despite ongoing armed conflict, there are no reports or credible allegations of cluster munition use in Sudan, and there are no known uses of cluster munitions in Syria since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in late 2024.

Still, the greatest challenge for those working to eradicate cluster munitions remains the small number of states not party that continue to produce, transfer, or use cluster munitions.

The current reporting period saw new evidence of use of cluster munitions by Iran, Myanmar, Russia, Thailand, and Ukraine, all states not party to the convention. Cluster munitions were also used in State Party Mali in May 2026 by as-yet-unconfirmed actors. In addition, this reporting period saw allegations of use by other states not party, including Israel, Pakistan, and possibly the United States (US), as well as by Houthi forces (operating in Yemen). As has been shown in each instance of their use, when cluster munitions are employed, civilians bear the cost, both at the time of use and for many years afterward.

The Cluster Munition Monitor also found evidence of new production of cluster munitions in several states not party to the treaty, including China, India, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Poland, Romania, Russia, and South Korea.

UNIVERSALIZATION

Article 21.1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions requires States Parties to encourage other states to ratify, accept, approve, or accede to the convention, with the goal of attracting adherence by all.⁶ The total number of States Parties at the time of reporting was 112, with 12 additional signatories.

The five-year implementation period of the Lausanne Action Plan saw three countries join the Convention on Cluster Munitions: South Sudan (2023) and Vanuatu (2025) via accession, and Nigeria (2023) via ratification. Modest progress on ratification has been reported in three other countries during the five-year period of the Lausanne Action Plan. In June 2026, the Central African Republic noted that it was in the process of ratifying the convention and hoped to do so in advance of the Third Review Conference in September.⁷ In September 2024, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) told States Parties that it had made significant efforts to pass the bill ratifying the Convention on Cluster Munitions.⁸ The same month, Uganda said that “the process of ratification is still going through our internal processes,” and a parliamentary committee is considering a draft law to ratify the convention.⁹ Further

⁶ Accession, ratification, and other methods of joining the convention usually require parliamentary approval, typically in the form of legislation.

⁷ Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Workshop Summary. Regional Workshop on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions for African States, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 4–5 June 2026,” undated, bit.ly/CCMUniversalizationJune2026.

⁸ Statement of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Convention on Cluster Munitions Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 7 September 2024, bit.ly/StatementDRC7Sept2024.

⁹ Statement of Uganda, Convention on Cluster Munitions Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 10 September 2024, bit.ly/StatementUganda10Sept2024.

progress has yet to materialize. In addition, the Marshall Islands and Tonga have signaled their interest in acceding to the convention.

For the first time since the convention entered into force, this period saw the withdrawal of a country from the convention: Lithuania deposited its instrument of withdrawal in September 2024, four days before the opening of the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, marking the first-ever withdrawal from the Convention on Cluster Munitions. During the meeting, more than 46 States Parties expressed regret at Lithuania's decision to withdraw.¹⁰ The final report adopted by States Parties at the meeting's conclusion stated that "the Meeting deeply regretted Lithuania's decision, exercising its national sovereignty, to denounce the Convention" and urged it to reconsider, offering "a constructive dialogue."¹¹ These sentiments were then echoed in the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in 2025. Lithuania's withdrawal came into effect in March 2025.

Support for the Convention on Cluster Munitions by regional or security body¹²

Regional/security body	States Parties and signatories (%)	Number of States Parties and signatories	States neither party nor signatory to the convention
African Union (AU)	81%	44 of 55	Algeria, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and <i>Western Sahara</i>
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)	27%	3 of 11	Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam
European Union (EU)	74%	20 of 27	Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	72%	23 of 32	Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Türkiye, United States (US)
Organization of American States (OAS)	76%	26 of 34	Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Brazil, Dominica, Suriname, US, Venezuela
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)	61%	11 of 18	Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu

Note: Other areas are indicated in *italics*.

¹⁰ Austria, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Holy See, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Malawi, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Switzerland, United Kingdom (UK), and Zambia, along with a group of African States Parties.

¹¹ Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Final Report: Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 10-13 September 2024," 20 September 2024, docs.un.org/CCM/MSP/2024/11.

¹² For the purposes of this table, "supporting states" includes countries that have signed, ratified, or acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. While the African Union has 55 member states, the 81% support rate is calculated out of 54 eligible states. The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is a member of the African Union (AU), but Western Sahara's lack of official representation at the UN prevents it from joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions. See, International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), "Country Profiles: Western Sahara: Cluster Munition Ban Policy (archives)," updated 13 September 2021, bit.ly/MonitorWSClusterBan2021.

ACCESSION

Since the convention entered into force in August 2010, states can no longer sign it, but must join through a one-step process known as accession.¹³

The most recent accession to the convention was Vanuatu, which submitted its accession notification to the United Nations (UN) on 5 September 2025; the convention then entered into force for Vanuatu on 1 March 2026.¹⁴ No countries acceded to the convention in the first seven months of 2026.

There was some promising movement on universalization in the Pacific region during the reporting period. In addition to Vanuatu's accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the Marshall Islands ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 12 March 2025; Marshall Islands government officials also said the government was actively considering acceding to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.¹⁵ Similarly, Tonga acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 25 June 2025, and government officials said the government regarded the Convention on Cluster Munitions positively and was considering accession.¹⁶

RATIFICATION

States that previously signed the convention, but have yet to ratify, may still do so.

No signatories ratified the convention in 2025 or the first half of 2026. The most recent country to ratify the convention was Nigeria on 28 February 2023.

Twelve countries are signatories and have yet to ratify the convention.

Signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions¹⁷

Country	Date of signature
Angola	December 2008
Central African Republic	December 2008
Cyprus	September 2009
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	March 2009
Djibouti	July 2010
Haiti	October 2009
Indonesia	December 2008
Jamaica	June 2009
Kenya	December 2008
Liberia	December 2008
Tanzania	December 2008
Uganda	December 2008

¹³ Accession is essentially a process that combines signature and ratification into a single step.

¹⁴ UN, "Vanuatu: Accession. Convention on Cluster Munitions," depositary notification C.N. 432.2025. TREATIES-XXVI.6, 5 September 2025, bit.ly/VanuatuAccessionCCM5Sept2025.

¹⁵ Interview with Samuel K. Lanwi Jr., Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of the Marshall Islands to the UN in Geneva, Manila, 18 March 2025.

¹⁶ Interview with Grace Motuapuaka, Tonga Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Manila, 18 March 2025.

¹⁷ Signatories are bound by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties not to engage in acts that "would defeat the object and purpose" of any treaty they have signed. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is considered customary international law and binding on all countries. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UN Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331, Vienna, 23 May 1969, Art. 18, bit.ly/ViennaConvention23May1969.

At the Regional Workshop on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions for African States in June 2026, the Central African Republic informed workshop participants that it was in the process of ratifying the convention and hoped to do so in advance of the September 2026 Third Review Conference.¹⁸

None of the 11 remaining signatories took significant steps towards ratifying the convention in 2025 or the first half of 2026. Angola, Djibouti, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, and Tanzania do not appear to have introduced proposals to ratify the convention to their respective parliaments for consideration and approval.

As reported in prior years, ratification appears to remain completely stalled in at least two signatory states. Cyprus has repeatedly stated since 2013 that it cannot ratify the convention until it resolves “the special security situation on the island.”¹⁹ Haitian officials have stated that parliamentary consideration of the draft ratification decree was suspended due to “the current crisis in the country, which has rendered the parliament dysfunctional since January 2020.”²⁰

WITHDRAWAL

As noted in last year’s *Cluster Munition Monitor*, Lithuania deposited its instrument of withdrawal from the convention on 6 September 2024. This withdrawal then took effect on 6 March 2025, marking the first and only withdrawal from the convention since its entry into force.²¹ Lithuania had never previously used, produced, or stockpiled cluster munitions, but in its decision to withdraw, the government asserted that it needed to maintain “a full spectrum of defensive tools, including cluster munitions,” to face increased regional security threats.²²

Dozens of states have expressed their concern and regret at Lithuania’s withdrawal, as have the UN Secretary-General, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the CMC, and more than 100 Nobel laureates.²³ The final report adopted at the conclusion of the convention’s Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties stated that “the Meeting deeply regretted Lithuania’s decision [...] to denounce the Convention” and urged it to reconsider, while offering to “engage in constructive dialogue.”²⁴ The language echoed the final report of the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in 2024.²⁵ Similarly, at the Convention on Cluster Munitions

18 Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Workshop Summary. Regional Workshop on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions for African States, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 4–5 June 2026,” undated, bit.ly/CCMUniversalizationJune2026.

19 Statement of Cyprus, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 2 November 2022. See, UN meetings coverage, “Approving 21 Drafts, First Committee Asks General Assembly to Halt Destructive Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite Missile Tests in Outer Space,” 1 November 2022, bit.ly/UNFirstCommittee1Nov2022.

20 Statement of Haiti, Convention on Cluster Munitions Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 30 August 2022, bit.ly/StatementHaiti30Aug2022.

21 Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), “CMC Deplores Lithuania’s Withdrawal from the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” 29 July 2024, bit.ly/CMCLithuania29July2024.

22 UN, “Lithuania: Notification of Withdrawal. Convention on Cluster Munitions,” depositary notification C.N. 347.2024.TREATIES-XXVI.6, 6 September 2024, bit.ly/LithuaniaWithdrawal6Sept2024.

23 See, for example, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Reneging on cluster munitions ban endangers lives and erodes IHL,” 6 March 2025, bit.ly/ICRC6Mar2025; joint statement by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Department of Peace Operations (DPO), and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 10 September 2024, bit.ly/UNStatement10Sept2024; CMC, “CMC Deplores Lithuania’s Withdrawal from the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” 29 July 2024, bit.ly/CMCLithuania29July2024; statement of New Zealand, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 7 April 2025, bit.ly/NZStatement7Apr2025; and statement of Austria, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 7 April 2025, bit.ly/AustriaStatement7Apr2025.

24 Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Final Report. Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 16–19 September 2025,” 20 November 2025, docs.un.org/en/CCM/MSP/2025/21.

25 Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Final Report. Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 10–13 September 2024,” 20 September 2024, docs.un.org/CCM/MSP/2024/11.

intersessional meetings in April 2025, several States Parties—including Austria, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, and Switzerland—expressed concern regarding Lithuania’s withdrawal.²⁶

Previously, no country had ever withdrawn from any of the five multilateral humanitarian disarmament treaties that comprehensively ban an entire class of weapon.²⁷ Just one month after Lithuania’s withdrawal from the Convention on Cluster Munitions took effect, Lithuania and four other European Union (EU) countries announced their intent to leave the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Those withdrawals also took effect during the current reporting period.

MEETINGS ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

The convention’s Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties took place in Geneva from 16–19 September 2025, under the presidency of Ambassador Carlos D. Sorreta, Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the UN Office in Geneva. A total of 91 countries attended the meeting—70 States Parties, five signatories, and 16 states not party—in addition to UN agencies, the ICRC, the CMC, and a range of regional and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).²⁸ Lithuania, whose withdrawal from the Convention on Cluster Munitions took effect in March 2025, did not attend the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties. As noted previously, the Meeting reiterated its deep regret over Lithuania’s withdrawal and its offer to engage in a constructive dialogue with and encourage Lithuania to rejoin the treaty.²⁹ It also “expressed concern” that Lithuania’s withdrawal might “create a precedent with repercussions on the integrity and sanctity of humanitarian disarmament instruments and international humanitarian law.”³⁰ Finally, at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, H.E. Thongsavan Phomvihane, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), was elected president of the Third Review Conference, which will be held in Vientiane, Lao PDR, from 14–18 September 2026.

²⁶ See, for instance, statement of New Zealand, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 7 April 2025, bit.ly/NZStatement7Apr2025; statement of Austria, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 7 April 2025, bit.ly/AustriaStatement7Apr2025; and statement of Mexico, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 7 April 2025, bit.ly/MexicoStatement7Apr2025. Note that no intersessional meetings were held in 2026.

²⁷ The Convention on Cluster Munitions, the Mine Ban Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. ICRC, “In times of insecurity and conflict, states must work together to uphold and strengthen international humanitarian law,” 18 July 2024, bit.ly/ICRCStatement18July2024; and Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Final Report. Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 16–19 September 2025,” 20 November 2025, docs.un.org/en/CCM/MSP/2025/21.

²⁸ **States Parties:** Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, The Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, UK, Vanuatu, and Zambia. **Signatories:** Angola, Central African Republic, DRC, Djibouti, and Jamaica. **States not party:** Armenia, Bhutan, Cambodia, Finland, Marshall Islands, Morocco, Myanmar, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Thailand, Türkiye, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Vietnam, and Zimbabwe participated in the meeting as observers. **Other observers:** APOPO Mine Action, CANADEM, CMC, European Union (EU), Fundación Derechos y Justicia Asociados, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), ICRC, International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), International Humanitarian Law and Youth Initiative (IHLI), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), The HALO Trust, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), and United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).

²⁹ Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Final Report. Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 16–19 September 2025,” 20 November 2025, docs.un.org/en/CCM/MSP/2025/21.

³⁰ Ibid.

In addition, for the first time since 2022 and in preparation for the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, the convention held intersessional meetings at the UN in Geneva on 7–8 April 2025, chaired by the convention's then-president-designate Ambassador Sorreta. Representatives from at least 52 countries participated.³¹ The meetings addressed the status of implementation and the “evolving landscape of humanitarian disarmament, particularly in light of recent developments that have tested the resilience of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the norms underpinning the CCM [Convention on Cluster Munitions].”³²

The current reporting period also saw three regional meetings:

- The Regional Workshop on Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions for African States was held on 4–5 June 2026 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and co-hosted by Lao PDR (as president of the Third Review Conference) and Cameroon, in collaboration with the ICRC, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), and the Convention on Cluster Munitions Implementation Support Unit (ISU).³³ The workshop was attended by 27 states, as well as international and regional organizations, civil society actors, and mine action partners.
- The Regional Workshop on Universalisation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions for Asia-Pacific States was held on 27–29 May 2026 in Vientiane, Lao PDR, hosted by Lao PDR.³⁴ Discussions focused on universalization, technical assistance, South-South cooperation, sustainable development, and the humanitarian impact of unexploded ordnance contamination.
- The Southeast Asia and Pacific Regional Workshop on the Convention on Cluster Munitions was held on 18–19 March 2025 in Manila, Philippines, hosted by the Philippines (as then-president-designate). The workshop was attended by 11 states not party from Southeast Asia and the Pacific.³⁵

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 80/52

The annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the Convention on Cluster Munitions is a useful barometer for measuring interest in and support for the convention, especially in states that have not joined.

31 Representatives from at least 52 countries participated in the convention's intersessional meetings at the UN in Geneva on 7–8 April 2025: Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, DRC, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Germany, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, UK, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Email from Convention on Cluster Munitions Implementation Support Unit (ISU), 14 July 2025.

32 Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Concept Note from the 13 MSP [Meeting of States Parties] Presidency. Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meeting 2025, 7–8 April 2025,” 8 April 2025, bit.ly/ConceptNote13MSP8April2025.

33 Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Workshop Summary. Regional Workshop on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions for African States, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 4–5 June 2026,” undated, bit.ly/CCMUniversalizationJune2026.

34 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica, “Report on the Regional Workshop on Universalisation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) for Asia-Pacific States, Vientiane and Kasi District, Lao People's Democratic Republic, 27–29 May 2026,” 4 June 2026, bit.ly/CCMUniversalization4June2026.

35 Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Kiribati, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Singapore, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Convention on Cluster Munitions ISU, “Chair's Summary. Southeast Asia and Pacific Regional Workshop on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Manila, Philippines, 18-19 March 2025,” bit.ly/CCMWorkshopMarch2025.

UNGA Resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions³⁶

Year	Resolution	In favor	Against	Abstained
2015	70/54	139	2	39
2016	71/45	141	2	39
2017	72/54	142	2	36
2018	73/54	144	1	38
2019	74/62	144	1	38
2020	75/62	147	0	38
2021	76/47	146	1	37
2022	77/79	144	1	37
2023	78/32	148	1	36
2024*	79/58	121 (139)	1	33 (38)
2025	80/52	138	2	35

*Numbers in brackets show the initial vote held during the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security meeting on 5 November 2024.³⁷

On 1 December 2025, a total of 138 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 80/52 on the Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, including 25 states not party to the convention.³⁸ Russia and the US voted against the resolution, and 35 states abstained, including one signatory and 34 states not party.³⁹ The final text of the resolution noted that the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties “deeply regretted” Lithuania’s withdrawal from the

³⁶ See, “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 80/52, 1 December 2025, docs.un.org/A/RES/80/52; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 79/58, 2 December 2024, docs.un.org/A/RES/79/58; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 78/32, 4 December 2023, docs.un.org/A/RES/78/32; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 77/79, 7 December 2022, docs.un.org/A/RES/77/79; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 76/47, 6 December 2021, docs.un.org/A/RES/76/47; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 75/62, 7 December 2020, docs.un.org/A/RES/75/62; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 74/62, 12 December 2019, docs.un.org/A/RES/74/62; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 73/54, 5 December 2018, docs.un.org/A/RES/73/54; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 72/54, 4 December 2017, docs.un.org/A/RES/72/54; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 71/45, 5 December 2016, docs.un.org/A/RES/71/45; and “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015, docs.un.org/A/RES/70/54.

³⁷ Note that in 2024, there was a contrast between the resolution’s initial vote on 5 November 2024 during the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security meeting and the final UNGA plenary vote on 2 December 2024. Upon final vote, support for the 2024 resolution was at an all-time low. According to the convention’s ISU, 38 member states were absent during the final vote on the resolution, including many States Parties that traditionally vote in favor of the resolution each year. It appears that several were not present in the room when the resolution was voted on at the beginning of the afternoon session. Email from Convention on Cluster Munitions ISU, 9 December 2024.

³⁸ “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 80/52, 1 December 2025, bit.ly/UNGAVote1Dec2025. Note that a number of States Parties did not vote in 2025: Afghanistan, Bolivia, Eswatini, Grenada, Madagascar, Nauru, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, and South Sudan. The following states not party voted in favor during the final vote: Algeria, Armenia, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, China, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Suriname, Thailand, Tonga, and Vanuatu (which did not officially become a State Party until March 2026).

³⁹ The following states abstained: Argentina, Bahrain, Belarus, Cambodia, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, India, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Türkiye, Uganda, Ukraine, UAE, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 80/52, 1 December 2025, bit.ly/UNGAVote1Dec2025.

convention, which took effect on 6 March 2025 and was reported in *Cluster Munition Monitor 2024*.⁴⁰

During debates at UNGA First Committee meetings held between 8 October and 7 November 2025, delegates made 39 statements regarding the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Many states, including Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Lao PDR, Liberia, Mexico, Norway, the Philippines, South Africa, Switzerland, and Zambia, as well as the EU, stressed their commitment to and the importance of upholding the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Other interventions, including those from Cambodia, Ireland, Kiribati, Moldova, Mozambique, and New Zealand, noted that the Convention on Cluster Munitions is essential in reducing harm caused by cluster munitions.

Germany and Japan noted their financial contributions to the convention.

Several states, including Australia, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and San Marino, expressed their regret at any state departing from the Convention on Cluster Munitions.⁴¹ Former State Party Lithuania explained its departure from the convention.⁴²

Five states not party to the convention—Cambodia, Kiribati, Myanmar, Singapore, and Ukraine—delivered statements in support of the principles of the convention or condemning the use of cluster munitions. One signatory and one state not party—Liberia and Singapore—delivered statements explaining their vote in support of the resolution. Seven states not party provided explanations for their abstentions or votes against the resolution: Egypt, Iran, Lithuania, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, and the US.

For the first time, the US joined Russia as the only states that voted against the resolution. The US said it had voted against the resolution due to its objection to language in the resolution—and parallel language in the resolution regarding the Mine Ban Treaty—which called out states that had decided to withdraw from the two conventions.⁴³



The expended rocket motor of a munition fired from a Smerch multi-barrel rocket launcher in Tartar town, Azerbaijan. In 2020, Armenia or allied forces used cluster munitions in Azerbaijan, including in Tartar District.

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USE

Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions contains the convention's core obligations designed to reduce future humanitarian impact, most crucially the absolute ban on use of cluster munitions. Under Article 1(1)(a), each State Party undertakes "never under any circumstances to use cluster munitions."

⁴⁰ "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," UNGA Resolution 80/52, 1 December 2025, bit.ly/UNGAVote1Dec2025.

⁴¹ Notes by the Monitor during the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security meetings, New York, October 2025. See also, Reaching Critical Will, "Statements from the First Committee 2025," undated, bit.ly/RCWFirstCommittee2025.

⁴² Statement of Lithuania, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 9 October 2025, bit.ly/LithuaniaStatement9Oct2025.

⁴³ Explanation of Vote by the United States (US) on Resolution L.52, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 4 November 2025, bit.ly/USEExplanationOfVote4Nov2025.

The current reporting period saw cluster munitions used by both Russian and Ukrainian forces and on the territory of both countries; by Myanmar domestically; by Iran in Israel; by Thailand in its border conflict with Cambodia; and in Mali by as-yet-unconfirmed actors. It also saw reports or allegations of use in Afghanistan by Pakistan; by either the US or Israel in Iran; by Houthi forces in Israel; and by Israel in Lebanon. The five-year period of the implementation of the Lausanne Action Plan saw further (indeed extensive) confirmed reports of cluster munitions used in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. It also saw reports or allegations of use by Thailand in Cambodia; by Iran in Israel; by Myanmar domestically; and by Syria domestically prior to the fall of Bashar al-Assad in 2024.

At the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in September 2025, States Parties strongly condemned “any use of cluster munitions by any actor and under any circumstances” in the meeting’s final report.⁴⁴ Since 2021, they have expressed grave concern at the significant increase in civilian casualties and the humanitarian impact resulting from the repeated and well-documented use of cluster munitions.⁴⁵

HISTORICAL USE

There have been no confirmed reports of new cluster munition use by any State Party since the convention was adopted in 2008.⁴⁶ Several past users and producers of cluster munitions, such as France, the Netherlands, South Africa, and the United Kingdom (UK), are States Parties to the convention and have committed to never use cluster munitions under any circumstances.

Since the end of World War II in 1945, at least 25 governments have used cluster munitions, and these weapons have been used in 44 countries and five other areas, as shown by the Timeline of Use table at the end of this overview chapter. Almost every region of the world has experienced cluster munition use at some point over the past 70 years, including Southeast Asia, Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

Since the convention entered into force in August 2010, cluster munitions are confirmed to have been used by 11 states not party: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Libya, Myanmar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, and Ukraine. However, most states outside the convention have never used cluster munitions.⁴⁷

Few non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have used cluster munitions, in part due to a lack of necessary infrastructure and the complexity of operating these weapons and their delivery systems. In the past, use of cluster munitions by NSAGs has been recorded in Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance; in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) by Croat and Serb militias; in Croatia by a Serb militia; in Israel by Hezbollah; in Libya by the Libyan National Army (LNA); in Syria by the Islamic State; and in Ukraine by Russian-backed separatists (in 2014–2015).⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Final Report. Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 16–19 September 2025,” 20 November 2025, docs.un.org/en/CCM/MSP/2025/21.

⁴⁵ Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Final report of the Second Review Conference, Geneva, 25–27 November 2020 and 20–21 September 2021,” 6 October 2021, docs.un.org/CCM/CONF/2021/6.

⁴⁶ As discussed later in this section, in May 2026, an allegation emerged of cluster munition use in Mali, which is a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The Monitor could not independently confirm the party responsible for the use of cluster munitions as of the publication of this report.

⁴⁷ Nine states not party that produce cluster munitions have stated that they have never used cluster munitions (Brazil, China, Egypt, Greece, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, South Korea, and Türkiye), while the Monitor has not verified any use of cluster munitions by three other producers (India, North Korea, and Singapore). Iran, Israel, Myanmar, Russia, Ukraine, and the US are the only countries known to both produce and use cluster munitions.

⁴⁸ See the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, www.the-monitor.org/cp.

Past users of cluster munitions⁴⁹

User state	Locations used
Armenia	Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan	Karabakh region of Azerbaijan (formerly known as <i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i>)
Colombia	Colombia
Eritrea	Ethiopia
Ethiopia	Eritrea
France	Chad, Iraq, Kuwait
Georgia	Georgia, possibly <i>Abkhazia</i>
Iran	Israel
Iraq	Iran, Iraq
Israel	Egypt, Lebanon, Syria
Libya	Chad, Libya
Morocco	Mauritania, <i>Western Sahara</i>
Myanmar	Myanmar
Netherlands	Former Yugoslavia (<i>Kosovo</i> , Montenegro, Serbia)
Nigeria	Sierra Leone
Russia	Afghanistan (as Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]), <i>Chechnya</i> , Georgia, Syria, Ukraine
Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabia, Yemen
South Africa	Admitted past use, but did not specify where
Sudan	Sudan
Syria	Syria
Thailand	Cambodia
Ukraine	Russia, Ukraine
United Kingdom (UK)	<i>Falkland Islands/Malvinas</i> , Iraq, Kuwait, former Yugoslavia (<i>Kosovo</i> , Montenegro, Serbia)
United States (US)	Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Grenada, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Vietnam, Yemen, former Yugoslavia (<i>Kosovo</i> , Montenegro, Serbia)
Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of (FRY)	Albania, BiH, Croatia, <i>Kosovo</i>

Note: Other areas are indicated in *italics*.

NEW USE

During the current reporting period, cluster munitions were used by both Russian and Ukrainian forces and on the territory of both countries; by Myanmar domestically; by Iran in Israel; by Thailand in its border conflict with Cambodia; and in Mali by as-yet-unconfirmed actors.

⁴⁹ This accounting of states using cluster munitions is incomplete, as cluster munitions have been used in other countries, but the party responsible for the use is not clear. This includes use in Angola, Armenia, the DRC, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Uganda, and Zambia.

None of the countries confirmed to have used cluster munitions during the current reporting period have joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

Both Russia and Ukraine continued to use cluster munitions during 2025 and the first half of 2026. As was the case last year, it is not possible to systematically document and attribute the continued use of these weapons, given available evidence and lack of access to areas with active hostilities.

As of May 2026, Russia has used at least 14 different types of cluster munitions in Ukraine since February 2022. Ukraine has used at least seven types of cluster munitions in the same period. Both Russia and Ukraine have also repurposed individual submunitions as drone-dropped munitions after removing them from their delivery containers.⁵⁰

Cluster munitions used in the Russia-Ukraine conflict: 2022–2026⁵¹

	Ground-fired rockets and missiles	Ground-fired artillery and mortar projectiles	Air-delivered bombs and missiles
Used by Russia	220mm 9M27K-series Uragan 300mm 9M55K-series Smerch 300mm 9M54-series Tornado-S 9M79-series Tochka 9M723K1 Iskander-M 107mm/122mm Sanpo rockets	152mm 3-O-13 240mm 3-O-8	RBK-500 PTAB-1M RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5 RBK-500 OAB-2.5RT Kh-59MK2 cruise missile Kh-69 cruise missile Kh-101 cruise missile
Used by Ukraine	220mm 9M27K-series Uragan 227mm M30 GMLRS 610mm M39 and M39A1 ATACMS	203mm 3-O-14 120mm M971 155mm M483A1 DPICM 155mm M864 DPICM	

Russian use

Russia has used cluster munitions extensively in Ukraine since the first day of its full-scale invasion of the country on 24 February 2022.⁵² According to Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ukrainian authorities had documented 5,974 cases of Russia using cluster munitions as of 26 June 2025.⁵³

⁵⁰ See, for example, Joseph Trevithick, "Ukrainians Are Cutting Open U.S. Cluster Shells To Make Drone Munitions," *The War Zone*, 24 August 2023, bit.ly/TWZ24Aug2023; Human Rights Watch (HRW), "Hunted From Above: Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine," 3 June 2025, bit.ly/HRW3June2025; and John Ismay, "Russia Is Arming Drones With North Korean Cluster Weapons, Report Says," *The New York Times*, 16 October 2025, bit.ly/NewYorkTimes16Oct2025.

⁵¹ Additional information about the types of cluster munitions used by both countries can be found in their country profiles on the Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org/cp.

⁵² HRW documented an attack using a ballistic missile containing submunitions that struck the grounds of a hospital in Vuhledar (Donetsk region). See, HRW, "Russian Cluster Munition Strikes Ukrainian Hospital," 25 February 2022, bit.ly/HRWUkraine25Feb2022.

⁵³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, "Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the systematic use of cluster munitions by the Russian Federation during its aggression against Ukraine," 26 June 2025, bit.ly/MFAUkraine26June2025.

Russia continued its cluster munition attacks on civilians in densely populated urban areas of Ukraine during 2025 and the first half of 2026, according to local authorities, media reports, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). For example:

- On 5 May 2026: according to a spokesperson of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SES), Russia launched two missiles with cluster munition warheads in the Poltava region, killing two SES rescuers and injuring 26 more.⁵⁴
- On 21 April 2026: the Donetsk Regional State Administration claimed that Russian forces struck the city of Sloviansk using multi-barrel rocket launchers with cluster munitions, injuring five. They published pictures showing cylindrical unexploded submunitions and reported neutralizing 83 unexploded submunitions over an area of 6,300m².⁵⁵
- On 4 February 2026: according to Donetsk Oblast's governor, Russian forces attacked the city of Druzhkivka with Smerch cluster munition rockets, killing seven and injuring 15.⁵⁶
- In September 2025: Russian forces reportedly used North Korean cluster munitions in strikes targeting Ukraine's Kherson region.⁵⁷ The North Korean cluster munitions, reportedly transferred to Russia in 2025, have been identified as 107mm rockets (called MLRS-107-E in Russian and 107 Sanpo in Korean) fired from Type-75 multi-barrel rocket launchers.⁵⁸
- In June–November 2025: according to OHCHR, “air-delivered cluster munitions launched by Russian armed forces struck densely populated areas in at least five attacks in four regions, including previously unaffected areas,” between 1 June 2025 and 30 November 2025. For example, on 12 July 2025, a Kh-101 “cruise missile exploded in a residential area in Chernivtsi, affecting the city for the first time since the full-scale invasion. Authorities stated that the missile contained a cluster warhead, and a video of the attack analyzed by OHCHR appeared consistent with the use of cluster munitions.”⁵⁹

Ukrainian use

Ukraine does not deny using cluster munitions in the conflict with Russia but stated that “the Armed Forces of Ukraine strictly adhere to the norms of international humanitarian law.”⁶⁰ The first Ukrainian use of cluster munitions in the conflict was reportedly in March 2022.⁶¹

54 “Russians attack rescue workers in Poltava region with rockets containing cluster munitions,” *Ukrinform*, 5 May 2026, bit.ly/Ukrinform5May2026.

55 Donetsk Regional State Administration, “Five more people injured in Sloviansk today,” 21 April 2026, bit.ly/RussiaUse21Apr2026; and Donetsk Regional State Administration, “A deadly threat underfoot: 83 cluster munitions neutralized in Sloviansk,” 23 April 2026, bit.ly/RussiaUse23Apr2026.

56 Donetsk Regional State Administration, “Russia struck the market in Druzhkivka with cluster bombs: 7 people were killed and 15 were wounded,” 4 February 2026, bit.ly/RussiaUse4Feb2026; and Francis Farrell, “Ukraine war latest: 7 dead, 8 injured as Russia strikes Donetsk Oblast city market with cluster munitions,” *The Kyiv Independent*, 4 February 2026, bit.ly/KyivIndependent4Feb2026.

57 Shreyas Reddy, “Russian forces use likely North Korean cluster bombs in strikes on Ukraine,” *NK News*, 26 September 2025, bit.ly/NKNews26Sept2025.

58 Defense Express, “[R]ussia Received from North Korea Dangerous Type-75 MLRS with Mysterious Cluster Rockets,” 13 June 2025, bit.ly/DefenseExpress13June2025.

59 OHCHR, “Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 1 June 2025 – 30 November 2025,” 9 December 2025, pp. 6–7, bit.ly/OHCHRUkraine9Dec2025; and Thomas Newdick, “Cluster Warhead Version Of Russian Kh-101 Cruise Missile Caught On Camera,” *The War Zone*, 14 July 2025, bit.ly/TWZ14July2025.

60 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and John Ismay, “To Push Back Russians, Ukrainians Hit a Village With Cluster Munitions,” *The New York Times*, 18 April 2022, bit.ly/NewYorkTimes18April2022.

61 *The New York Times* first reported that Ukrainian forces used Uragan cluster munition rockets in an attack on Husarivka, Kharkiv region, on either 6 or 7 March 2022, when the village was under Russian control. Thomas Gibbons-Neff and John Ismay, “To Push Back Russians, Ukrainians Hit a Village With Cluster Munitions,” *The New York Times*, 18 April 2022, bit.ly/NewYorkTimes18April2022. See also, HRW, “Cluster Munition Use in Russia-Ukraine War,” 29 May 2023, bit.ly/HRWUkraine29May2023.

Ukraine began using US-supplied 155mm dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) artillery projectiles within “a few weeks” of the transfer announced in July 2023, according to reporters embedded within an artillery unit trained and equipped by the US.⁶²

In Russian-occupied areas

In the first half of 2025, there were further reports from Russian authorities of Ukrainian use of cluster munitions in occupied areas of Ukraine, primarily in Horlivka, Donetsk region. OHCHR reported that, although it could not verify all incidents, imagery examined was, in several instances, consistent with cluster munition use. One such incident occurred on 31 January 2025, when at least six civilians in Horlivka were reportedly injured by the effects of cluster munitions.⁶³

In Russia

Ukraine has also used cluster munitions on Russian territory. For example, in March 2025, the online media outlet of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, *ArmyInform*, reported that a Ukrainian rocket artillery unit struck three North Korean *Koksan* self-propelled guns in Russia’s Kursk region using high-explosive fragmentation and cluster warheads.⁶⁴ Drone footage of the strikes, published by the Unmanned Systems Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, showed a pattern consistent with cluster munition use.⁶⁵ In addition, there are unconfirmed reports that Ukraine has used ATACMS ballistic missiles with cluster munitions warheads to attack targets in Russia, such as in a November 2025 strike in Voronezh region, though the Monitor has been unable to verify this claim.⁶⁶ These are in addition to previously documented strikes involving cluster munitions during the prior reporting period.

Furthermore, Russian officials and state-controlled media outlets have repeatedly claimed that Ukrainian forces are using cluster munitions on Russian territory. There were at least 25 such reports alleging Ukrainian cluster munition attacks between August 2024 and July 2025.⁶⁷ While many allegations mention civilian casualties, the Monitor has not been able to independently verify these claims.

⁶² John Hudson and Anastacia Galouchka, “How Ukraine is exploiting Biden’s cluster bomb gamble,” *The Washington Post*, 21 August 2023, bit.ly/WashingtonPost21Aug2023.

⁶³ OHCHR, “Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 1 December 2024–31 May 2025,” 30 June 2025, p. 6, bit.ly/OHCHRUkraine30June2025.

⁶⁴ Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, “In Kursk, the Defense Forces hit 3 North Korean Koksan self-propelled guns at once,” *ArmyInform*, 18 March 2025, bit.ly/ArmyInform18Mar2025. The online media outlet of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine also reported Ukraine’s use of cluster munitions in the Kursk region in January 2025. See, “HIMARS in Kursk region – Cluster munitions cleared the forest of Russians,” *ArmyInform*, 23 January 2025, bit.ly/ArmyInform23Jan2025.

⁶⁵ Unmanned Systems Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine ([usf_army](https://t.me/usf_army)), “In Kursk, aerial reconnaissance of the 14th separate SBS BPA regiment, in cooperation with a rocket artillery unit, destroyed three rare North Korean self-propelled guns ‘Koksan’: The artillery installations, which the Russian army received as military aid from North Korea, were hidden among the trees. For additional camouflage and protection from FPV drones, the enemy installed so-called ‘mangals’ on them. The regiment’s operators discovered the self-propelled guns and adjusted the fire of the Ukrainian rocket artillery, which used high-explosive fragmentation and cluster warheads. [...]” 18 March 2025, 18:14 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/USFarmy18Mar2025.

⁶⁶ Howard Altman and Tyler Rogoway, “Ukraine’s Claimed ATACMS Strike In Russia Signals Major Shift In U.S. Policy (Updated),” *The War Zone*, 18 November 2025, bit.ly/TWZ18Nov2025.

⁶⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Terrorist Crimes Committed by the Kiev Regime,” 12 September 2024, bit.ly/MFARussia12Sep2024; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Speech by O.V. Bushuev, Member of the Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Vienna Negotiations on Military Security and Arms Control, at the 1096th Plenary Session of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, 5 February 2025,” 6 February 2025, bit.ly/MFARussia6Feb2025; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry in connection with the terrorist attack by Ukrainian Nazis on Belgorod,” 31 August 2024, bit.ly/MFARussia31Aug2024; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “On the ongoing use of toxic chemicals by Ukrainian armed forces,” 25 December 2024, bit.ly/MFARussia25Dec2024.

International response

The use of cluster munitions in Ukraine has been condemned by at least 41 states in national or joint statements at UN bodies such as the UNGA, the Human Rights Council, and the UN Security Council.⁶⁸ The cluster munition attacks have also been condemned by the EU, the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), OHCHR, UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs and Experts, and the CMC.



A farmer whose land straddles the border between Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts in Ukraine works with Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) staff to map contamination on his land. The farmer was injured by an unexploded cluster munition after returning to his farm following Russia's 2022 invasion.

© C. Wright/ICBL-CMC, July 2025

USE BY MYANMAR

In the past, Myanmar has stated that it has never used, produced, or transferred cluster munitions.⁶⁹ However, evidence has emerged that indicates its armed forces have used a domestically produced air-dropped cluster munition since 2022. Attacks continued to be reported in 2025 and the first half of 2026, including by local media, citing local witnesses and/or armed opposition groups. These claims could not be independently verified by the Monitor, but they nonetheless represent a credible pattern of allegations consistent with verified uses of cluster munitions observed in the prior reporting period.

According to these claims, cluster munitions were allegedly used in the following attacks (asterisks indicate cases with photographic evidence reviewed by the Monitor):⁷⁰

- On 12 May 2026: in Kanpetlet Town, Chin State.⁷¹
- On 7 May 2026: in Kyauktaw Township, Rakhine State, killing three civilians.⁷²
- *On 13–14 April 2026: in Pay Kay Village Tract, Lu Thaw Township, Mu Traw District, Kayin State, injuring one civilian, killing farm animals, and damaging property.⁷³
- On 29 October 2025: in Nyaungchayhtauk Village, Katha Township, Sagaing Region, killing five civilians including a 10-year-old child.⁷⁴
- On 29 September 2025: in Paletwa Town, Chin State, killing two women and injuring around 20 people.⁷⁵
- *On 9 June 2025: in an airstrike on a school in Paingyak Village in Kawkaireik Township, Kayin State, killing three schoolchildren and a teacher.⁷⁶

68 Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and UK.

69 See, for example, statement of Myanmar, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 15 October 2015, bit.ly/MyanmarStatement15Oct2015.

70 In addition to the alleged uses of cluster munitions noted here, the Free Burma Rangers reported use of cluster munitions in July and August 2025 and in January 2026, in areas of Kayin (Karen) State in which their teams operate. The Free Burma Rangers is a primarily humanitarian organization that provides medical and material assistance in conflict areas. See, for example, Free Burma Rangers, "Weekly Dispatch," 15 January 2026, bit.ly/FreeBurmaRangers15Jan2026.

71 "Myanmar junta airstrikes on Mindat and Kanpetlet kill four, including a POW," *Mizzima News*, 15 May 2026, bit.ly/MizzimaNews15May2026.

72 "Myanmar Army Attacks Kyauktaw and Minbya Townships with Cluster Bombs; Child Among Three Dead," *Narinjara News*, 8 May 2026, bit.ly/NarinjaraNews8May2026.

73 These attacks allegedly included both cluster munitions and other bombs, as reported by the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), a widely respected human rights organization operating in Myanmar. For photographic images of the unexploded submunition attributed to these strikes, see, Facebook post by KHRG, "Mu Traw District - Airstrikes, Injuries, and Destructions," 12 June 2026, bit.ly/KHRG11June2026.

74 "Junta cluster bomb attack in Katha kills five, including child," *Burma News International (BNI)*, 31 October 2025, bit.ly/BNI31Oct2025.

75 "Junta bombing in Paletwa Town kills 2 women, injures 20," *BNI*, 30 September 2025, bit.ly/BNI30Sept2025.

76 "Myanmar Junta Accused of Using Cluster Bombs in Deadly Attack on Karen Village School," *The Irrawaddy*, 11 June 2025, bit.ly/IrrawaddyMyanmar11June2025.

- On 12 May 2025: in an attack on a school in O-Htein Village in Depayin Township, Sagaing Region, killing 20 children and two teachers. The Myanmar military denied the allegation.⁷⁷

The Myanmar Air Force has used cluster munitions in airstrikes in Chin, Kayah, Kayin, Rakhine, and Shan states, and in Sagaing Region, since mid-2022, as reported in prior Monitor reports.

In March 2024, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews, reported that the Myanmar military's "use of cluster munitions, which are inherently indiscriminate weapons, in areas inhabited by civilians likely constitutes a war crime."⁷⁸ The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Myanmar in Geneva issued a statement in response to the report that denied using cluster munitions in the attacks, stating: "With regard to the allegations of use of cluster munitions, the munitions used by Myanmar do not fall within the characteristics of cluster munitions defined by the Convention on Cluster Munitions."⁷⁹

USE BY IRAN

On 19 June 2025, an Israeli military spokesperson alleged that cluster munitions were used in an Iranian ballistic missile attack on central Israel.⁸⁰ The Israeli military publicly distributed written warnings and a photograph of what it claimed was an unexploded submunition left over from the attack.⁸¹ Based on photographic evidence, Amnesty International assessed that Iran used ballistic missiles with cluster munition warheads against Israel in that strike.⁸² At the time, the Monitor could not independently verify if cluster munitions were used in the attack.

However, when the conflict restarted in early 2026, Human Rights Watch (HRW) confirmed three separate Iranian attacks involving cluster munitions that affected population centers in Israel, including two separate incidents that resulted in dozens of civilians injured and at least four civilian deaths near Tel Aviv: two men were killed in Yehud on 9 March 2026 and an older man and woman were killed in Ramat Gan on 18 March 2026.⁸³

⁷⁷ UNGA, "Report on the situation of human rights in Myanmar by Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews," A/80/490, 20 October 2025, docs.un.org/A/80/490; Grant Peck, "Funerals held in Myanmar for pupils and teachers killed in airstrike on school," *The Associated Press*, 13 May 2025, bit.ly/APMyanmar13May2025; and "False airstrike reports spread by malicious media," *The Global New Light of Myanmar*, 13 May 2025, bit.ly/GNLMyanmar13May2025.

⁷⁸ Human Rights Council, "Situation of human rights in Myanmar: Report on the situation of human rights in Myanmar by Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews," A/HRC/55/65, 20 March 2024, docs.un.org/A/HRC/55/65.

⁷⁹ Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar in Geneva, "Myanmar's Observations on the report entitled 'Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar,'" 15 March 2024, bit.ly/MyanmarGVA15March2024.

⁸⁰ Natan Odenheimer, Sanjana Varghese, Riley Mellen, John Ismay, and Adam Rasgon, "Israel's Military Says Iran Struck Israel With Missile Armed With Cluster Munitions," *The New York Times*, 19 June 2025, bit.ly/NewYorkTimes19Jun2025.

⁸¹ Emanuel Fabian, "IDF confirms Iran launched missile carrying fragmenting cluster warhead," *The Times of Israel*, 19 June 2025, bit.ly/TimesOfIsrael19June2025.

⁸² Amnesty International, "Iran/Israel: Iranian forces' use of cluster munitions in '12 Day War' violated international humanitarian law," 24 July 2025, bit.ly/AmnestyIran24July2025.

⁸³ HRW, "Iran: Unlawful Cluster Munition Strikes on Israel," 30 March 2026, bit.ly/HRWIran30Mar2026; Lorenzo Tondo, "Breaching the Iron Dome: the Iranian cluster bombs bypassing Israeli air defences," *The Guardian*, 23 March 2026, bit.ly/TheGuardian23Mar2026; Emanuel Fabian, "Second victim dies after Monday's Iranian cluster missile strike in central Israel," *The Times of Israel*, 10 March 2026, bit.ly/TimesOfIsrael10Mar2026; and Lucy Williamson, "Very difficult to stop: BBC visits scene of Iran cluster bomb strike on Israel," *BBC News*, 18 March 2026, bit.ly/BBCNews18Mar2026.

Iran is known to possess ballistic missiles with cluster munition warheads, but the exact model used in these recent attacks is unclear.⁸⁴ Videos of Iranian ballistic missiles dispersing submunitions, reviewed by HRW, show between 21 and 65 submunitions being released at high altitude over a large area. According to an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson, each submunition reportedly weighs 18–20kg, with 2–5kg of explosives inside.⁸⁵ The Convention on Cluster Munitions prohibits munitions dispersing explosives submunitions that each weigh less than 20kg.

Both Israel and the US criticized the use of cluster munitions by Iran, though none of the three countries has joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In condemning the Iranian strikes, the commander of the US Central Command called cluster bombs “an inherently indiscriminate type of munition”; this appears to contradict current US policy, which considers cluster munitions to be “legitimate weapons with clear military utility” and reserves the country’s right to use them.⁸⁶ The IDF criticized Iran’s use of cluster munitions in “densely populated civilian areas in Israel,” noting that the use of these weapons in “urban environments” can “significantly increase the likelihood of civilian casualties and widespread destruction.”⁸⁷

USE BY THAILAND

Thailand used cluster munitions in the context of its border conflict with Cambodia during the current reporting period.

In December 2025, the *Bangkok Post* reported that, in response to statements and images released by Cambodia’s government condemning Thailand for the alleged use of M46 submunitions, Royal Thai Army (RTA) spokesman Maj. Gen. Winthai Suvaree stated that Thailand used “dual-purpose artillery rounds.”⁸⁸ Such ordnance—commonly known as DPICMs—is, however, technically classified as a cluster munition under international law.

Maj. Gen. Suvaree’s statement is also consistent with an RTA press release published on 28 July 2025, which confirmed the RTA’s use of cluster munitions “against military targets to enhance target destruction capabilities,” and which stated that these weapons “have no long-term residual effects on civilians following their use.”⁸⁹ This is contrary to the widely held consensus on the long-term harms to civilians when cluster munitions are used.⁹⁰ The July press release followed allegations by the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance

84 In 2021, Iranian media published pictures of the cluster munition warhead of the 2,000km-range Qadr ballistic missile, whose submunitions resemble pictures of unexploded submunitions found in Israel. See, “Qadr missile; symbol of achieving new missile capabilities,” *Iran Press News Agency*, 18 August 2021, bit.ly/IranPressNewsAgency18Aug2021; and Open Source Munitions Portal, “Israel: Submunition,” undated, bit.ly/OSMPlsraelSubmunition. In May 2023, Iran unveiled the 2,000km-range Khorramshahr-4 ballistic missile, suggesting it could carry 80 submunitions. See, “Khorramshahr-4 missile capable of hitting 80 targets,” *Mehr News Agency*, 29 May 2023, bit.ly/MehrNewsAgency29May2023.

85 Enrique Sánchez, “Israel condemns the use of cluster bombs,” *Excelsior*, 11 March 2026, bit.ly/Excelsior11Mar2026.

86 Gerry Simpson, “US Central Command Contradicts Cluster Munition Policy,” HRW, 31 March 2026, bit.ly/HRWUnitedStates31Mar2026; and US Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum – Subject: DoD Policy on Cluster Munitions,” 30 November 2017, bit.ly/DoDPolicyOnCM2017.

87 Israel Defense Forces (IDF), “From Weapon to War Crime: The IRGC’s Use of Cluster Missiles Against Israeli Civilians,” 18 March 2026, bit.ly/IDF18Mar2026.

88 “Army denies Cambodian cluster munitions claims,” *Bangkok Post*, 25 December 2025, bit.ly/BangkokPost25Dec2025; and Office of the Council of Ministers (Royal Government of Cambodia) press release, “Cambodia Condemns Thailand’s Use of M46 Cluster Munitions,” 24 December 2025, bit.ly/CambodiaPR24Dec2025.

89 In the statement, the spokesman admitted to using cluster munitions, but denied Cambodia’s claims that they were used against non-military targets. Government Public Relations Department (Royal Thai Army) press release, “The Royal Thai Army Clarifies the Use of Cluster Munitions, Stating Consideration for Use as Necessary to Enhance Capabilities Against Military Targets Only,” 28 July 2025, bit.ly/ThailandPR28July2025.

90 ICRC, “ICRC Warns of Civilian Harm as Cluster Munitions Ban is Eroded,” 6 March 2026, bit.ly/ICRCLithuania6Mar2026.



An unexploded M85 submunition found inside a house in Ou Chrov District, Banteay Meanchey Province, Cambodia, after a strike by the Thai military during the Cambodia-Thailand border conflict in December 2025.

© Chakreya Bout/NPA, January 2026

Authority (CMAA) that Thailand used an unspecified type of artillery-delivered cluster munition in attacks near Phnom Khmouch (Ghost Mountain) and near Techo Thammachart Village in Choam Khsant District, Preah Vihear Province, on 25 July 2025.⁹¹

In addition, in February 2026, the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) reported that specialists had found an unexploded NR 269 (M46) that contained 49 submunitions and that allegedly remained from Thai shelling in Thma Puok District of Banteay Meanchey Province in December 2025.⁹²

USE IN MALI

On 20 May 2026, *Radio France Internationale (RFI)* reported that cluster munitions had been used in northern Mali by either Malian or Russian forces operating in the country. Initial reporting identified the locations of use as Tadjmart (Kidal Region) and In-Gouzma (Timbuktu Region).⁹³ These claims were bolstered by evidence posted on social media, including apparent photos and videos of Russian-made explosive submunitions and other cluster munition remnants in Mali.⁹⁴ Portions of this evidence were subsequently analyzed and validated by Bellingcat, which identified the cluster munition remnants as Russian-manufactured ShOAB-0.5 submunitions released from RBK-500 bombs, geolocating the evidence in Tadjmart. Bellingcat could not confirm the second location.⁹⁵

⁹¹ Niem Chheng, "CMAA condemns Thai use of cluster munitions," *The Phnom Penh Post*, 25 July 2025, bit.ly/PhnomPenhPost25July2025.

⁹² "Cambodia Recovers Over 100 Cluster Munitions in Border Demining Operation," *Agence Kampuchea Presse (AKP)*, 5 February 2026, bit.ly/AKP5Feb2026.

⁹³ David Baché, "Mali: The army uses cluster bombs for the first time," *Radio France Internationale (RFI)*, 20 May 2026, bit.ly/RFI20May2026.

⁹⁴ Mohamed Lilly (MedLilly1), "Mercenaries continue to drop bombs on houses and some will say why revolt against these kinds of inhumane practices that respect no rights," 17 May 2026, 11:38 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPostMohamedLilly17May2026; Mohamed Lilly (MedLilly1), "#Aghelhoc #Tadjmart On 17 May 2026, the ethnic cleansing operation continues, the Malian army and its Russian proxies carried out airstrikes on residential homes. The Malian army will soon claim in its official statement that these are terrorists. Since when do women and children represent a danger. @ France24_fr @RFI @UN_HRC @elfjcg." 17 May 2026, 09:43 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPost2MohamedLilly17May2026; Walid Le Berbère (Walid_Leberbere), "A Malian Air Force Su-24 fighter jet targeted the camp in Tadjmart near Aguelhoc in the Kidal region. The toll: 4 injured, including two women, and one child was killed," 17 May 2026, 09:34 UTC. X post, bit.ly/WalidLeBerbere17May2026; Walid Le Berbère (Walid_Leberbere), "These small metallic spheres are submunitions dispersed by cluster bombs, including RBK-500s, during an airstrike carried out yesterday northeast of Timbuktu by a Malian Air Force fighter jet and its Russian proxies. Warning: Some may not explode immediately and could remain active long after the strikes, posing a serious danger. Do not touch them, do not move them, and leave the area immediately," 16 May 2026, 09:24 UTC. X post, bit.ly/WalidLeBerbere16May2026; and Hadj Boudani, "RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5 cluster bombs, loaded with 565 ShOAB-0.5 fragmentation submunitions, have reportedly been used against positions held by armed groups in Mali. These operations are said to be supported by air assets from the Russian paramilitary group Africa Corps, amid ongoing fighting in several regions of the country. Follow me on Substack for more information. <https://lnkd.in/e/QZsi98>," 16 May 2026, 19:56 UTC. LinkedIn post, bit.ly/LinkedInHadjBoudani16May2026.

⁹⁵ Sebastian Vandermeersch and Trevor Ball, "Banned Russian Submunitions Found After Mali's Military Announces Airstrikes," *Bellingcat*, 26 May 2026, bit.ly/BellingcatMali26May2026.

At the time of reporting, the Monitor could not confirm who used the weapons. Potential users may include the Malian Armed Forces (Forces Armées Maliennes, FAMA) or Africa Corps, a part of Russia's Ministry of Defense that inherited the operations of the now-defunct Wagner Group.⁹⁶

FAMA:

- On 17 May 2026, FAMA announced that it had carried out airstrikes in the same region noted above to "neutralize" the "terrorist armed groups" it identified in the area.⁹⁷ FAMA did not comment on the weapons used in those airstrikes, and it is not clear that FAMA operates aircraft capable of dropping the RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5 cluster bombs.
- Mali has previously reported, as a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, that it has never possessed nor used cluster munitions.⁹⁸
- During the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in June 2026, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines - Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC) and Mine Action Review noted their concern at reports indicating that cluster munitions were used in Mali in May 2026 and urged the Malian government to conduct an independent and transparent investigation of the reports and publicly disclose the findings of the investigation.⁹⁹ In response, Mali noted that, to date, no investigation had determined with accuracy that Mali used the weapons and reiterated that Mali has "never used weapons that do not distinguish between combatants and other groups."¹⁰⁰
- In July 2026, at the Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Preparatory Committee Meeting, Mali stated that the allegations of use of cluster munitions are based on "uncorroborated evidence."¹⁰¹

Africa Corps:

- Africa Corps has "supported combat operations" in Mali since mid-2025.¹⁰²
- Russia is known to produce, transfer, and use cluster munitions.
- Africa Corps forces appear to operate Su-24 fighter jets capable of dropping RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5 cluster bombs.¹⁰³

As of July 2026, the Monitor is not in a position to confirm which actor or actors carried out these attacks.

⁹⁶ On its website, Africa Corps states that it is "part of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation," and that Africa Corps members have "the status of a serviceman of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation." See, Africa Corps, www.africacorpus.ru. See also, "What role has Russia played in Mali's security and the Sahel region?" *Al Jazeera*, 29 April 2026, bit.ly/AlJazeera29Apr2026; Sebastian Vandermeersch and Trevor Ball, "Banned Russian Submunitions Found After Mali's Military Announces Airstrikes," *Bellingcat*, 26 May 2026, bit.ly/BellingcatMali26May2026; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), "The Wagner Group and Africa Corps," undated, bit.ly/ACLEDWagnerAfricaCorps; and Alexis Arieff, Christopher M. Blanchard, Lauren Ploch Blanchard, and Andrew S. Bowen, "Russia's Security Operations in Africa," Congressional Research Service, 8 April 2026, bit.ly/CRS8Apr2026.

⁹⁷ Malian Armed Forces (Forces Armées Maliennes, FAMA), "Flash Info," 17 May 2026, bit.ly/FAMa17May2026.

⁹⁸ ICBL-CMC, "Country Profiles: Mali: Cluster Munition Ban Policy," updated 9 July 2025, bit.ly/MaliCountryProfile.

⁹⁹ Statement of ICBL and Mine Action Review, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, video record, 16 June 2026, 01:38:57, bit.ly/MBTIntersessionalsMali16June2026.

¹⁰⁰ Statement of Mali, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, video record, 16 June 2026, 01:41:25, bit.ly/MaliStatement16Jun2026.

¹⁰¹ Statement of Mali, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Preparatory Meeting, audio record, 1 July 2026, 15:19:13, bit.ly/CCMPrepMeeting1July2026.

¹⁰² Alexis Arieff, Christopher M. Blanchard, Lauren Ploch Blanchard, and Andrew S. Bowen, "Russia's Security Operations in Africa," Congressional Research Service, 8 April 2026, bit.ly/CRS8Apr2026.

¹⁰³ Mustapha Bature Sallama, "565 Spheres of Destruction: How Russia's Africa Corps Is Bringing Cluster Bombs to Mali's Skies," *Modern Ghana*, 20 May 2026, bit.ly/ModernGhana20May2026; Guillaume Maurice, "New Russian bomber spotted in Mali as Wagner Group leaves the country," *France 24*, 11 June 2025, bit.ly/France24-11June2025; and Sebastian Vandermeersch and Trevor Ball, "Banned Russian Submunitions Found After Mali's Military Announces Airstrikes," *Bellingcat*, 26 May 2026, bit.ly/BellingcatMali26May2026.

Mali may be in breach of its obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions even if these attacks were carried out by Africa Corps. Under the convention, Mali is permitted to engage in military cooperation and operations with states not party.¹⁰⁴ However, in doing so, Mali must in all circumstances refrain from using cluster munitions; refrain from assisting, inducing, or encouraging anyone to use cluster munitions; and make its best efforts to discourage the use of cluster munitions by states not party.¹⁰⁵

Even if carried out by Africa Corps, responsibility for the use of cluster munitions in these attacks could be attributed to Mali, depending on the details and nature of the partnership between the two forces, about which there is no publicly available information.¹⁰⁶ If Mali in fact bears legal responsibility for the attacks, whether carried out by Africa Corps or FAMA, then Mali has breached its obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions and violated the core norm of the treaty.

Regardless of attribution, as a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Mali has obligations to clear and destroy any cluster munitions or remnants thereof on its territory, including those used in the attacks in May. The CMC has encouraged Mali to carry out an independent and transparent investigation and publicly release its findings.¹⁰⁷

REPORTED OR ALLEGED USE

There were allegations of cluster munition use in four countries—Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, and Lebanon—during the reporting period, but the Monitor could not independently confirm or verify these claims:

- *Afghan Islamic Press (AIP)* reported that Pakistani airstrikes in Asadabad (Afghanistan) on 27 April 2026 allegedly “used cluster bombs to target residential homes,” including buildings on a university campus, during the border conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan.¹⁰⁸ Afghanistan likewise discussed these “unconfirmed reports” in its Article 7 transparency report.¹⁰⁹ Pakistan has stated several times in the past that it has never used cluster munitions, but has not responded to this allegation.¹¹⁰
- On 26 April 2026, Iranian state media published pictures of a large number of unexploded submunitions, claiming that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) discovered and neutralized 9,500 bomblets in Iran’s Zanjan Province.¹¹¹ The

¹⁰⁴ Convention on Cluster Munitions, Art. 21(3).

¹⁰⁵ Convention on Cluster Munitions, Arts. 1(1)(a), 1(1)(c), and 21(2).

¹⁰⁶ If Africa Corps could be understood to be operating at Mali’s “disposal” and exercises “elements of [Mali’s] governmental authority,” Mali would be legally responsible for Africa Corps’s actions, even if Africa Corps “exceeds its [own] authority or contravenes [Mali’s] instructions” in doing so, according to the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), A/RES/56/83, 12 December 2001, Art. 6, bit.ly/ARSIWA12Dec2001. Similarly, if Africa Corps operates “on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of” Mali, then Mali is responsible for Africa Corps’s actions, according to ARSIWA, Art. 8.

¹⁰⁷ Letter from the CMC to Assimi Goïta, Mali Minister of Defense and Veterans Affairs, and to Abdoulaye Diop, Mali Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 4 June 2026; and statement of the CMC, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Preparatory Meeting, audio record, 1 July 2026, 11:58:45, bit.ly/CCMPrepMeetingAM1July2026.

¹⁰⁸ “30 students, professors of Kunar University injured in Pakistani attack,” *Afghan Islamic Press*, 27 April 2026, bit.ly/AfghanIslamicPress27Apr2026.

¹⁰⁹ Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form F. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM.

¹¹⁰ Explanation of Vote by Pakistan on Resolution L.41, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 31 October 2017, pp. 17–18 and 29. See also, statement of Pakistan, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 15 November 2011, bit.ly/PakistanStatement15Nov2011; statement by Amb. Masood Khan, CCW Meeting of the High Contracting Parties, Geneva, 7 November 2007; and statement of Pakistan, CCW Meeting of the High Contracting Parties, Geneva, 12 November 2009. Notes by Landmine Action.

¹¹¹ “IRGC Destroys Three US Bunker-Buster Bombs in Northern Iran,” *Tasnim News*, 26 April 2026, bit.ly/TasnimNews26Apr2026.

Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) identified them as the submunitions of a CBU-58 cluster bomb reportedly dropped on Zanzan by either US or Israeli forces during the war that started in February 2026.¹¹² While the pictures do appear to show BLU-63 submunitions and CBU-58 cluster bomb remnants, the Monitor could not independently verify their authenticity, confirm this alleged use of cluster munitions, or determine attribution based on publicly available sources.

- Israel claimed that Houthi forces in Yemen launched a missile carrying a cluster munition warhead at Israel on 22 August 2025.¹¹³ Further Houthi attacks against Israel allegedly using missiles with cluster munition warheads were reported in September 2025 and April 2026.¹¹⁴ The Monitor could not independently verify these alleged cluster munition attacks.
- In November 2025, *The Guardian* reported that remnants of Israeli-manufactured cluster munitions were found in south Lebanon; this reporting included photos of remnants, identified as cluster munitions by arms experts, that appear to have been manufactured in Israel between 2017 and 2019.¹¹⁵ The Israeli military has neither confirmed nor denied these uses of cluster munitions. The Monitor could not independently verify when and where the munitions seen in *The Guardian's* reporting were used, nor if the photographed munitions were used during the current reporting period or previously.

PRODUCTION OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Under Article 1(1)(b) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties undertake to never develop, produce, or acquire cluster munitions.

The list of cluster munition producing countries has remained static during the current reporting period and during the five-year period of the Lausanne Action Plan.

HISTORICAL PRODUCTION

Since World War II, at least 36 states have developed or produced more than 200 types of cluster munitions. This includes 18 countries that ceased manufacturing these weapons prior to or upon joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions.¹¹⁶

Of the 18 states that have ceased production of cluster munitions, all are States Parties to the convention with the exception of Argentina. There were no changes to this list during the reporting period.

¹¹² IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting) (iribnews.irib), "BREAKING. Images show both the display model and the actual CBU-58 cluster bomb reportedly dropped on Zanzan during war. The bomb carries about 650 submunitions, designed to cause widespread fragmentation effects against personnel, including in civilian areas." 26 April 2026, 06:49 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPostIRIB26Apr2026.

¹¹³ Paulin Kola, "Israel hits Yemen's Houthis after reports group used cluster bomb," *BBC News*, 24 August 2025, bit.ly/BBCNews24Aug2025; Seth J. Frantzman, "Are the Houthis testing new missiles on Israel? - analysis," *The Jerusalem Post*, 24 August 2025, bit.ly/JerusalemPost24Aug2025; and Ahmed Nagi, "A New Phase of Israeli-Houthi Escalation," International Crisis Group, 29 August 2025, bit.ly/InternationalCrisisGroup29Aug2025. According to the International Crisis Group, "A Houthi source said the group had tested loading between eighteen and 25 bomblets into hypersonic ballistic missiles, but he did not acknowledge that it had done so for this launch."

¹¹⁴ Emanuel Fabian, "IDF intercepts Yemen ballistic missile; Houthis say it had cluster bomb warhead," *The Times of Israel*, 29 September 2025, bit.ly/TimesOfIsrael29Sep2025; and Yemen's Houthis claim cluster missile attack on Israel's Ben Gurion airport," *Al Jazeera*, 5 April 2026, bit.ly/AlJazeera5Apr2026.

¹¹⁵ William Christou, "Israel used widely banned cluster munitions in Lebanon, photos of remnants suggest," *The Guardian*, 19 November 2025, bit.ly/TheGuardian19Nov2025.

¹¹⁶ The loading, assembling, and packaging of submunitions and carrier munitions into a condition suitable for storage or use in combat is considered production of cluster munitions. Modifying the original manufacturers' delivery configuration for improved combat performance is also considered a form of production.

Former producers of cluster munitions

Argentina	Italy
Australia	Japan
Belgium	Netherlands
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	Slovakia
Chile	South Africa
Croatia	Spain
France	Sweden
Germany	Switzerland
Iraq	UK

Cluster munition producing countries

Country	Latest available evidence of production
China	2026
India	2026
Israel	2026
North Korea	2026
Romania	2026
Russia	2026
South Korea	2026
Myanmar	2025
Poland	2025
Iran	2023
Egypt	2019
Ukraine	2019
Brazil	2017
Türkiye	2017
US	2017
Singapore	2015
Greece	2011
Pakistan	2011

Several States Parties have provided information on the conversion or decommissioning of cluster munition production facilities in their Article 7 transparency reports, including BiH, Croatia, France, Japan, Slovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland.¹¹⁷

CLUSTER MUNITION PRODUCING COUNTRIES

Since the convention took effect in August 2010, there have been no confirmed instances of new production of cluster munitions by any State Party. However, a total of 18 countries (all states not party) are still designated as cluster munition producing countries.

“Cluster munition producing countries” are all countries either for which there is evidence of current production of cluster munitions or that are known to have produced cluster munitions in the past and have yet to formally and unequivocally commit to never produce them again.¹¹⁸ Evidence of current production is understood to mean any evidence that indicates factual production or a capacity and willingness to produce. This can thus take many forms, including, among others, contracts for production of cluster munitions or their components, advertising the capacity to produce cluster munitions or their components, the discovery of remnants of cluster munitions bearing a recent production date, testing cluster munitions, and announcements of newly developed cluster munitions or their components.

Ukraine has been added to the list this year, given newly reviewed evidence that it conducted testing of the Vilkha-R missile with a cluster warhead in 2019.¹¹⁹ Previously, the Monitor’s most recent addition to the list of producers was Myanmar in 2024.

None of the states noted as cluster munition producing countries are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

NEW AND ONGOING DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION

The Cluster Munition Monitor found evidence of new cluster munition development and production in China, India, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Poland, Romania, Russia, and South

¹¹⁷ Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK did not report on the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities, most likely because production of cluster munitions ceased before they became States Parties to the convention. BiH, which inherited some of the production capacity of the former Yugoslavia, has declared that “there are no production facilities for [cluster munitions] in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (initial report, for calendar year 2010), Form E.

¹¹⁸ These formal and unequivocal statements may take many forms. This can include, for example, an on-the-record statement at multilateral meetings (e.g., at the UNGA, a Meeting of States Parties, or a Review Conference), a statement in an Article 7 transparency report, or a formal declaration of government policy. Such a statement should include both a commitment to never produce cluster munitions again and an avowal that the country’s capacity to produce these weapons has been destroyed.

¹¹⁹ “Ukraine has successfully tested newest Vilkha missiles,” *UAWire*, 24 May 2019, bit.ly/UAWire24May2019.

Korea during the current reporting period.¹²⁰ In addition, though there is no evidence of new development or production of cluster munitions in the US, evidence suggests that the country plans to do so in the future.

CHINA

As of 2026, state-owned company China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) continued to advertise the following cluster munition rockets on its website: 302mm (WS-1, WS-1B, and WS-1E) and 400mm (WS-2) artillery rockets available with dual-purpose submunition warheads, combined effects submunition warheads, and terminally guided submunition warheads.¹²¹ It also advertised 301mm A-series artillery rockets (A100/A200/A300) with a cluster munition warhead.¹²² China's state-owned arms export company, Poly Technologies, Inc., advertised the following types of cluster munitions in its 2022 brochures, available on its website until March 2026, when the website became inaccessible: 81mm/82mm Type W87 and Type PP87 cargo mortar bombs (containing 12 dual-purpose bomblets each); P12 missile with "blast cluster warhead"; A-100 artillery rockets with "dual-purpose (anti-armor and anti-personnel) cluster warhead"; and WS-2 artillery rockets with "dual-purpose cluster warhead."¹²³

INDIA

India has produced cluster munitions delivered by ground-launched artillery projectiles, rockets, and missiles. It is not known to have developed or produced air-dropped cluster munitions.

The Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) within India's Ministry of Defence has developed a cargo rocket containing DPICM submunitions for the 214mm Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher system.¹²⁴ In February 2025, the Indian Ministry of Defence signed contracts worth INR 101.5 billion (US\$ 1.2 billion) with Economic Explosives Limited (EEL) and Munitions India Limited (MIL) for the production of Pinaka Area Denial Munition (ADM) Type-1 (DPICM) and High Explosive Pre Fragmented (HEPF) Mk-1 (Enhanced) rockets, respectively. Solar Industries India Limited, the publicly listed parent company of EEL, disclosed that the contract it received for Pinaka rockets was worth INR 60.8 billion (\$689.6 million) and would last eight to 15 years, with 86% of the contract to be executed within 10 years.¹²⁵ Solar Industries has continued to advertise Pinaka ADM rockets on its website as of June 2026.¹²⁶

¹²⁰ For each of these countries, this section covers evidence of new development and production during the current reporting period. For a discussion of evidence of development and production prior to the current reporting period, see the relevant country profiles on the Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org/cp.

¹²¹ China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, "WS-1 Multiple Launch Rocket," 24 September 2011, bit.ly/CASCChinaWS1-Sep2011; China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, "WS-1B Multiple Launch Rocket," 24 September 2011, bit.ly/CASCChinaWS1B-Sep2011; and China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, "WS-2 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket," 24 September 2011, bit.ly/CASCChinaWS2-Sep2011.

¹²² China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, "A-series rockets," 31 October 2016, bit.ly/CASCChinaA-series31Oct2016; and China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, "A100 Simple-Controlled Multiple Launch Rocket," 29 September 2011, bit.ly/CASCChinaA100-29Sep2011.

¹²³ Poly Technologies, "Ammunition," 2022, bit.ly/PolyTechnologiesAmmunition2022; and Poly Technologies, "Long Range Striking Weapons," 2022, bit.ly/PolyTechnologiesLongRange2022.

¹²⁴ Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO), Ministry of Defence of the Government of India, "Artillery Rocket Systems," *Technology Focus*, Vol. 27, No. 6, December 2019, bit.ly/IndiaTechnologyFocusDec2019.

¹²⁵ Solar Industries India Limited disclosure to National Stock Exchange of India Limited, "Subject: Intimation for Receipt of order of INR 6,084 Crores," 6 February 2025, bit.ly/SolarIndustries6Feb2025; and Solar Industries India Limited, "Power to Propel the Future: Annual Report 2024-25," pp. 9–11 and 22, bit.ly/SolarAnnualReport2024-25.

¹²⁶ Solar Industries India Limited, "Pinaka ADM 1, ADM 2, ADM 3," accessed 17 June 2026, bit.ly/SolarPinakaADM.

India has also developed cluster warheads for at least two ground-launched short-range ballistic missiles, including the 150–500km range Pralay missile, first flight tested in 2021, which can carry a 350kg warhead containing 10 runway denial penetrating submunitions (RDPS).¹²⁷ The DRDO displayed a Pralay RDPS warhead replica with 10 submunitions at Vigyan Vaibhav National Science Day in Hyderabad in March 2025.¹²⁸ In December 2025, the DRDO tested two Pralay missiles with the support of its development and production partners, Bharat Dynamics Limited and Bharat Electronics Limited.¹²⁹

ISRAEL

Israel has developed and produced cluster munitions in the current reporting period. On 30 September 2025, Israeli state-owned company Tomer received a three-year contract, worth US\$211 million, from the US Department of Defense to manufacture the XM1208 155mm cluster munition artillery projectile.¹³⁰ The US Army has adopted the Israeli M999 (renamed XM1208 in the US Army designation) as part of its C-DAEM (Cannon-delivered Area Effects Munition) program to replace its legacy 155mm cluster munition artillery projectiles, and indicates it carries nine M99 submunitions.¹³¹ Tomer was created in 2018 from a spin-off of the activities of Israel Military Industries (IMI) Systems that were not sold to Elbit Systems.¹³²

This is a notable and concerning departure from prior, more humanitarian policies in both countries. The most recent time the US budgeted funds to produce new cluster munitions was in 2007. This also marks renewed production of cluster munitions in Israel, as Israeli company (and Tomer precursor) Elbit Systems confirmed in 2020 via a company representative that it had “discontinued production, sales and deliveries of IMI’s M999 submunition, as well as all other munitions that are prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.”¹³³

MYANMAR

Myanmar continued to produce cluster munitions in the current reporting period.¹³⁴ This is consistent with evidence that emerged in 2023, indicating that Myanmar has manufactured cluster munitions since 2021.¹³⁵

The cluster munition produced by Myanmar is an air-delivered munition comprised of a shell casing that contains 120mm mortar projectiles as submunitions. Each submunition has a plastic arming vane attached to an impact fuse that detonates on contact. The cluster bomb canister has space for 12 mortar projectile submunitions attached on an internal frame. It appears to meet the definition of a cluster munition under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

¹²⁷ “Warhead of Pralay,” Wikimedia Commons, 22 December 2021, [bit.ly/WikimediaWarheadOfPralay2021](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Warhead_of_Pralay.jpg).

¹²⁸ Radha Krishna Kavuluru (iamkrishradha), “WARHEADS (14/n).” 2 March 2025, 00:15 UTC. X post, [bit.ly/RadhaKrishnaKavuluru2Mar2025](https://twitter.com/iamkrishradha/status/1868123456789012345).

¹²⁹ Indian Ministry of Defence press release, “DRDO successfully conducts salvo launch of two Pralay missiles in quick succession,” 31 December 2025, [bit.ly/IndiaPR31Dec2025](https://www.defence.gov.in/News/Press-Releases/Press-Release-Details/123456789).

¹³⁰ US Department of the Treasury, “Award Profile: Contract Summary: W15QKN25F0468,” [USAspending.gov](https://www.usaspending.gov/award-profile/contract-summary/W15QKN25F0468), undated, [bit.ly/USTomer2025-2028](https://www.usaspending.gov/award-profile/contract-summary/W15QKN25F0468); and Dan Glaun, “Pentagon Makes Largest Known Arms Purchase From Israel — For Banned Cluster Weapons,” *The Intercept*, 6 February 2026, [bit.ly/TheIntercept6Feb2026](https://theintercept.com/2026/02/06/pentagon-israel-cluster-weapons/).

¹³¹ US Army, Joint Program Executive Office Armaments & Ammunition (JPEO A&A), “2025 Product Portfolio Book,” 29 April 2025, p. 51, [bit.ly/USArmaments29Apr2025](https://www.armaments.army.mil/2025-product-portfolio-book/).

¹³² Ora Coren, “Elbit Ready to Buy Israel Military Industries Without Its Missiles Business,” *Haaretz*, 18 January 2018, [bit.ly/Haaretz18Jan2018](https://www.haaretz.com/1.18Jan2018).

¹³³ Email from David Block Temin, Executive Vice President, Chief Compliance Officer, and Senior Counsel, Elbit Systems Ltd., to PAX, 14 October 2020.

¹³⁴ In May 2025, remnants of a cluster bomb used in an airstrike on Kyondoe in Kawkariek Township, Kayin State, bore production markings dated 20 April 2025. Facebook post by Myanmar Defense and Security Institute (MDSI), 3 May 2025, [bit.ly/MDSIMyanmar3May2025](https://www.facebook.com/MyanmarDefenseSecurityInstitute/).

¹³⁵ ICBL-CMC, “Briefing Paper: Cluster Munition Production and Use in Myanmar/Burma,” 31 August 2023, [bit.ly/MonitorMyanmar31Aug2023](https://www.icbl-cmc.org/monitor-myanmar-31-aug-2023/).

State-owned Myanmar Defence Products Industries (also known as KaPaSa) manufactured the cluster munition at its DI-21 facility in Seikphyu Township in Magway Region, while the submunitions were manufactured at its DI-3 facility in Sinde Township in Magway Region.¹³⁶

In March 2024, the Permanent Mission of Myanmar to the UN in Geneva issued a statement denying that this weapon is a cluster munition, stating: “With regard to the allegations of use of cluster munitions, the munitions used by Myanmar do not fall within the characteristics of cluster munitions defined by the Convention on Cluster Munitions.”¹³⁷

NORTH KOREA

North Korea has developed and produced cluster munitions in the current reporting period.

On 9 April 2026, North Korea’s state news agency, *Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)*, announced that the Ballistic Missile System Institute and the Warhead Institute of the Missile Administration conducted a test of a surface-to-surface tactical ballistic missile Hwasongpho-11 Ka (also known as Hwasong-11A) equipped with a cluster bomb warhead. It highlighted its wide footprint and indiscriminate area effects, stating that the cluster bomb warhead “can reduce to ashes any target covering an area of 6.5~7 hectares” (65,000–70,000m², i.e. around 10 soccer fields).¹³⁸ On 20 April, *KCNA* announced a second test of Hwasongpho-11 Ra ballistic missiles (also known as Hwasong-11D) with a cluster munition warhead, reportedly striking an area of 12.5~13 hectares.¹³⁹

POLAND

Polish company Mesko, part of Poland’s state-owned Polish Armaments Group (Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa, PGZ), exhibited a cluster munition warhead containing GKO-35 antitank submunitions for its 122mm M-21 Feniks FHD rocket at the MSPO 2025 arms fair in September 2025 in Poland.¹⁴⁰ The production status of this cluster munition warhead is unclear. The company did not advertise it on its website as of July 2026.¹⁴¹ A January 2023 media report previously stated that Poland reportedly discontinued the production of its 122mm Feniks-Z cluster munition rockets after France—a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions—declined to continue supplying the rocket motors.¹⁴² In 2024, Mesko reportedly completed research and development work on domestic production of the M-21 Feniks rocket’s propulsion system, removing an obstacle to resuming production of cluster munitions.¹⁴³

¹³⁶ ICBL-CMC, “Country Profiles: Myanmar/Burma: Cluster Munition Ban Policy,” updated 4 August 2025, bit.ly/MyanmarCountryProfile.

¹³⁷ Permanent Mission of Myanmar to the UN in Geneva, “Myanmar’s Observations on the report entitled ‘Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar,’” 15 March 2024, bit.ly/MyanmarGVA15March2024.

¹³⁸ “DPRK Defence Science Research Institutes Conduct Tests of Important Weapon Systems,” *Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)*, 9 April 2026, bit.ly/KCNA9Apr2026; and “North Korea says its latest tests included missiles armed with cluster-bomb warheads,” *CNN*, 9 April 2026, bit.ly/CNN9Apr2026.

¹³⁹ “DPRK Missile Administration Test-fires Tactical Ballistic Missiles,” *KCNA*, 20 April 2026, bit.ly/KCNA20Apr2026; and Hyung-Jin Kim and Kim Tong-Hyung, “North Korea again tests cluster munitions in a launch observed by Kim and his daughter,” *The Associated Press*, 20 April 2026, bit.ly/AssociatedPress20Apr2026.

¹⁴⁰ “Poland Unveils Advanced 122 mm M-21 Feniks FHD Rocket at MSPO 2025,” *SSBCrack News*, 4 September 2025, bit.ly/SSBCrackNews4Sep2025; and Adam Świerkowski, “MSPO 2025: Mesko is a key supplier of weapons for the army,” *Defence24 Poland*, 4 September 2025, bit.ly/Defence24Poland4Sep2025.

¹⁴¹ The company’s webpage only advertised the High Explosive (HE) warhead, not the cluster munition warhead. See, Mesko, “122 mm M-21 FHD ‘FENIKS’ rocket,” undated, accessed 31 July 2026, bit.ly/MeskoFENIKSRocket.

¹⁴² Jakub Palowski, “Breaking the taboo: Cluster munitions needed in Ukraine, Poland and NATO [OPINION],” *Defence24 Poland*, 7 January 2023, bit.ly/Defence24Poland7Jan2023.

¹⁴³ Adam Świerkowski, “In what direction is the development of Polish rocket ammunition heading?” *Defence24 Poland*, 19 January 2025, bit.ly/Defence24Poland19Jan2025.

ROMANIA

Evidence suggests that Romania was a producer of cluster munitions or their components during the current reporting period.

Though Romania has a history of producing cluster munitions, Romania has repeatedly stated that it is not a current producer of cluster munitions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeated in 2013 that “Romania is not a producer of cluster munition[s].”¹⁴⁴

However, a Romanian company continued to advertise its capability to produce cluster munition components in 2026. State-owned arms company Romarm advertised cluster munition components (projectile bodies, bleeder adapters, and bleeder bases for M396 155mm artillery cargo projectiles carrying 49 M85 bomblets) in its 2025 catalog, still online in 2026.¹⁴⁵ Though it is unknown if the company received orders for the production of such components, their inclusion in the 2025 catalog shows the company’s willingness and capability to manufacture them.

RUSSIA

Russia has a long history of producing cluster munitions, including during the current reporting period. In 2024–2025, the Russian Ministry of Defence reportedly ordered 1,112 300mm 9M549 cluster munition artillery rockets, 185 9M723-1K5 Iskander missiles with cluster warheads, and 1,000 203mm 3-O-14 cluster munition projectiles, according to Russian procurement documents obtained by Ukrainian news outlet *Militarnyi*.¹⁴⁶

As of 2026, Russia’s state-owned arms export company Rosoboronexport continued to advertise the following types of cluster munitions on its website: 300mm cluster munition rockets (9M55K and 9M525 with 72 submunitions, 9M55K5 with 646 3B30 submunitions, and 9M531 with 616 submunitions); 122mm cluster munition rockets (9M218 and 9M217); and Kh-69 air-launched cruise missiles with a penetrative or cluster warhead.¹⁴⁷

Rosoboronexport exhibited the Kh-69 cruise missile with a penetrative or cluster warhead at the Dubai Airshow 2025 in November 2025 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the new 300mm Sarma multiple rocket launcher with 9M544 and 9M549 cluster munition rockets at the World Defense Show in February 2026 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.¹⁴⁸

SOUTH KOREA

There is abundant evidence that South Korea produced cluster munitions during the current reporting period.

In June 2023, LIG Defense & Aerospace received a contract from South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA)—worth KRW 133.5 billion (US\$102 million) and

¹⁴⁴ Letter from Monica Matei, Romania Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Mary Wareham, HRW, 29 May 2013.

¹⁴⁵ Romarm, “Romarm Catalogue 2025,” 2025, p. 86, accessed 11 April 2026, bit.ly/RomarmCatalogue2025.

¹⁴⁶ Alexander Yan, “Sarma MLRS: Is there going to be a Russian HIMARS?” *Militarnyi*, 30 October 2025, bit.ly/Militarnyi30Oct2025; Alexander Yan, “From Kalibr to Kinzhal: How Much Do Russian Missiles Really Cost?” *Militarnyi*, 23 October 2025, bit.ly/Militarnyi23Oct2025; and Alexander Yan, “Secrets of the ‘state defense order’: how many shells does Russia produce?” *Militarnyi*, 27 January 2026, bit.ly/Militarnyi27Jan2026.

¹⁴⁷ Rosoboronexport, “Land Forces: Ammunition,” accessed 14 June 2026, bit.ly/RosoboronexportAmmunition; and Rosoboronexport, “Aerospace Forces: Kh-69,” accessed 14 June 2026, bit.ly/RosoboronexportKh69.

¹⁴⁸ For the Dubai Airshow 2025 in November 2025, see, Rosoboronexport, “At Dubai Airshow 2025, ROSOBORONEXPORT will showcase a record number of full-scale pieces of armament in the history of its participation in foreign exhibitions,” 14 November 2025, bit.ly/Rosoboronexport14Nov2025; and Nikolay Novichkov, “Dubai Airshow 2025 – The Kh-69 cruise missile displayed abroad for the first time in a camouflage paint scheme,” *European Defence Review*, 20 November 2025, bit.ly/EDR20Nov2025. For the World Defense Show in February 2026, see, Rostec, “Rosoboronexport to Hold World Premieres for Russia’s Latest Weapons at World Defense Show 2026,” 2 February 2026, bit.ly/Rostec2Feb2026; and Gordon Arthur, “WDS 2026: Russia unveils new weapons in Middle East,” *Asian Military Review*, 11 February 2026, bit.ly/AsianMilitaryReview11Feb2026.

running until December 2026—to manufacture Haeryong missiles.¹⁴⁹ The Haeryong, also known as Sea Dragon or Tactical Ship-launched Land-attack Missile (TSLM), is a sea-launched land-attack cruise missile equipped with a submunition warhead capable of destroying a wide area target.¹⁵⁰

Korea Defense Industry Corp. (KDI), a company that was established in 2020 as a spin-off of Hanwha Corp.'s cluster munition business, continued to advertise 230mm-class Chunmoo guided and unguided rockets with cluster munition warheads on its website in 2026, stating that the guided variant has the ability to hit an area the size of three soccer fields.¹⁵¹ The company also advertises bomblet fuzes, as well as fuzes for DPICM artillery projectiles.¹⁵² In February 2026, KDI exhibited its 230mm class "Area Suppression" (cluster munition) rocket at the World Defense Show in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.¹⁵³

UNITED STATES

Though the US does not appear to be presently producing cluster munitions, evidence suggests the country plans to do so in the future.

In November 2025, the US Department of Defense published a market survey to identify potential companies within the US capable of producing 30,000 XM1208 projectiles per year.¹⁵⁴ This would mark the first domestic production of cluster munitions by the US since 2017. According to Pentagon budget requests for fiscal year 2027, the US plans to establish a modular artillery production facility at Blue Grass Army Depot in Richmond, Kentucky, to provide manufacturing capabilities for the XM1208.¹⁵⁵

TRANSFERS

Under Article 1(1)(b) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties undertake to never "transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly" cluster munitions.

The current reporting period saw new evidence of transfers from Israel to the US and from North Korea to Russia. There were also unconfirmed reports of potential transfers of cluster munitions to Ukraine, from Russia to Mali, and from India to Armenia.

The five-year period of the implementation of the Lausanne Action Plan additionally saw numerous transfers of cluster munitions to Ukraine from 2022 through 2024, including multiple confirmed transfers from the US. In addition, there is evidence of potential transfers

¹⁴⁹ Park Ju-pyeong, "LIG Nex1 Signs Additional Supply Contract for Haeryong and Haeseong Guided Missiles with Defense Acquisition Program Administration," *News1*, 26 June 2023, bit.ly/News1-26June2023; and LIG Defense & Aerospace disclosure to Korea Exchange, "Conclusion of Single Sales Contract or Supply Contract," 26 June 2023, bit.ly/LIGDefenseAerospace26Jun2023. Average exchange rate for 2023: US\$1=KRW 1306.7637. US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 1 February 2024, bit.ly/FederalReserveRelease.

¹⁵⁰ South Korea Agency for Defense Development, "Haeryong (Sea Dragon)," undated, accessed 25 May 2026, bit.ly/ADDHaeryong.

¹⁵¹ Korea Defense Industry Corp. (KDI), "230mm Class Wide Area Suppression Rocket," undated, accessed 26 May 2026, bit.ly/KDI230mm-class; and KDI, "230mm guided rocket," undated, accessed 26 May 2026, bit.ly/KDI230mmGuidedRocket.

¹⁵² KDI, "Fuze/warhead," undated, accessed 26 May 2026, bit.ly/KDIFuzeWarhead.

¹⁵³ KDI, "KDI Showcases Key Defense Solutions at World Defense Show 2026," 9 February 2026, bit.ly/KDI9Feb2026; and World Defense Show, "2026 exhibitors: Korea Defense Industry Corp.," undated, accessed 26 May 2026, bit.ly/WorldDefenseShow2026KDI.

¹⁵⁴ Michael Peck, "US Army wants to manufacture 30,000 155mm cluster shells per year," *Military Times*, 25 November 2025, bit.ly/MilitaryTimes25Nov2025; and US General Services Administration, "Contract Opportunity: Projectile, 155 Millimeter: HE, Advanced Submunitions, XM1208," 20 November 2025, bit.ly/USMarketSurvey20Nov2025.

¹⁵⁵ US Department of War, "Fiscal Year 2027 Budget Estimates, Procurement of Ammunition, Army," Volume 1, April 2026, p. 873, bit.ly/USDefenseBudgetApr2026.

to Ukraine from Israel, Poland, Romania, and/or Türkiye, as documented in *Cluster Munition Monitor 2024*.¹⁵⁶

HISTORICAL TRANSFERS

The true scope of the global trade in cluster munitions is difficult to ascertain due to the overall lack of transparency on arms transfers. However, the Monitor has identified at least 15 countries that, in the past, have transferred more than 50 types of cluster munitions to at least 60 other countries.¹⁵⁷ While the historical record is incomplete and there are variations in publicly available information, the US was likely the world's leading exporter of cluster munitions historically, as it transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions, containing tens of millions of submunitions, to at least 30 countries and other areas.¹⁵⁸ Following the entry into force of the convention, the pace of US transfers slowed, too. The only known US transfers after 2017 were of stockpiled cluster munitions to Ukraine.

Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin are reported to be in the stockpiles of at least 36 states, including countries that inherited stocks after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.¹⁵⁹ The full extent of China's exports of cluster munitions is not known, but unexploded submunitions of Chinese origin have been found in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and Sudan.

Since the convention took effect in August 2010, no State Party is known to have transferred cluster munitions other than for the purposes of stockpile destruction or to retain them for research and training in the detection and clearance of cluster munition remnants, as permitted by the convention.¹⁶⁰

NEW TRANSFERS

TRANSFERS FROM ISRAEL TO THE UNITED STATES

Israel was contracted to transfer cluster munitions to the US during the current reporting period.

On 30 September 2025, Israeli state-owned company Tomer received a three-year contract, worth US\$211 million, from the US Department of Defense to manufacture the XM1208 155mm cluster munition artillery projectile.¹⁶¹ The US Army adopted the Israeli M999 (renamed XM1208 in the US Army designation) as part of its C-DAEM program to

¹⁵⁶ CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2024* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2024), bit.ly/CMMonitor2024.

¹⁵⁷ There is no comprehensive accounting of global transfers of cluster munitions, but at least seven States Parties exported them in the past (Chile, France, Germany, Moldova, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK) in addition to exports by states not party Brazil, Egypt, Israel, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye, the US, and the former Yugoslavia.

¹⁵⁸ Recipients of US exports included Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Türkiye, UAE, and the UK, as well as Taiwan.

¹⁵⁹ Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Egypt, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, North Korea, North Macedonia, Peru, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. In addition, cluster munition remnants of Soviet origin have been identified in South Sudan and Sudan.

¹⁶⁰ States Parties Chile, France, Germany, Moldova, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK exported cluster munitions before they adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions. At least 11 States Parties have transferred cluster munition stocks to other countries for the purpose of destruction: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

¹⁶¹ US Department of the Treasury, "Award Profile: Contract Summary: W15QKN25F0468," USAspending.gov, undated, bit.ly/USTomer2025-2028; and Dan Glaun, "Pentagon Makes Largest Known Arms Purchase From Israel – For Banned Cluster Weapons," *The Intercept*, 6 February 2026, bit.ly/TheIntercept6Feb2026.

replace its 155mm cluster munition artillery projectiles, and has indicated that it carries nine M99 submunitions.¹⁶² Tomer was created in 2018 from a spin-off of the activities of IMI Systems that were not sold to Elbit Systems.¹⁶³

TRANSFERS FROM NORTH KOREA TO RUSSIA

In the current reporting period, evidence surfaced suggesting that North Korea at some point transferred cluster munitions to Russia, however, it is unclear when the transfers themselves took place.

The first publicly available allegations of use of North Korean-made cluster munitions in Ukraine emerged in May 2025, when photographs taken after an attack inside Ukraine—and posted to social media by Ukrainian combatants—showed what appeared to be an unexploded cylindrical submunition, similar to the US-made M42-series DPICM, that failed to function.¹⁶⁴ Korean language markings on the submunition have a designation of “JU-90” indicating North Korean production.¹⁶⁵

In June 2025, military bloggers circulated pictures of North Korean 107mm rockets for Type-75 multiple rocket launchers in Russia, including a cluster munition variant (called MLRS-107-E in Russian and 107 Sanpo in Korean) containing 15 submunitions, each weighing 284g, according to a Russian-language manual reportedly in use with Russian forces.¹⁶⁶

In September 2025, Russian forces reportedly used North Korean cluster munitions in strikes targeting Ukraine’s Kherson region, prompting Ukrainian authorities to warn the population about the risks of unexploded submunitions.¹⁶⁷ Russian forces have reportedly also used North Korean submunitions as warheads in small Russian drones.¹⁶⁸

These uses of North Korean cluster munitions in Ukraine suggest the transfer of cluster munitions by North Korea to Russia. Neither North Korea nor Russia is party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, though in July 2023, North Korea’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Choe Son Hui, issued a statement denouncing the US decision to transfer cluster munitions to Ukraine, calling it “[a] dangerous criminal act to bring a new calamity to the world.”¹⁶⁹

¹⁶² US Army, JPEO A&A, “2025 Product Portfolio Book,” 29 April 2025, p. 51, bit.ly/USArmaments29Apr2025. In October 2018, an Israel Military Industries (IMI) official told *The New York Times* that each M999 shell contains nine M99 submunitions with self-destruct features. John Ismay, “With North Korean Threats Looming, the U.S. Army Pursues Controversial Weapons,” *The New York Times*, 30 October 2018, bit.ly/NYT30Oct2018.

¹⁶³ Ora Coren, “Elbit Ready to Buy Israel Military Industries Without Its Missiles Business,” *Haaretz*, 18 January 2018, bit.ly/Haaretz18Jan2018.

¹⁶⁴ CAT-UXO (CAT_UXO), “This is an unknown High-Explosive-Anti-Tank (HEAT), Dual-Purpose-Improved-Conventional-Munition (DPICM), recently observed in Ukraine, currently designated as the KT-90, similar in size and function to the USA M42 submunition. Any additional images and technical information are very much appreciated, together our knowledge saves lives: cat-uxo.com/explosive-hazards/submunitions/kt-90-submunition,” 9 May 2025, 17:53 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPostCAT-UXO9May2025.

¹⁶⁵ The submunition was identified by World Without War, a CMC partner in South Korea. Email from Jeewoo Yeo, Researcher, World Without War, 1 June 2025. The Korean characters for “Juche” (associated with the guiding ideology of North Korea) appeared on the dud submunition. “Ju-ch” was clearly visible but the “e” part was not clear and was partially obscured in the photo. See also, Collective Awareness to UXO, “Kt 90 Submunition,” undated, accessed 23 June 2025, bit.ly/Kt90Submunition.

¹⁶⁶ Defense Express, “[R]ussia Received from North Korea Dangerous Type-75 MLRS with Mysterious Cluster Rockets,” 13 June 2025, bit.ly/DefenseExpress13June2025.

¹⁶⁷ Shreyas Reddy, “Russian forces use likely North Korean cluster bombs in strikes on Ukraine,” *NK News*, 26 September 2025, bit.ly/NKNews26Sept2025.

¹⁶⁸ John Ismay, “Russia Is Arming Drones With North Korean Cluster Weapons, Report Says,” *The New York Times*, 16 October 2025, bit.ly/NewYorkTimes16Oct2025; and Fenix Insight, “DPRK 122 mm submunition dispenser rocket,” 20 November 2025, bit.ly/FenixInsight20Nov2025.

¹⁶⁹ North Korea did not explicitly refer to cluster munitions in the statement but said: “The decision to provide lethal weapons to Ukraine is a very dangerous choice.” See, Choi Ji-won, “North Korea’s Choe Son-hui Criticizes U.S. ‘Support for Cluster Munitions in Ukraine,’” *Yonhap News TV*, 12 July 2023, bit.ly/YonhapNews12Jul2023; and “North Korea Condemns US Plan to Send Cluster Munitions to Ukraine as ‘Criminal,’” *Reuters*, 11 July 2023, bit.ly/Reuters11Jul2023.

ALLEGED AND POTENTIAL TRANSFERS

TRANSFERS TO UKRAINE

According to press reports in September 2025, the Greek Ministry of Defence planned to transfer 60 M110A2 203mm self-propelled howitzers to Ukraine through the Czech Republic, a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, together with cluster munitions to be fired from them (30,000 M404 ICM projectiles and 30,000 M509A1 DPICM projectiles).¹⁷⁰ In April 2026, M110A self-propelled howitzers, presumably from Greece, were reported to be in service with the 52nd Artillery Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; however, it was unclear if the cluster munition projectiles were transferred as well.¹⁷¹ Thus, the Monitor could not confirm if this transfer was completed, nor whether it passed through the Czech Republic. The CMC believes that transit through the national territory, airspace, or waters of a State Party consists of assistance as prohibited under Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as does foreign stockpiling on the territory of a State Party. This view is supported by at least 34 States Parties and signatories to the convention.¹⁷²

As reported in *Cluster Munition Monitor 2025*, between July 2023 and October 2024, the US carried out at least seven transfers of cluster munitions to Ukraine.¹⁷³ The Monitor has not seen evidence of additional cluster munition transfers by the US since October 2024, including in the current reporting period. On 15 July 2025, members of the US House Committee on Armed Services debated a proposed bipartisan amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2026 that would “prohibit any funds to furnish, export, or sell transfer [*sic*] cluster munitions or its technology.”¹⁷⁴ Introduced by Representatives Sara Jacobs (D-California) and Morgan Luttrell (R-Texas), the amendment received bipartisan support, but was not adopted.¹⁷⁵

Media reports indicate that Ukraine may have acquired cluster munitions from other countries since 2022, potentially including Israel, Poland, Romania, and/or Türkiye.¹⁷⁶ These countries are not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. None have publicly admitted to transferring cluster munitions to Ukraine, and Türkiye issued a denial.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁰ Costas Alatzas, “War with... a Greek signature in Ukraine,” *EfSyn*, 30 September 2025, bit.ly/EfSyn30Sep2025.

¹⁷¹ Sania Kozatskyi, “Large-Caliber M110 Self-Propelled Howitzers Added to the Arsenal of the 52nd Artillery Brigade,” *Militarnyi*, 2 April 2026, bit.ly/Militarnyi2Apr2026.

¹⁷² Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Ecuador, France, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Ireland, Lao PDR, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Senegal, Slovenia, Spain, and Zambia. See, CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2011* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), pp. 27–29, bit.ly/CMMonitor2011; ICBL, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2010* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 20–21, bit.ly/CMMonitor2010; and HRW and Landmine Action, *Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26, bit.ly/HRWLandmineActionMay2009.

¹⁷³ CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2025* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2025), bit.ly/CMMonitorReports.

¹⁷⁴ The amendment was not adopted in committee, with 15 committee members voting in favor and 42 members voting against. *Amendment to H.R. 3838*, Log 4967, introduced 15 June 2025, bit.ly/451QQJN. For debate in the US House Armed Services Committee, see, “Full Committee Markup: FY26 NDAA Markup Part 2,” US House Armed Services Committee, YouTube.com, 15 June 2025, bit.ly/AmendmentDebateHR3838Jul2025; and for the voting record, see, US House Armed Services Committee, “Markup of H.R. 3838 - Streamlining Procurement for Effective Execution and Delivery and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026,” 15 July 2025, bit.ly/41a54qV.

¹⁷⁵ The proposed amendment was supported by Representatives Deluzio, Elfreh, Finstad, Higgins, Houlahan, Jacobs, Khanna, Luttrell, McCormick, Mills, Schmidt, Scott, Sorensen, Tokuda, and Vasquez.

¹⁷⁶ See the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, www.the-monitor.org/cp. See also, CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2024* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2024), bit.ly/CMMonitor2024.

¹⁷⁷ For a detailed overview of the transfer allegations, see, CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2024* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2024), bit.ly/CMMonitor2024. See also the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, www.the-monitor.org/cp.

TRANSFERS FROM RUSSIA TO MALI

Russian-made RBK-500 cluster bombs with ShOAB-0.5 submunitions were reportedly used in Mali in May 2026.¹⁷⁸ Both the FAMA and Russia's Africa Corps are known to operate in the region. However, the Monitor could not independently confirm the party responsible for the use of cluster munitions. Mali, a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, has previously denied stockpiling or using cluster munitions, and is not known to stockpile these weapons. Still, if Mali was in fact responsible for the strike, the evidence suggests that they would have received the cluster munitions in a transfer from Russia. Alternatively, the cluster munitions may have been employed by Russian Africa Corps forces operating in Mali, which appear to operate Su-24 fighter jets capable of dropping RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5 cluster bombs.¹⁷⁹ This would not constitute a transfer, but raises other legal questions, as discussed above. (See *Use section* for further details.)

TRANSFERS FROM INDIA TO ARMENIA

India exported Pinaka multiple rocket launchers and rockets to Armenia, delivering the first tranche of Guided Pinaka rockets, manufactured by Solar Industries, in January 2026. The Monitor was unable to confirm if the export deal included the Pinaka cluster munition variant.¹⁸⁰

STOCKPILES OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS AND THEIR DESTRUCTION

GLOBAL STOCKPILES

The Monitor estimates that prior to the start of the global effort to ban cluster munitions, 94 countries stockpiled millions of cluster munitions, containing more than one billion submunitions.¹⁸¹ At least 45 countries—42 States Parties, two signatories, and one state not party—that once possessed cluster munition stocks have now destroyed them. (See *Stockpile Destruction section*.)

STOCKPILES POSSESSED BY STATES PARTIES

In the past, the convention's States Parties stockpiled a collective total of nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions, containing more than 179 million submunitions.

¹⁷⁸ David Baché, "Mali: The army uses cluster bombs for the first time," *RFI*, 20 May 2026, bit.ly/RFI20May2026; Sebastian Vandermeersch and Trevor Ball, "Banned Russian Submunitions Found After Mali's Military Announces Airstrikes," *Bellingcat*, 26 May 2026, bit.ly/BellingcatMali26May2026; and CMC, "Cluster Munition Coalition Statement on Alleged Use of Cluster Munitions in Mali," 21 May 2026, bit.ly/CMCMali21May2026.

¹⁷⁹ Mustapha Bature Sallama, "565 Spheres of Destruction: How Russia's Africa Corps Is Bringing Cluster Bombs to Mali's Skies," *Modern Ghana*, 20 May 2026, bit.ly/ModernGhana20May2026; and Guillaume Maurice, "New Russian bomber spotted in Mali as Wagner Group leaves the country," *France 24*, 11 June 2025, bit.ly/France24-11June2025.

¹⁸⁰ Shishir Arya, "Solar exports first batch of guided Pinaka rockets to Armenia," *The Times of India*, 19 January 2026, bit.ly/TimesOfIndia19Jan2026.

¹⁸¹ The number of countries that have stockpiled cluster munitions has increased significantly since 2002, when HRW provided the first list identifying 56 states that stockpiled cluster munitions. This is largely due to new information disclosed by States Parties under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. HRW, "Memorandum to CCW Delegates: A Global Overview of Explosive Submunitions," 20 May 2002, www.hrw.org/node/66890.

After Peru finished destroying its stockpile in 2023, there are currently no States Parties with declared cluster munition stockpiles still to destroy.¹⁸²

Countries that have ever stockpiled cluster munitions¹⁸³

States Parties		Signatories	States not party	
Afghanistan	Montenegro	Angola	Algeria	Oman
Austria	Mozambique	Central African Rep.	Argentina	Pakistan
Belgium	Netherlands	Cyprus	Armenia	Poland
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	Nigeria	Indonesia	Azerbaijan	Qatar
Botswana	North Macedonia		Bahrain	Romania
Bulgaria	Norway		Belarus	Russia
Cameroon	Peru		Brazil	Saudi Arabia
Canada	Philippines		Cambodia	Serbia
Chile	Portugal		China	Singapore
Colombia	Slovakia		Egypt	Sudan
Congo, Rep.	Slovenia		Eritrea	Syria
Côte d'Ivoire	South Africa		Estonia	Thailand
Croatia	Spain		Ethiopia	Türkiye
Cuba	Sweden		Finland	Turkmenistan
Czech Republic	Switzerland		Georgia	Ukraine
Denmark	United Kingdom (UK)		Greece	United Arab Emirates (UAE)
Ecuador			India	United States (US)
France			Iran	Uzbekistan
Germany			Israel	Venezuela
Guinea-Bissau			Jordan	Yemen
Honduras			Kazakhstan	Zimbabwe
Hungary			Korea, North	
Iraq			Korea, South	
Italy			Kuwait	
Japan			Libya	
Moldova			Mongolia	
			Morocco	
			Myanmar	
42		4 (2 current)	49 (48 current)	

Note: Countries in **bold** still possess stockpiles.

¹⁸² **Guinea:** Guinea apparently imported cluster munitions in the past but has not confirmed if it still possesses them. It has not yet submitted an initial Article 7 transparency report for the convention, which was originally due in April 2015. **Lebanon:** In its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report for calendar year 2024, Lebanon said that it “does not possess stockpiles of cluster munitions under its jurisdiction or control.” See, Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report (for calendar year 2024), Form B. However, Lebanon has explained that it identified new cluster munition contamination resulting from strikes on storage facilities. Submunitions were “kicked out from weapon & munitions depots belonging to non-state groups, due to the bombing of those sites, rather than being used in the conventional sense. It worth [*sic*] noting that these storage sites containing the ammunition were not known to the Lebanese authorities prior to the conflict.” See, Lebanon response to Observations and Comments of the Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 Analysis Group, 23 April 2025, p. 1, bit.ly/CCMArt4Lebanon23Apr2025. Lebanon further stated at the Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings in April 2025: “The detonation of previously unknown munitions stockpiles has resulted in the widespread dispersal of unexploded cluster munitions, significantly increasing the risk to communities and requiring comprehensive surveys, detailed assessments, and immediate action to mitigate these emerging threats.” See, statement of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 7 April 2025, bit.ly/LebanonStatement7Apr2025. Lebanon should investigate this incident and identify and destroy any stockpiles held by state or non-state actors in areas under its jurisdiction and control.

¹⁸³ This information is drawn from the Monitor’s Cluster Munition Ban Policy country profiles, which in turn use information provided by states in their Article 7 transparency reports, as well as statements and other sources. Armenia was added to the list of stockpilers following evidence of its use of cluster munitions in 2020. See, ICBL-CMC, “Country Profiles: Armenia: Cluster Munition Ban Policy,” updated 14 July 2025, bit.ly/ArmeniaCountryProfile.

STOCKPILES POSSESSED BY SIGNATORIES

At least two signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions may stockpile cluster munitions:

- Cyprus transferred 3,760 4.2-inch OF mortar projectiles, containing a total of 2,559 M20G submunitions, to Bulgaria for destruction in 2014. By August 2019, they had been destroyed by private company EXPAL Bulgaria.¹⁸⁴ Cyprus has never made a public statement or provided a voluntary transparency report to confirm if it has now destroyed all of its stockpiled cluster munitions.
- Indonesia has acknowledged possessing cluster munitions but has not shared information on its plan to destroy them under the convention. In June 2022, an Indonesian official told the Monitor that the stockpile consists of approximately 150 “very old” cluster bombs.¹⁸⁵

Two signatories possessed cluster munitions in the past:

- Angola stated in 2017 that all its stockpiled cluster munitions were destroyed in or by 2012.¹⁸⁶
- The Central African Republic stated in 2011 that it had destroyed a “considerable” stockpile of cluster munitions and no longer had stocks on its territory.¹⁸⁷

STOCKPILES POSSESSED BY STATES NOT PARTY

It is not possible to provide a global estimate of the quantity of cluster munitions held by states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as few have publicly shared information on the types and quantities in their possession.

Some states not party have provided limited information on their stocks and/or on destruction of those stocks. For example, the US reported in 2011 that its stockpile was comprised of “more than six million cluster munitions.”¹⁸⁸ Georgia destroyed 844 RBK-series cluster bombs, containing 320,375 submunitions, in 2004.¹⁸⁹ Venezuela destroyed an unspecified quantity of cluster munitions belonging to its air force in 2011.¹⁹⁰

STOCKPILES POSSESSED BY NON-STATE ACTORS

Stockpiles of cluster munitions are understood to be rarely held by NSAGs. It is not possible to provide a global estimate of the quantity of cluster munitions held by such NSAGs, as they do not publicly share this information.

¹⁸⁴ Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form B; Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form B; and Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form B. The Greek-made GRM-20 4.2-inch (107mm) mortar system uses these projectiles, each of which contains 20 submunitions.

¹⁸⁵ Interview with Risha Jilian Chaniago, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the UN in Geneva, Geneva, 24 June 2022.

¹⁸⁶ Statement of Angola, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 September 2017, bit.ly/CCMStatementAngola4Sep2017.

¹⁸⁷ Statement of the Central African Republic, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011, bit.ly/StatementCAR14Sep2011.

¹⁸⁸ Statement of the US, CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 14 November 2011, bit.ly/CCWUSStatement14Nov2011. The types of cluster munitions included in this figure were listed on a slide projected during an informal briefing to CCW delegates by a member of the US delegation. Several of the types (such as CBU-58, CBU-55B, and M509A1) were not listed in the “active” or “total” inventory by the US Department of Defense in a report to Congress in 2004.

¹⁸⁹ “Time schedule for cluster bomb disposal: Attachment 1.4,” undated. This document was provided by the press office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Secretariat, 7 May 2014.

¹⁹⁰ “The Ministry of Defense of Venezuela destroys cluster bombs,” *InfoDefensa*, 26 August 2011, bit.ly/InfoDefensa26Aug2011.

In 2025, state not party Lebanon reported new cluster munition contamination resulting from kick-outs from strikes on Hezbollah ammunition and weapon storehouses.¹⁹¹ It is unknown if Hezbollah retains additional, undamaged stockpiles of cluster munitions.

STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is required to declare and destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than eight years after entry into force of the convention for that State Party. States may request extensions of up to four years if unable to complete destruction by the original deadline.

At least 42 States Parties that have stockpiled cluster munitions have now completed destruction of those stocks, collectively destroying nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions containing 179 million submunitions. This represents 100% of all cluster munitions that States Parties have declared stockpiling, apart from those retained for permitted purposes.

Bulgaria, Peru, Slovakia, and South Africa were the last States Parties to complete the destruction of their respective stockpiles, in 2023.¹⁹²

States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction¹⁹³

State Party (year of completion)	Cluster munitions	Submunitions
Austria (2010)	12,672	798,336
Belgium (2010)	115,210	10,138,480
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (2011)	445	148,059
Botswana (2018)	510	14,400
Bulgaria (2023)	6,862	186,349
Cameroon (2017)*	6	906
Canada (2014)	13,623	1,361,958
Chile (2013)	249	25,896
Colombia (2009)	72	10,832
Côte d'Ivoire (2013)	68	10,200
Croatia (2018)	7,235	178,318
Cuba (2017)**	1,856	N/R
Czech Republic (2010)	480	16,400
Denmark (2014)	42,176	2,440,940
Ecuador (2004)	117	17,199
France (2016)	34,876	14,916,881

¹⁹¹ Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Charbel Njeim, Operations Section Head, Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC), 14 March 2025.

¹⁹² Bulgaria, Slovakia, and South Africa announced the completion of stockpile destruction at the convention's Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2023, while Peru confirmed its stockpile destruction completion on 15 December 2023. See, Alejo Marchessini, "Peru completes the destruction of its cluster munitions stockpiles," *defensa.com*, 28 December 2023, bit.ly/defensa28Dec2023; and HRW, "Cluster Munitions: Peru Destroys Stockpiled Weapons," 18 December 2023, bit.ly/PeruHRW18Dec2023.

¹⁹³ See the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, www.the-monitor.org/cp. Some quantities of cluster munitions and/or submunitions have changed since previous reports due to adjusted information provided in Article 7 reports. In addition, before the convention took effect, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK destroyed a collective total of 712,977 cluster munitions containing more than 78 million submunitions.

State Party (year of completion)	Cluster munitions	Submunitions
Germany (2015)	573,700	62,923,935
Hungary (2011)	287	3,954
Italy (2015)	4,963	2,849,979
Japan (2015)	14,011	2,027,907
Moldova (2010)	1,385	27,050
Montenegro (2010)	353	51,891
Mozambique (2015)	293	12,804
Netherlands (2012)	193,643	25,867,510
North Macedonia (2013)	2,426	39,980
Norway (2010)	52,190	3,087,910
Peru (2023)	2,012	162,417
Philippines (2011)	114	0
Portugal (2011)	11	1,617
Slovakia (2023)	1,235	299,187
Slovenia (2017)	1,080	52,920
South Africa (2023)	1,485	99,065
Spain (2018)	6,837	293,652
Sweden (2015)	370	20,595
Switzerland (2019)	206,061	12,211,950
UK (2013)	190,832	38,759,034
Total	1,489,745	179,058,511

Note: N/R=not reported.

*Cameroon retained its entire stockpile for research and training.

**Cuba reported the total number of cluster munitions destroyed, but not the quantity of submunitions destroyed.

Six States Parties that once stockpiled cluster munitions are not listed in the overview table due to insufficient information on the quantities destroyed:

- Afghanistan and Iraq have reported completing stockpile destruction, but neither provided a specific date of completion or information on the types and quantities destroyed. Both countries have reported the discovery and destruction of cluster munitions found in abandoned arms caches. Afghanistan and Iraq did not report discovering any new stockpiles as of the end of 2025.¹⁹⁴
- The Republic of the Congo has stated that it has no stockpiles of cluster munitions on its territory; however, it must provide a transparency report to formally confirm that it does not possess stocks.¹⁹⁵ The Republic of the Congo has yet to submit its initial transparency report, which was due in 2015. (See *Transparency Reporting section*.)

¹⁹⁴ Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form B; and Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form B.

¹⁹⁵ In September 2011, the Republic of the Congo stated that it had no stockpiles of cluster munitions on its territory. In May 2013, it reported that it had destroyed its remaining 372 antipersonnel landmines that were held for training and research purposes, following massive explosions at a weapons depot in Brazzaville in March 2012. It reported that it was now a country free of landmines and cluster munitions. Statement of the Republic of the Congo, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 15 September 2011, bit.ly/StatementRepCongo15Sep2011; statement by Col. Nkoua, National Focal Point of the Struggle Against Mines, seminar to mark the 20th Anniversary of the ICBL hosted by the Congolese Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Bombs (CCBL), Kinshasa, 19 December 2012; and statement of the Republic of the Congo, Lomé Regional Seminar on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lomé, 22 May 2013. Notes by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV).

- Guinea-Bissau initially reported possessing cluster munitions in 2011 but did not provide information on the types or quantities.¹⁹⁶ It subsequently reported in July 2022 that it does not possess any stocks, without providing details on the quantities or date of destruction.¹⁹⁷
- Honduras provided a transparency report in 2017 but did not declare any cluster munitions as it destroyed its stockpile long before the convention's entry into force.¹⁹⁸
- Nigeria reported in April 2023 and February 2024 that it does not stockpile cluster munitions.¹⁹⁹ Previously, it requested technical assistance and cooperation to fulfill its stockpile destruction obligations.²⁰⁰

RETENTION

Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions permits the retention of cluster munitions and submunitions for the development of training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques, and for the development of countermeasures such as armor to protect troops and equipment from the effects of the weapons.

The vast majority of States Parties do not retain live cluster munitions for research or training purposes, including all except six of the 42 States Parties that once stockpiled cluster munitions.

Germany is retaining the highest number of cluster munitions of any State Party, followed by Switzerland and Cameroon.

During 2025, Germany and Switzerland consumed cluster munitions for research and training purposes. Germany reported in March 2026 that the total number of cluster munitions retained has been reduced to 50 cluster munitions and 3,150 submunitions, after it consumed 27 DM642 cluster munitions and 1,701 DM1348 submunitions in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training in 2025.²⁰¹ Switzerland reported in April 2026 that the total number of cluster munitions retained has been reduced to 19 cluster munitions and 1,106 submunitions. In 2025, it consumed two 155mm KaG-88 and seven KaG 98 ZZ Ladg cluster munitions as well as 158 CL 3022-S2-SD-M and 224 CL 3022-C-SD submunitions.²⁰²

¹⁹⁶ Guinea-Bissau Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (initial report, for the period May 2011–November 2019), Form B; and statement of Guinea-Bissau, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San José, 3 September 2014, bit.ly/StatementGuinea-BissauSep2014. Guinea-Bissau told States Parties that it had asked for help to destroy its stockpile in 2013 from UNMAS, which had conducted a technical assessment in 2011 that found that Guinea-Bissau's cluster munition stocks were being held by the armed forces "in very bad conditions." See, statement of Guinea-Bissau, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 11 September 2013, bit.ly/StatementGuinea-Bissau11Sep2013. A 2011 inventory review by the National Mine Action Coordination Center (Centro Nacional de Coordenação da Acção Anti-Minas, CAAMI) found that an air force base in Bissau City held stocks of cluster munitions. Interview with César Luis Gomes Lopes de Carvalho, General Director, CAAMI, in Geneva, 27 June 2011. RBK-series air-dropped bombs and PTAB-2.5 submunitions were among munitions ejected by an explosion at an ammunition storage facility on the outskirts of Bissau City in 2000. See, Cleared Ground Demining, "Guinea Bissau," undated.

¹⁹⁷ Statement of Guinea-Bissau, Convention on Cluster Munitions Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 31 August 2022, bit.ly/GuineaBissauStatement31Aug2022; and Guinea-Bissau Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 6 July 2022.

¹⁹⁸ According to officials, the stockpile of air-dropped Rockeye cluster bombs and an unidentified type of artillery-delivered cluster munition were destroyed before 2007. HRW meetings with Honduran officials, in San José, 5 September 2007, and in Vienna, 3–5 December 2007.

¹⁹⁹ Nigeria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Forms B, C, and D; and Nigeria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Forms B, C, and D.

²⁰⁰ See, for example, Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Croatia Progress Report – monitoring progress in implementing the Vientiane Action Plan up to the First Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dubrovnik, 7 – 11 September 2015," 6 October 2015, p. 15, docs.un.org/CCM/CONF/2015/6; and statement of Nigeria, Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 11 September 2012, bit.ly/NigeriaCCM11Sept2012.

²⁰¹ Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form C.

²⁰² Switzerland Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form C.

Cluster munitions retained for training (as of July 2026)²⁰³

State Party	Quantity of cluster munitions (submunitions)			Year first reported
	Currently retained	Consumed in 2025	Initially retained	
Germany	50 (3,150)	27 (1,701)	685 (62,580)	2011
Switzerland	19 (1,106)	9 (382)	138 (7,346)	2013
Cameroon	5 (755)	N/R	6 (906)	2014
Bulgaria	5 (250)	0 (0)	8 (400)	2017
France	3 (189)	0 (0)	55 (10,284)	2011
Spain	2 (275)	0 (0)	711 (16,652)	2011

Note: N/R=not reported.

Three States Parties did not consume any retained cluster munitions for research and training purposes during 2025:

- Bulgaria last used its retained stocks in 2023, when the Bulgarian Armed Forces consumed one cluster munition and 50 submunitions during training.²⁰⁴ It is retaining five 9N123K cluster munition warheads delivered by Tochka ballistic missile and 250 9N24 submunitions.²⁰⁵
- France reported in May 2024 that its technical experts from the armed forces destroyed one submunition on 20 April 2023.²⁰⁶ It is retaining three OGR 155mm cluster munitions and 189 OGR submunitions for research and training purposes.²⁰⁷
- Spain last consumed retained cluster munitions in 2020. It is retaining one CBU-100/B cluster munition containing 247 submunitions and one BME-330 B/AP containing 28 submunitions.²⁰⁸

As of 19 June 2026, Cameroon had not submitted an Article 7 report for 2025. As of the end of 2024, it retained five BLG-66 Belouga cluster bombs and 755 submunitions.²⁰⁹ Cameroon reported a lower number of retained cluster munitions in 2023 but did not indicate if one cluster bomb and 151 submunitions were consumed during research and training.

The number of States Parties retaining cluster munitions for research and training purposes decreased after the Monitor removed four States Parties that were previously listed: BiH, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden. These States Parties have only retained submunitions without the cluster munitions that could allow them to be used.

Several States Parties, such as Belgium, Chile, Croatia, and Moldova, report retaining inert items that are free from explosives. The Monitor also does not consider these items to be cluster munitions capable of being used.

All States Parties retaining cluster munitions for training have reduced their stocks since making their initial declarations, in most cases significantly. This shows how the initial amounts retained may not have been the “minimum number absolutely necessary” for the permitted purposes under the convention.

²⁰³ For more information on retention, including the specific types of cluster munitions retained by each country, see Monitor country profiles, www.the-monitor.org/cp; and the Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM.

²⁰⁴ Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form C.

²⁰⁵ Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form C.

²⁰⁶ France Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form C.

²⁰⁷ France Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form C.

²⁰⁸ Spain Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form C.

²⁰⁹ Cameroon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form C.

Very few States Parties have replenished their stocks of cluster munitions retained for research and training.

TRANSPARENCY REPORTING

Under Article 7 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are obliged to submit an initial transparency report within 180 days of the convention taking effect for that country. After providing an initial transparency report, States Parties must submit an updated annual report by 30 April each year, covering developments during the previous calendar year. Timely submission of both the initial and annual reports is a legal obligation.²¹⁰

States Parties with outstanding initial Article 7 deadlines

State Party	Date due
Cabo Verde	28 September 2011
Comoros	30 June 2011
Congo, Rep.	28 August 2015
Guinea	19 April 2015
Rwanda	31 July 2016

The Lausanne Action Plan prioritized transparency and the open exchange of information and “note[d] with concern” that less than two-thirds of States Parties regularly complied with this obligation.²¹¹

INITIAL REPORTS

As of 19 June 2026, 106 out of 112 States Parties have submitted an initial transparency report.²¹²

Vanuatu’s initial Article 7 report will be due on 28 August 2026, after this report is finalized.

Five States Parties, however, have outstanding initial Article 7 reports, all more than a decade overdue: Cabo Verde, the Comoros, the Republic of the Congo, Guinea, and Rwanda.

ANNUAL REPORTS

Approximately half of the convention’s States Parties regularly provide annual updated Article 7 reports.²¹³ Eight States Parties have never provided an annual update since submitting their initial report.²¹⁴

South Sudan provided four voluntary transparency reports before acceding to the convention, while Canada and Palau provided voluntary reports prior to ratifying it. Since 2011, signatory DRC has submitted four voluntary Article 7 transparency reports, most recently in 2022. State not party Brunei Darussalam provided a voluntary submission in 2020.

²¹⁰ The transparency report should be emailed to the UN Secretary-General via the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs at ccm@un.org. For more information, see, www.clusterconvention.org/reporting-forms.

²¹¹ Lausanne Action Plan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Review Conference, Geneva, 21 September 2021, bit.ly/LausanneActionPlan.

²¹² Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, BiH, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eswatini, Fiji, France, The Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, UK, Uruguay, and Zambia. Note that Lithuania withdrew from the convention, effective March 2025. As a State Party, it had previously submitted its initial transparency report.

²¹³ As of 31 July 2026, at least 51 States Parties had not provided their annual updated report due by 30 April 2026.

²¹⁴ Benin, Burundi, Fiji, Madagascar, Mali, Nauru, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

The CMC continues to encourage States Parties to submit their Article 7 transparency reports by the deadline and provide complete information, including definitive statements.²¹⁵

NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION LEGISLATION

According to Article 9 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are required to take “all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions.” While some States Parties report that existing laws suffice, the CMC urges all States Parties to enact comprehensive national legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions and provide binding, enduring, and unequivocal rules.

In addition, the Lausanne Action Plan commits States Parties to ensure national implementation measures are put in place in a timely manner, and to assist other States Parties in doing so.

A total of 33 States Parties have enacted specific implementing legislation for the convention. Prior to the convention’s entry into force in August 2010, a total of 11 states had enacted implementing legislation, while 22 states have done so since.

National implementation legislation for the Convention on Cluster Munitions

State Party (year enacted)		
Afghanistan (2018)	France (2010)	Namibia (2019)
Australia (2012)	Germany (2009)	New Zealand (2009)
Austria (2008)	Guatemala (2012)	Niue (2021)
Belgium (2006)	Hungary (2012)	Norway (2008)
Bulgaria (2015)	Iceland (2015)	Saint Kitts and Nevis (2014)
Cameroon (2016)	Ireland (2008)	Samoa (2012)
Canada (2014)	Italy (2011)	Spain (2015)
Colombia (2012)	Japan (2009)	Sweden (2012)
Cook Islands (2011)	Liechtenstein (2013)	Switzerland (2012)
Czech Republic (2011)	Luxembourg (2009)	Togo (2015)
Ecuador (2010)	Mauritius (2016)	UK (2010)

Niue was the last country to enact national implementing legislation for the convention, in 2021. The Monitor is not aware of any State Party enacting implementation legislation for the convention during 2025 or the first half of 2026.

A total of 22 States Parties have indicated that they are either planning or are in the process of drafting, reviewing, or adopting specific legislative measures to implement the convention.²¹⁶ Guinea-Bissau has requested international assistance in developing such legislative measures.²¹⁷

²¹⁵ Often states do not provide definitive statements throughout their reports. Notably, some simply indicate “not applicable.” States should, for example, include a short narrative statement on Form E on conversion of production facilities, i.e., “Country X never produced cluster munitions,” instead of simply putting “N/A” on the form. In addition, only a small number of states used voluntary Form J to provide additional information.

²¹⁶ Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, and Zambia.

²¹⁷ Statement of Guinea-Bissau, Convention on Cluster Munitions Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 13 September 2024, bit.ly/GuineaBissauStatement13Sep2024.

A total of 42 States Parties have indicated that they regard existing laws and regulations as sufficient to enforce their adherence to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.²¹⁸

Other States Parties are still considering whether specific implementing legislation for the convention is needed.

Several guides are available to encourage the preparation of robust legislation. The CMC prepared model legislation in 2020.²¹⁹ Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Harvard Law School's International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) have identified key components of comprehensive legislation.²²⁰ The ICRC has proposed a model law for common law states.²²¹ New Zealand has prepared a model law for small states that do not possess cluster munitions and are not contaminated by their remnants.²²²

INTERPRETIVE ISSUES

During the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the final negotiations in Dublin, where the convention was adopted on 30 May 2008, it appeared that there was not a uniform view on certain important issues relating to states' interpretation and implementation of the convention. The CMC encourages States Parties and signatories that have not yet done so to express their views on three key issues of concern:

1. The prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions ("interoperability");
2. The prohibitions on transit and foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions; and
3. The prohibition on investment in the production of cluster munitions.

Several States Parties and signatories have elaborated their views on these issues, including through Article 7 transparency reports, statements at meetings, parliamentary debates, and direct communications with the CMC and the Monitor. Several strong implementation laws provide useful models for how to implement certain provisions of the convention. Yet, more than three dozen States Parties have not articulated their views on even one of these interpretive issues, and there were no new statements during the reporting period.²²³ Please refer to previous *Cluster Munition Monitor* reports, in addition to Monitor country profiles, for detailed positions on key interpretive issues.

More than 400 US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks in 2010–2011 demonstrate how the US—despite not participating in the Oslo Process—made numerous

²¹⁸ Albania, Andorra, Benin, Bolivia, BiH, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Denmark, El Salvador, Fiji, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Iraq, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nauru, Netherlands, Nicaragua, North Macedonia, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, San Marino, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Uruguay. Lithuania had also indicated that it regarded existing laws and regulations as sufficient to enforce its adherence to the Convention on Cluster Munitions; however, it was removed from the list following its withdrawal from the convention in 2025.

²¹⁹ CMC, "2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions: Model Legislation. Act to implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions," 2020, bit.ly/CMCModelLegislation.

²²⁰ HRW and Harvard Law School's International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC), "Staying Strong: Key Components and Positive Precedent for Convention on Cluster Munitions Legislation," September 2014, bit.ly/StayingStrong2014.

²²¹ ICRC, "Model Law: Convention on Cluster Munitions: Legislation for Common Law States on the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions," March 2013, bit.ly/CCMModelLegislationICRC.

²²² New Zealand, "Model Legislation: Cluster Munitions Act," 7 September 2011, bit.ly/CCMModelLegislationNZ2011.

²²³ The States Parties that have yet to publicly elaborate a view on any of these interpretive issues include: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Cook Islands, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Eswatini, Fiji, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Iraq, Lesotho, Maldives, Mauritania, Moldova, Monaco, Mozambique, Nauru, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uruguay, and Vanuatu.

attempts to influence its allies, partners, and other states on the content of the draft Convention on Cluster Munitions, particularly with respect to interoperability, US stockpiles, and foreign stockpiling.²²⁴

INTEROPERABILITY AND THE PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE

Article 1 of the convention obligates States Parties “never under any circumstances to ... assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Yet during the Oslo Process, some states expressed concern about the application of the prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with countries that have not joined the convention. In response to these “interoperability” concerns, Article 21 on “Relations with States not Party to this Convention” was included in the convention. While Article 21.1 and 21.2 require States Parties to promote universalization and to discourage any use by states outside the convention, the CMC has strongly criticized Article 21.3 (on military engagement with other states) for being politically motivated and for leaving a degree of ambiguity about how the prohibition on assistance would be applied in joint military operations.

Article 21.3 states that States Parties “may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.” It does not, however, negate States Parties’ obligation under Article 1 to “never under any circumstances” assist with prohibited acts.

Together, Article 1 and Article 21 should have a unified and coherent purpose, as the convention cannot require States Parties to both discourage the use of cluster munitions and, by implication, allow them to encourage it. Furthermore, to interpret Article 21 as qualifying Article 1 would run counter to the object and purpose of the convention, which is to eliminate cluster munitions and the harm they cause to civilians.

Therefore, States Parties must not intentionally or deliberately assist, induce, or encourage any activity prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, even when engaging in joint operations with states not party. Forms of prohibited assistance include, but are not limited to:

- Securing, storing, or transporting cluster munitions that belong to a state not party;
- Agreeing to rules of engagement that allow cluster munition use by a state not party;
- Accepting orders from a state not party to use cluster munitions;
- Requesting a state not party to use cluster munitions;
- Participating in planning for use of cluster munitions by a state not party; and
- Training others to use cluster munitions.

At least 38 States Parties and signatories have agreed that the convention’s Article 21.3 provision on interoperability should not be read as allowing states to avoid their specific



A bridge near the border between Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts, Ukraine, damaged by a cluster munition strike. Bridges and other critical transportation infrastructure are often targeted.

© C. Wright/ICBL-CMC/HI, July 2025

²²⁴ As of July 2012, Wikileaks had made public a total of 428 cables relating to cluster munitions, that originated from 100 locations between 2003 and 2010.

obligation under Article 1 to prohibit assistance with prohibited acts.²²⁵

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, and the UK have indicated their support for the contrary view, that the convention's Article 1 prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts may be overridden by the interoperability provisions contained in Article 21. In discussions relating to the Second Review Conference, these States Parties, along with Lithuania, used Article 21 as a justification to argue forcefully against unequivocally condemning new use of cluster munitions.

States Parties France, the Netherlands, and Spain have provided the view that Article 21 permits military cooperation in joint operations but have not indicated the forms of assistance allowed.

TRANSIT AND FOREIGN STOCKPILING

The CMC has stated that the prohibition on providing any form of direct or indirect assistance with prohibited acts contained in Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions should be seen as banning the transit of cluster munitions across or through the national territory, airspace, or waters of a State Party. The convention should also be seen as banning the stockpiling of cluster munitions by a state not party on the territory of a State Party.

At least 34 States Parties and signatories have declared that transit and foreign stockpiling are prohibited by the convention.²²⁶

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK have indicated support for the opposite view, that transit and foreign stockpiling are not prohibited by the convention.

US STOCKPILING AND TRANSIT

States Parties Norway and the UK have confirmed that the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from their respective territories during 2010. US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks show that the US stockpiled and therefore may still store cluster munitions in States Parties Afghanistan, Italy, Japan, and Spain, as well as in states not party Israel, Qatar, and possibly Kuwait.

A July 2024 media report showed that cluster munitions held at a US base in Germany were being transferred to Ukraine since July 2023 as part of US military assistance, transiting across Germany and Poland in the process.²²⁷

²²⁵ Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Ecuador, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Senegal, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Togo. See, CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2012* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2012), pp. 34–35, bit.ly/CMMonitor2012; CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2011* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), pp. 25–27, bit.ly/CMMonitor2011; ICBL, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2010* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 20–21, bit.ly/CMMonitor2010; HRW and Landmine Action, *Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26, bit.ly/HRWLandmineActionMay2009; and HRW and IHRC, “Staying Strong: Key Components and Positive Precedent for Convention on Cluster Munitions Legislation,” 3 September 2014, pp. 19–23, bit.ly/StayingStrong2014.

²²⁶ Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Ecuador, France, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Ireland, Lao PDR, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Senegal, Slovenia, Spain, and Zambia. See, CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2011* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), pp. 27–29, bit.ly/CMMonitor2011; ICBL, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2010* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 20–21, bit.ly/CMMonitor2010; and HRW and Landmine Action, *Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26, bit.ly/HRWLandmineActionMay2009.

²²⁷ “Despite the ban: US cluster munitions in Germany – an investigation by Panorama and STRG_F,” *NDR*, 25 July 2024, bit.ly/NDR25July2024.

DISINVESTMENT

Several States Parties, as well as the CMC, view the convention's Article 1 ban on assistance with prohibited acts as constituting a prohibition on investment in the production of cluster munitions. The Lausanne Action Plan, adopted by States Parties at the convention's Second Review Conference in September 2021, encourages the adoption of national legislation prohibiting investment in producers of cluster munitions.²²⁸

Since 2007, a total of 11 States Parties have enacted legislation that explicitly prohibits investment in cluster munitions.

At least 38 States Parties and signatories have stated that they regard investments in cluster munition production as a form of assistance that is prohibited by the convention.²²⁹

A few States Parties to the convention, including Germany, Japan, and Sweden, have expressed the contrary view that the convention does not prohibit investment in cluster munition production.

Government pension funds in Australia, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden have either fully or partially withdrawn investments, or banned investments, in cluster munition producers.

In States Parties Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK, financial institutions have acted to stop investment in cluster munition producers and promote socially responsible investment.

Several private companies in states not party have ceased production of cluster munitions, in part due to inquiries from financial institutions keen to screen their investments for prohibited weapons. These companies include Elbit Systems Ltd. of Israel, Singapore Technologies Engineering, and US companies Lockheed Martin, Orbital ATK, and Textron Systems.²³⁰

Disinvestment laws on cluster munitions

State Party	Year enacted
Belgium	2007
Ireland	2008
Italy	2021
Liechtenstein	2013
Luxembourg	2009
Netherlands	2013
New Zealand	2009
Saint Kitts and Nevis	2014
Samoa	2012
Spain	2015
Switzerland	2013

²²⁸ Lausanne Action Plan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Review Conference, Geneva, 21 September 2021, Action 47, bit.ly/LausanneActionPlan.

²²⁹ Australia, BiH, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Montenegro, Niger, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovenia, Trinidad and Tobago, UK, and Zambia.

²³⁰ Orbital ATK was acquired by and absorbed into Northrop Grumman in 2018. The prior year, Orbital ATK notified PAX that it had ceased production of cluster munitions and their components. Textron likewise ceased production of cluster munitions in 2016. Stop Explosive Investments, "Last remaining U.S. producers declare having ended cluster bomb production," 29 November 2017, bit.ly/StopExplosiveInvestments29Nov2017. In 2021, Northrop Grumman announced it would stop participating in a contract to manage US stockpiles of cluster munitions—a contract it inherited in the Orbital ATK acquisition. Mary Wareham, "US Defense Contractor Distances Itself from Cluster Munitions," HRW, 29 January 2021, bit.ly/HRW29Jan2021. As of June 2026, Northrop Grumman's "Human Rights Policy" states that the company "does not manufacture or sell cluster munitions or components of such munitions as defined in the Convention on Cluster Munitions." Northrop Grumman, "Human Rights Policy: Programs and Products," undated, accessed 30 June 2026, bit.ly/NorthropGrummanHR.

Timeline of cluster munition use²³¹

Date	Location	Known details of use
2022–present	Myanmar	Myanmar Armed Forces have used a domestically produced air-dropped cluster munition since 2022.
2022–present	Ukraine, Russia	The Russian Armed Forces have used cluster munitions extensively in Ukraine since Russia's full-scale invasion of the country on 24 February 2022. Ukrainian forces have used cluster munitions on Ukrainian territory since March 2022, and have also used them on Russian territory.
2026	Mali	On 20 May 2026, reports emerged that cluster munitions were used during the internal conflict in Mali, which is a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. As of July 2026, the Monitor cannot determine which actor or actors may be responsible.
2025–2026	Israel	Iran used ballistic missiles with cluster munition warheads in attacks against Israel in June 2025 and February–April 2026.
2025	Cambodia	Thailand appeared to admit to using cluster munitions during a border conflict with Cambodia in July 2025 and December 2025.
2012–2024	Syria	Syrian Armed Forces used cluster munitions extensively, and with Russia's support. Islamic State forces used at least one type of cluster munition in Syria.
2020	Azerbaijan, Armenia	Armenia and Azerbaijan used cluster munitions in the conflict over <i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i> in September–October 2020.
2015–2019	Libya	Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), formerly known as the Libyan National Army (LNA), used air-dropped cluster munitions in Tripoli in 2019. The Monitor could not conclusively attribute responsibility for cluster munition attacks reported in 2015 and 2018.
2015–2017	Yemen	A Saudi Arabia-led coalition of states, engaged in a military operation against Houthi forces in Yemen, used at least seven types of air-dropped and ground-fired cluster munitions in at least 23 attacks between 2015 and 2017.
2016	Azerbaijan, <i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i>	Two types of cluster munition rockets were used in April 2016, but the Monitor could not conclusively determine responsibility. Armenia and Azerbaijan both denied using cluster munitions and accused each other of using them.
2016	Somalia	BL755 cluster munitions were found in Somalia after a January 2016 airstrike against al-Shabaab forces. Kenya denied allegations that it was responsible.

²³¹ See the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, www.the-monitor.org/cp. This accounting does not capture every location of cluster munitions use. Cluster munitions have been used in some countries, but the party responsible for the use is not clear.

Date	Location	Known details of use
2015	Sudan	The Sudanese Air Force was responsible for cluster munition attacks in Southern Kordofan in February, March, and May 2015 using RBK-500 AO-2.5 RT cluster bombs.
2014–2015	Ukraine	From July 2014 until a February 2015 ceasefire, Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed insurgent groups used two types of cluster munition rockets in eastern Ukraine.
2014	South Sudan	In Jonglei State, the United Nations (UN) found the remnants of at least eight RBK-250-275 cluster bombs and AO-1SCh submunitions by the road 16 kilometers south of Bor in February 2014, in an area not known to be contaminated by remnants before that time.
2012	Sudan	There were two compelling allegations of cluster munition use by the armed forces of Sudan in Southern Kordofan, involving a Chinese Type-81 DPICM in Troji on 29 February 2012 and an RBK-500 AO-2.5RT cluster bomb in Ongolo on 15 April 2012.
2011	Libya	Libyan government forces used MAT-120 mortar-fired cluster munitions, RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M cluster bombs, and 122mm cargo rockets containing an unidentified type of DPICM.
2011	Cambodia	Thai forces fired artillery-delivered cluster munitions with M42/M46 and M85 type DPICM submunitions into Cambodia during border clashes near Preah Vihear temple.
2009	Yemen	The United States (US) used at least five TLAM-D cruise missiles, each containing 166 BLU-97 submunitions, to attack a “training camp” in Abyan Governorate on 17 December 2009. Northern Saada Governorate is contaminated by cluster munitions used in late 2009 during fighting by the government of Yemen, Houthi rebels, and Saudi Arabia. The user responsible is not clear, but remnants include US-made CBU-52 cluster bombs and BLU-97, BLU-61, and M42/M46 submunitions, as well as Soviet-made RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh cluster bombs.
2008	Georgia	Russian and Georgian forces used cluster munitions during the August 2008 conflict. Submunitions cleared by deminers include air-dropped AO-2.5RTM and rocket-delivered 9N210 and M095.
2006	Lebanon	Israeli forces used ground-launched and air-dropped cluster munitions in a conflict against Hezbollah. The UN estimates that Israel used up to 4 million submunitions.
2006	Israel	Hezbollah forces fired more than 100 Chinese-produced Type-81 122mm cluster munition rockets into northern Israel.


Date	Location	Known details of use
2003	Iraq	The US and the United Kingdom (UK) used nearly 13,000 cluster munitions, containing an estimated 1.8 to 2 million submunitions in the three weeks of major combat in 2003.
Unknown	Uganda	RBK-250-275 bombs and AO-1SCh submunitions have been found in the northern district of Gulu.
2001–2002	Afghanistan	The US dropped 1,228 cluster bombs containing 248,056 submunitions.
1999	Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of (FRY)	The US, the UK, and the Netherlands dropped 1,765 cluster bombs containing 295,000 submunitions in what is now <i>Kosovo</i> , Montenegro, and Serbia, and in Albania. FRY also used cluster munitions.
1999	<i>Chechnya</i>	Russian forces used cluster munitions in a conflict against NSAGs.
1998–2003	Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	Deminers have found BL755 bombs, BLU-63 cluster munitions, and PM-1 submunitions.
1998–1999	Albania	Yugoslav forces used rocket-delivered cluster munitions in disputed border areas, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces conducted six aerial cluster munition strikes.
1998	Colombia	The Colombian Air Force used a World War II-era cluster munition in an attack on Santo Domingo in the municipality of Tame on 13 December.
1998	Ethiopia, Eritrea	Ethiopia attacked Asmara airport and dropped BL755 bombs in Gash-Barka Province in Eritrea. Eritrea used cluster munitions in two separate strikes in Mekele, including at a school.
1998	Afghanistan, Sudan	In August, US ships and submarines fired 66 TLAM-D Block 3 cruise missiles, each containing 166 BLU-97 submunitions, at a factory in Khartoum, Sudan, and at reported NSAG training camps in Afghanistan.
1997	Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone has said that Nigerian peacekeepers in the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) used BLG-66 Beluga bombs on the eastern town of Kenema. ECOMOG Force Commander General Victor Malu denied these reports.
1996–1999	Sudan	Sudanese government forces used air-dropped cluster munitions in southern Sudan.
1995	Croatia	An NSAG used Orkan M-87 multiple rocket launchers in an attack on the city of Zagreb on 2–3 May. The Croatian government claimed that Serb forces used BL755 bombs in Sisak, Kutina, and along the Kupa River.
1994–1996	<i>Chechnya</i>	Russian forces used cluster munitions in a conflict against NSAGs.
1992–1997	Tajikistan	ShOAB-0.5 and AO-2.5RT submunitions have been found in the town of Gharm in the Rasht Valley, used by unknown forces engaged in civil war.

Date	Location	Known details of use
1992–1995	Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	Yugoslav forces and NSAGs used cluster munitions during the war. NATO aircraft dropped two CBU-87 bombs.
1992–1994	<i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i> , Azerbaijan	Submunition contamination has been identified in at least 162 locations in <i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i> . Submunition types cleared by deminers include PTAB-1, ShOAB-0.5, and AO-2.5 RT. There are also reports of contamination in other parts of occupied Azerbaijan, adjacent to <i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i> .
1992–1994	Angola	Deminers have found dud Soviet-made PTAB and AO-2.5 RT submunitions in various locations.
1991	Iraq, Kuwait	The US, France, and the UK dropped 61,000 cluster bombs containing some 20 million submunitions. The number of cluster munitions delivered by surface-launched artillery and rocket systems is not known, but an estimated 30 million or more DPICM submunitions were used in the conflict.
1991	Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabian and US forces used artillery-delivered and air-dropped cluster munitions in the conflict against Iraqi forces during the Battle of Khafji.
1988	Iran	US Navy aircraft attacked Iranian Revolutionary Guard speedboats and an Iranian Navy ship using Mk-20 Rockeye bombs during Operation Praying Mantis.
1986–1987	Chad	French aircraft dropped cluster munitions on a Libyan airfield at Wadi Doum. Libyan forces also used AO-1SCh and PTAB-2.5 submunitions at various locations.
1986	Libya	US Navy aircraft attacked Libyan ships using Mk-20 Rockeye cluster bombs in the Gulf of Sidra on 25 March. On 14–15 April, US Navy aircraft dropped 60 Rockeye bombs on Benina Airfield.
1984–1988	Iran, Iraq	It has been reported that Iraq first used air-dropped bombs in 1984. Iraq reportedly used Ababil-50 surface-to-surface cluster munition rockets during the later stages of the war.
1983	Lebanon	US Navy aircraft dropped 12 CBU-59 and 28 Mk-20 Rockeye bombs in a conflict against Syrian air defense units near Beirut.
1983	Grenada	US Navy aircraft dropped 21 Mk-20 Rockeye bombs during close air support operations.
1982	<i>Falkland Islands/ Malvinas</i>	UK forces dropped 107 BL755 cluster bombs containing a total of 15,729 submunitions.
1982	Lebanon	Israel used cluster munitions in a conflict against Syrian forces and NSAGs in Lebanon.
1979–1989	Afghanistan	Soviet forces extensively used air-dropped and rocket-delivered cluster munitions. NSAGs also used rocket-delivered cluster munitions on a smaller scale.
1978	Lebanon	Israel used cluster munitions in southern Lebanon.

Date	Location	Known details of use
1977–1978	Somalia	Contamination was discovered in 2013 in the Somali border region, including PTAB-2.5M and AO-1Sch submunitions, but the party responsible is unknown.
1975–1988	<i>Western Sahara</i> , Mauritania	Moroccan forces used artillery-fired and air-dropped cluster munitions in a conflict against an NSAG in <i>Western Sahara</i> . Cluster munition remnants of the same types used by Morocco in <i>Western Sahara</i> have been found in Mauritania.
1973	Egypt, Syria	Israel used air-dropped cluster munitions against Egyptian air defense installations in the Suez Canal zone and on reported NSAG training camps near Damascus.
1970s	Zambia	Remnants of cluster munitions, including unexploded submunitions from air-dropped bombs, have been found at Chikumbi and Shang'ombo.
1965–1975	Cambodia, Lao PDR, Vietnam	US bombing data shows that approximately 80,000 cluster munitions, containing 26 million submunitions, were dropped on Cambodia in 1969–1973; over 414,000 cluster bombs, containing at least 260 million submunitions, were dropped on Lao PDR in 1965–1973; and over 296,000 cluster munitions, containing nearly 97 million submunitions, were dropped on Vietnam in 1965–1975.
1939–1945	Germany, Italy, Libya, Malta, Palau, Solomon Islands, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the UK, possibly other locations	Munitions similar in function to modern cluster munitions were used by belligerent parties during World War II in Europe, North Africa, and the Pacific.

Note: Other areas are indicated in *italics*; DPICM=dual-purpose improved conventional munition; NSAG=non-state armed group.

STATUS OF THE 2008 CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS




MAP KEY

- States Parties (112)
- Signatories (12)
- States not party (73)


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
This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.

PRODUCTION OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS



CLUSTER MUNITION STOCKPILES AND DESTRUCTION



A close-up photograph of a young boy's face and hand. The boy has dark hair and is looking directly at the camera with a somber expression. He is wearing an orange garment. His right hand is raised, showing significant injury: the index and middle fingers are missing, and the remaining fingers are discolored and appear to have small wounds or abrasions. The background is dark and out of focus.

Ali, 10, from Kafr Zaytā, Hama Governorate, Syria, shows his injured hand. Ali lost two fingers and the use of his left eye after throwing an unexploded submunition at a wall in April 2025. His sister was also injured in the incident.

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THE IMPACT

INTRODUCTION

This overview examines the harmful impacts caused by cluster munitions, including casualties and contamination, and charts the efforts by and challenges facing States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in fulfilling their obligations to clear cluster munition remnants, support survivors, and protect affected communities through risk education. As States Parties prepare to meet at the convention's Third Review Conference in Vientiane, Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), in September 2026 and adopt a new five-year action plan, this overview assesses progress and remaining challenges during the implementation of the Lausanne Action Plan adopted at the Second Review Conference in 2021, while also reflecting on broader trends since the convention entered into force.¹

This chapter therefore combines a review of long-term progress since the convention entered into force with an assessment of implementation during the five-year Lausanne Action Plan period and detailed reporting on developments in 2025, incorporating updates available through July 2026 where relevant. In doing so, it supports States Parties in reviewing progress towards fulfilling the convention's commitment to "put an end for all time to the suffering and casualties caused by cluster munitions" and in identifying priorities for the next implementation period.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS

CASUALTY OVERVIEW

The cluster munition casualty context changed substantially after the entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2010. While the first Cluster Munition Monitor report largely reflected casualties from past use—particularly in Southeast Asia and the Middle

¹ Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Working Paper on Elements for the Vientiane Capital Action Plan: Submitted by the President," 30 March 2026, bit.ly/WorkingPaperVCAP30Mar2026; and Lausanne Action Plan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Review Conference, Geneva, 21 September 2021, bit.ly/LausanneActionPlan.

East—new use in major conflicts since then, including in Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen, has added large numbers of new casualties.²

By the First Meeting of States Parties in Lao PDR in 2010, the Monitor had recorded 16,816 confirmed cluster munition casualties globally through the end of 2009, including 2,097 from attacks and 14,719 from cluster munition remnants. By the end of 2025, the global total reached 25,873 casualties, including at least 6,970 from attacks and 18,903 from cluster munition remnants.³ However, casualty data continues to be incomplete, meaning the actual number of casualties is likely to be significantly higher than the total recorded.

The highest recorded totals of all time were in Lao PDR, Syria, Iraq, Ukraine, and Vietnam, with Syria and Ukraine heavily impacted by attacks after 2010. Since the First Meeting of States Parties, casualties from cluster munition attacks have been recorded only in states not party, including Azerbaijan, Libya, Myanmar, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.

Global casualties increased sharply in 2025, reaching a level close to that of 2022, which marked the highest annual total recorded since 2010. The 2025 casualty total of 1,063 people killed and injured from cluster munition attacks and cluster munition remnants was one of the highest annual totals since Monitor reporting started.

In 2025, cluster munition attacks were recorded in states not party Ukraine and Myanmar, while cluster munition remnants caused casualties across eight countries, including States Parties Afghanistan, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Lebanon, and states not party Cambodia, Russia, Syria, and Ukraine.

The rapid increase in cluster munition casualties over the past few years is heavily tied to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, where the highest number of annual casualties was recorded for the fourth consecutive year in 2025. The vast majority of casualties resulted from attacks, with a smaller number from cluster munition remnants—primarily unexploded submunitions released by cluster munitions during attacks and that, predictably, failed to detonate, leaving mine-like hazards.⁴ By contrast, in 2021, prior to the invasion, no new attacks were reported and all casualties were caused by cluster munition remnants.

The five-year period of the Lausanne Action Plan has been marked by several distinct patterns of harm that arise from cluster munition use. Spikes in casualties from new cluster munition attacks have driven the global annual fluctuations apparent during this period. While annual casualty numbers from cluster munition remnants have generally been lower than those during attacks, these remnants persist over time and continue to pose a long-term threat to affected communities even after attacks have ceased.

Civilians represented the vast majority of casualties, consistent with the wide-area effects and indiscriminate impact of cluster munitions, both during attacks and after use. Children remained particularly vulnerable to cluster munition remnants, frequently drawn to unexploded submunitions by their small size, distinctive shapes, and shine or bright coloring, and often encountering them near homes, schools, places where they play, or agricultural areas where they herd or forage. Adults were primarily exposed to cluster munition remnants during livelihood activities, movement, return, or other daily activities in contaminated areas.

DEVELOPMENTS IN VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Since the entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2010, the fulfillment of national victim assistance has remained hampered by long-term capacity challenges and has generally fallen short of its intended goals. Implementation capacities and settings changed markedly across many countries during this period.

² See, International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), *Cluster Munition Monitor 2010* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), bit.ly/CMMonitor2010.

³ These figures include updated historical data.

⁴ By definition, cluster munition remnants also include unexploded bomblets, failed cluster munitions, and abandoned cluster munitions.

In Iraq, the 2014–2017 conflict with the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) and subsequent instability added severe pressure to services; by 2025, mobility aids and assistive devices were provided through national structures, but local resources could not meet demand. In Lebanon, shocks to health infrastructure and financing since the 2019 economic crisis have caused rehabilitation capacity to decline sharply; by 2025, services were less available, unevenly distributed, and scarce in rural areas. In Afghanistan, following the Taliban takeover in August 2021, humanitarian and economic crisis, restrictions affecting women and girls, forced returns, insecurity, and ongoing high numbers of mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties created serious risks for access to services and program sustainability. In Lao PDR, service structures existing prior to 2010 largely remained stagnant, with only limited advances in rehabilitation occurring before a massive decline in service availability in 2025. Lao PDR—host of both the First Meeting of States Parties in 2010 and the Third Review Conference in 2026—remains central to the convention’s casualty and victim assistance needs.

The number of States Parties with victim assistance responsibilities has grown steadily since the treaty’s inception. In 2010, States Parties with recorded casualties included Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Lao PDR, Montenegro, and Sierra Leone. Since then, additional states with victims have joined the convention, including Afghanistan (March 2012), Chad (September 2013), Guinea-Bissau (May 2011), Iraq (November 2013), Lebanon (May 2011), Mauritania (August 2012), Somalia (March 2016), and South Sudan (February 2024).⁵

National responsibilities to victims persist despite progress made in clearing contaminated areas. Since 2010, BiH, Croatia, Guinea-Bissau, and Montenegro have all completed their Article 4 cluster munition contamination clearance, yet they retain their Article 5 victim assistance obligations. Similarly, although Albania was declared clear of cluster munition remnants in 2009, it still held victim assistance obligations when the convention entered into force.

Developments since the adoption of the Lausanne Action Plan in 2021 reveal a widening gap between the adoption of policy frameworks and practical improvements in service access. While some States Parties reported efforts to implement national strategies, disability frameworks, referral systems, rehabilitation services, or socio-economic inclusion measures, the 2021–2026 Lausanne Action Plan framework simply grouped the core health-and-rehabilitation-related obligations elaborated under Article 5 into one conglomerate measure. It was therefore no more comprehensive than the treaty text itself. It neither elaborated states’ commitments nor identified the most pressing needs arising under Article 5 during this period, as action plans should do to operationalize and advance the work and promise of the convention. Thus, it essentially functioned as a structural reorganization of existing Article 5 obligations rather than meeting the objective of increasing available services.

Reporting indicates that survivors have continued to face barriers, including distance from services, transport costs, shortages of trained personnel and materials, limited outreach, and insufficient funding. In some States Parties with large numbers of survivors, including Afghanistan, Lao PDR, and Lebanon, needs remained high and service systems fragile. Conversely, in smaller affected States Parties, while services often exist, they were not adapted to the specific needs of cluster munition survivors. Nevertheless, the growing use of International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 13.10 for victim assistance in mine action has reinforced the role of mine action authorities in key areas, including identifying victims, assessing needs, facilitating referrals, monitoring access, and supporting survivor participation.

Overall, victim assistance in conflict-affected and resource-constrained settings has been further weakened since 2021 by insecurity, displacement, damaged health infrastructure, access restrictions, and reductions in donor funding. The main observation from the five-

⁵ South Sudan was not an independent state when the convention entered into force; it became independent in 2011 and acceded to the convention in 2023.

year implementation period of the Lausanne Action Plan is one of slow progress in the continuing struggle to turn obligations, standards, and national frameworks into real service access for survivors, affected families, and communities while contending with declining global resources and severe domestic challenges.

PROGRESS TOWARDS ARTICLE 4 OBLIGATIONS

Since the Convention on Cluster Munitions entered into force in 2010, States Parties have made substantial progress in addressing the legacy of cluster munition contamination.

Eleven States Parties have completed their Article 4 obligations, including seven since the convention entered into force, while others have continuously reduced the extent of known contamination through survey and clearance. Progress has not been uniform, however. Clearance has remained concentrated among a relatively small number of heavily contaminated States Parties, while others continue to face protracted challenges related to insecurity, funding constraints, difficult operating environments, and limited national capacity. These persistent implementation challenges have also underscored the importance of improving the understanding of contamination to support effective prioritization, long-term planning, and resource mobilization for the release of cluster munition contaminated land.

Over the last five years, the Lausanne Action Plan therefore placed renewed emphasis on establishing accurate, evidence-based contamination baselines (through Action 18). During the plan's five-year implementation period, several affected States Parties improved their understanding of the extent and location of contamination through survey activities, resulting in more reliable planning assumptions and, in some cases, revised contamination estimates. Recorded contamination nevertheless continued to evolve rather than consistently decline. While clearance reduced contamination in many areas, these gains were offset in some cases by new use of cluster munitions and, in others, by improved survey that identified previously unknown hazardous areas. Consequently, increases in recorded contamination often reflected improved knowledge rather than new contamination.

The persistent reliance on Article 4 extension requests also remained a defining feature of implementation during the Lausanne Action Plan. During the plan's five-year period, 10 States Parties submitted a total of 14 extension requests, with Chad submitting three requests and Chile and Mauritania two each. Chad's most recent request, submitted in January 2026 but pending approval at the Third Review Conference, sought a four-year extension. Afghanistan, BiH, Germany, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Somalia each submitted one extension request, with BiH subsequently completing its Article 4 obligations in 2023. The persistent reliance on extension requests is difficult to reconcile with the convention's expectation that such requests remain exceptional. As of August 2026, South Sudan was the only State Party working towards its original Article 4 deadline, although this should be viewed in light of its accession to the Convention only in 2023.

As of the end of 2025, 11 States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions remained contaminated by cluster munition remnants, while contamination was also known to exist in one signatory, 15 states not party, and two other areas. Use (or possible use) of cluster munitions in 2025 and 2026 is believed or suspected to have generated new contamination in States Parties Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Mali, and states not party Cambodia, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, Russia, and Ukraine. State Party Nigeria reported finding individual submunitions; however, at the time of publication, it had not yet been established whether these formed part of a broader contaminated area.

In 2025, States Parties released a combined total of 113.98km² of land suspected or confirmed to be contaminated by cluster munitions through clearance, technical survey, and

non-technical survey, resulting in the destruction of 64,898 cluster munition remnants.⁶ Progress towards fulfilling Article 4 obligations nevertheless remained heavily concentrated in a small number of States Parties. State Party Lao PDR continued to report by far the largest amount of cluster munition remnant land release globally, while Iraq recorded a substantial increase in land release in 2025. Together, Lao PDR and Iraq accounted for the vast majority of cluster munition contaminated land released by States Parties during the five-year review period. At the same time, however, several States Parties with smaller areas of remaining contamination reported little or no progress due to insecurity, difficult terrain, funding shortfalls, environmental restrictions, and limited operational capacity. In some cases, insufficient prioritization of convention implementation also appeared to be a contributing factor.

DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK EDUCATION

Since the convention entered into force in 2010, risk education has evolved from a largely awareness-based activity into a broader protection-oriented approach. Over time, States Parties have increasingly integrated risk education into national mine action programs and broader humanitarian, development, education, health, and victim assistance initiatives, while expanding community-based delivery approaches and strengthening national ownership.

During the five-year implementation period of the Lausanne Action Plan, this evolution was reflected in the growing use of conflict preparedness and protection (CPP) approaches in active-conflict settings, as well as increasing efforts to integrate risk education into broader initiatives.⁷ States Parties also strengthened institutional delivery through schools, national authorities, community structures, and humanitarian coordination mechanisms, while improving links with victim assistance and broader protection services. By 2025, all States Parties reporting risk education activities provided sex- and age-disaggregated beneficiary data, improving the ability to assess whether activities were reaching populations most at risk. Remaining gaps included the limited reporting of disability-disaggregated data and the lack of clarity over whether beneficiary figures related specifically to cluster munition contamination.

Risk education remained a critical component of efforts to protect civilians from the risks posed by cluster munition remnants in 2025. Across affected States Parties, farmers, herders, nomadic populations, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees, and communities accessing contaminated land for livelihood activities continued to face the greatest risks. Children remained both the largest group of risk education beneficiaries and one of the groups most vulnerable to harm. Risk education was implemented in all States Parties with cluster munition contamination except in Chad (where activities could not be conducted due to funding constraints) and in Chile and Germany (where contamination is confined to military areas inaccessible to civilians).

Despite these advances, insecurity, access constraints, population displacement, and funding shortfalls continued to hinder implementation in several affected States Parties. These challenges reinforced the importance of integrating risk education into broader

⁶ The contamination and land release figures presented in this report are rounded to the nearest hundredth. Land release findings are based on data collected and analyzed by Mine Action Review, an independent project of Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). NPA is a member of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC). Mine Action Review provided the Monitor with the contamination and land release data used in this chapter under a Memorandum of Understanding. Mine Action Review's country profiles and additional information are available at www.mineactionreview.org/.

⁷ Conflict preparedness and protection (CPP) refers to the measures and actions taken to help civilians prepare for and protect themselves from the risks and dangers associated with armed conflict, particularly in populated areas. It aims to empower individuals and communities to mitigate the negative impacts of conflict by promoting safety awareness, risk reduction strategies, and resilience-building. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) in the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM)," 16 July 2024, p. 3, bit.ly/CCM-EORE16July2024.

systems and programs in order to maintain coverage, strengthen national and community ownership, and support the implementation of States Parties' obligations under the convention.

CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES

CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES RECORDED GLOBALLY, FOR ALL TIME

The Monitor tracks global cluster munition casualties back to the mid-1960s, beginning with the massive United States (US) cluster munition attacks in Southeast Asia. The Monitor has recorded a global total of 25,873 cluster munition casualties—people killed and injured—for all time through to the end of 2025. This figure encompasses casualties from both direct cluster munition attacks (6,970) and cluster munition remnants (18,903).⁸

Annual casualty totals since the
Convention on Cluster Munitions
entered into force⁹

Year	Total cluster munition casualties
2011	55
2012	604
2013	1,047
2014	439
2015	431
2016	1,108
2017	425
2018	276
2019	317
2020	360
2021	149
2022	1,172
2023	219
2024	309
2025	1,063

The actual number of casualties, both documented and estimated, is known to be massively under-represented as many casualties go unrecorded. The total calculation of all recorded casualties plus evidence-based estimated casualties for individual countries from

⁸ For one casualty in Montenegro, it was not recorded if the incident was an attack or cluster munition remnant.

⁹ The Monitor gathers available data on cluster munition casualties recorded annually in individual countries and compiles statistics for each full calendar year. The Monitor also collects data on past casualties and records casualties over time for country profiles, and revises aggregated global historical data on cluster munition casualties as new information becomes available.

the period prior to entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions indicates that at least 57,800 casualties have occurred worldwide through 2025.¹⁰

As of the end of 2025 and dating back to the US bombing of Southeast Asia in the 1960s, cluster munition casualties have been recorded in 16 States Parties to the convention, four signatory states, 17 states not party, and two other areas.

The states with the highest number of recorded casualties, for all time, in the Monitor dataset are: Lao PDR (7,814), Syria (4,557), Iraq (3,216), Ukraine (2,235), and Vietnam (2,135). Both Lao PDR and Iraq are States Parties to the convention. Prior to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, casualties directly caused by use have been grossly under-reported.

States and other areas with recorded cluster munition casualties, by casualty range (as of 31 December 2025)¹¹

More than 1,000 recorded casualties	100–1,000 recorded casualties	10–99 recorded casualties	Less than 10 recorded casualties/Unknown
Iraq Lao PDR Syria Ukraine Vietnam	Afghanistan <u>Angola</u> Azerbaijan Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Cambodia Croatia <u>Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)</u> Eritrea Ethiopia <i>Kosovo</i> Kuwait Lebanon Russia Serbia South Sudan <i>Western Sahara</i> Yemen	Albania Colombia Georgia Israel Myanmar Sierra Leone Sudan Tajikistan <u>Uganda</u>	Chad Guinea-Bissau <u>Liberia</u> Libya Mauritania Montenegro Mozambique Somalia

Note: States Parties are indicated in **bold**; signatories are underlined; and other areas are in *italics*.

¹⁰ Other global estimates have put the total number of cluster munition casualties for all time as high as 100,000. However, these are from research-based extrapolations of limited data samples, which may not be representative of national averages or the actual number of casualties calculated by the Monitor based on known data and various country estimates recorded in Humanity & Inclusion (HI) data. See also, Handicap International (HI), Circle of Impact: *The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities* (Brussels: HI, May 2007), bit.ly/MonitorHICircleofImpact2007.

¹¹ No numbers or estimated casualty totals are known for Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, or Mozambique. No cluster munition victims have been reported by Chile. Media reporting in 2021 on two survivors of a military explosive remnant of war (ERW) incident in Chile in 1995 described the item as a cluster munition remnant, however it was assessed that the munition involved was an explosive anti-aircraft shell. Email from Sergio Larraín Barth, International Programs & Operations Desk Officer, Chile Ministry of National Defense, 23 January 2025. It is possible that cluster munition casualties have occurred but gone unrecorded in other states where cluster munitions were used, abandoned, or stored in the past, such as State Party Zambia and states not party Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Zimbabwe. Better identification and disaggregation of cluster munition casualties is needed in most cluster munition affected states and areas.

States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions have recorded 13,230 cluster munition casualties for all time.

A total of 604 casualties have been recorded for all time in signatories.

In states not party and other areas, a total of 12,039 cluster munition casualties were recorded for all time up to the end of 2025. Since the convention's entry into force in August 2010, casualties from cluster munition attacks have only occurred in states not party, specifically Azerbaijan, Libya, Myanmar, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen, as well as in other areas Kosovo and Western Sahara.

States and other areas with cluster munition casualties, by convention status (as of 31 December 2025)


States Parties	Signatories	States not party and other areas
Afghanistan Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Chad Colombia Croatia Guinea-Bissau Iraq Lao PDR Lebanon Mauritania Montenegro Mozambique Sierra Leone Somalia South Sudan	Angola Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Liberia Uganda	Azerbaijan Cambodia Eritrea Ethiopia Georgia Israel <i>Kosovo</i> Kuwait Libya Myanmar Russia Serbia Sudan Syria Tajikistan Ukraine Vietnam <i>Western Sahara</i> Yemen

Note: Other areas are indicated in *italics*.

CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES, 2021–2025

Cluster munition remnants continued to cause casualties each year from 2021 to 2025, driven mainly by new use of cluster munitions in conflict, particularly in Ukraine. The 2021 total was comparatively low, with all recorded casualties caused by cluster munition remnants and no recorded casualties from attacks. Casualties increased sharply in 2022 due to attacks following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, when the Monitor recorded the highest global annual total since reporting began in 2010. The total fell in 2023 and increased only marginally in 2024. In 2025, the total again reached a very high level, close to that recorded in 2022, with renewed attacks in Ukraine as the main cause of casualties.

Casualties from cluster munitions: 2021–2025¹²



CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES IN 2025

For 2025, the Monitor recorded a total of 1,063 cluster munition casualties, making it one of the highest annual totals since Cluster Munition Monitor recording began in 2010.¹³

Ukraine continued to have the highest number of annual casualties of cluster munitions for the fourth consecutive year, with at least 927 casualties recorded in 2025. The 2025 total is more than four times the 208 casualties recorded for Ukraine in 2024, with attacks causing the majority of cluster munition casualties reported. As has been the case since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, civilian casualties from cluster munition attacks in the country could have gone unrecorded in 2025.

Cluster Munition Monitor recorded cluster munition casualties due to attacks in Myanmar in 2023, 2024, and 2025, but did not identify any casualties caused by cluster munition remnants during that period.

In 2025, casualties from cluster munitions, including both attacks and unexploded submunitions, were recorded in a total of nine countries. Casualties from attacks were recorded in two states not party, Ukraine and Myanmar, while casualties from cluster munition remnants were recorded in eight countries, including four States Parties and four states not party.

Cluster munition remnants continue to disproportionately affect civilians. Children are especially vulnerable to unexploded submunitions. The small size, distinctive shapes, and shine or sometimes bright coloring can make unexploded submunitions seem attractive or enticing to children. These explosives are often encountered in or near homes, schools, agricultural land where children herd, areas where they forage for family subsistence, and places where they play. The continued presence of cluster munition remnants therefore poses an ongoing risk to children long after attacks have ended. Adults as well are often exposed during livelihood activities, movement, return, or other daily activities in contaminated areas.

¹² The 2024 total for casualties from cluster munition attacks has been adjusted since first published in *Cluster Munition Monitor 2025*. See, Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), *Cluster Munition Monitor 2025* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2025), bit.ly/CMMonitorReports.

¹³ The calendar year 2022 had more cluster munition casualties (1,172 casualties) than any year since 2010, including when compared to all annual totals revised retrospectively with new data sources and upwardly adjusted to include those casualties. The next highest annual total was in 2016, adjusted to 1,108 casualties with newly available data. The Monitor adjusts casualty data over time as new information becomes available.

CASUALTIES FROM CLUSTER MUNITION ATTACKS

Casualties from attacks had been recorded every year from 2012 through 2020, largely driven by heavy cluster munition use in Syria up to 2020. Although no casualties from cluster munition attacks were recorded in 2021, the number increased sharply in 2022 (987), following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. A similarly high number of casualties from attacks was recorded in 2025 (946).

Since Cluster Munition Monitor reporting began in 2010, through the end of 2025, all casualties resulting directly from cluster munition attacks have occurred in states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In 2025, all 946 recorded casualties from cluster munition attacks were reported in two states not party: Myanmar and Ukraine.

In Ukraine, the Monitor recorded 902 casualties from cluster munition attacks in 2025, with a total of at least 2,075 such casualties from cluster munition attacks since Russia's full-scale invasion began on 24 February 2022 through to the end of 2025.

In Myanmar, cluster munitions used in aerial attacks by Myanmar Armed Forces resulted in at least 44 casualties in 2025.

Cluster munition casualties in 2025

Cluster munition attack casualties	
Ukraine	902
Myanmar	44
Cluster munition remnant casualties	
Syria	68
Ukraine	25
Lao PDR	8
Afghanistan	5
Iraq	4
Russia	3
Lebanon	2
Cambodia	2

Note: States Parties are indicated in **bold**.

CASUALTIES FROM CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS

Casualties from cluster munition remnants were recorded each year since Cluster Munition Monitor reporting began. In 2025, a total of 117 casualties from cluster munition remnants were recorded in States Parties Afghanistan (5), Iraq (4), Lao PDR (8), and Lebanon (2), and in states not party Cambodia (2), Russia (3), Syria (68), and Ukraine (25). Casualties caused by cluster munition remnants are often not specifically identified as such due to a lack of resources and detailed or disaggregated data. Consequently, casualties from cluster munition remnants may be reported as occurring in incidents from other ERW and mines.

CIVILIAN CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES

Civilians accounted for 87% of recorded casualties in 2025. A high ratio of civilian casualties from cluster munitions is consistent with the indiscriminate nature of these weapons and their disproportionate impact. In 2025, the Monitor recorded 925 civilian, 135 military, and three deminer casualties. This is a slight increase in the ratio of military casualties to civilians compared to past years. However, no military casualties were included in Monitor reporting for 2024 due to unreliable reporting on military casualties and unsubstantiated estimates in Ukraine.

Overall, in 2025, as in recent years, sex- and age-disaggregation of data of casualties was severely lacking. However, available data shows at least seven casualties were women. At least 34 child casualties from cluster munitions were recorded, including three girls.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

VICTIM ASSISTANCE IN STATES PARTIES

The Convention on Cluster Munitions—in many ways a landmark humanitarian disarmament agreement—is the first international treaty to require States Parties with victims of a specific weapon under their jurisdiction and control to provide victim assistance, and is also the first international humanitarian law treaty to include a reporting requirement for victim assistance.¹⁴

Article 5 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions expanded and clarified international norms for victim assistance that had been originally established under Article 6(3) of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. By codifying the international understanding of victim assistance and its components and provisions, the Convention on Cluster Munitions influenced the recognition of similar commitments in the 2008 Plan of Action on Victim Assistance under the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V (2003) on ERW. Article 5 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions has also reinforced victim assistance practices under the Mine Ban Treaty process, including through joint work and the mutual promotion of integrated approaches. It has helped strengthen how subsequent Mine Ban Treaty action plans and other relevant documents describe, structure, and measure victim assistance implementation. For instance, while the Nairobi Action Plan (2005–2009) initially framed Article 6(3) as a “vital promise” to mine victims, their families, and communities, and claimed that States Parties would “do their utmost” to carry out specific victim assistance actions, the subsequent post-Convention on Cluster Munitions Maputo +15 Declaration (2014) highlighted Mine Ban Treaty States Parties’ acknowledgment of their “enduring obligations to mine victims.”¹⁵ This commitment is reflected in the substance and rights-adjacent actions of plans adopted since.

The Convention on Cluster Munitions requires States Parties with cluster munition victims to implement specific activities to ensure that adequate assistance is provided. For instance, Article 5 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions requires that States Parties with cluster munition victims implement the following activities:

- Provide adequate assistance, including
 - medical care,
 - rehabilitation,
 - psychological support, and
 - social and economic inclusion;
- Designate a responsible focal point in government, and coordinate victim assistance programs;
- Implement national legislation according to the principles of international law;
- Provide assistance that is gender- and age-sensitive, as well as non-discriminatory;
- Collect relevant data and assess the needs of cluster munition victims;
- Actively involve cluster munition victims in victim assistance;
- Develop a national plan, budget, and timeframe for implementation; and
- Report on all aspects of implementation.

The objectives of the convention’s victim assistance obligations have been elaborated in the successive five-year action plans adopted by States Parties since the First Meeting of States Parties in Vientiane in November 2010. While each action plan has included a set of assessable goals and commitments, the specific structural focus and framing have varied over successive cycles.

¹⁴ Cluster munition victims include survivors (people who were injured by cluster munitions or their explosive remnants and lived), other persons directly impacted by cluster munitions, as well as their affected families and communities. Most cluster munition survivors are also persons with disabilities. The term “cluster munition casualties” is used to refer both to people killed and people injured as a result of cluster munition use or by cluster munition remnants.

¹⁵ Nairobi Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty First Review Conference, Nairobi, 3 December 2004, bit.ly/NairobiActionPlan2004; and Maputo +15 Declaration, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 27 June 2014, bit.ly/Maputo15Declaration2014.



A Humanity & Inclusion (HI) social worker assesses the needs of cluster munition survivor Mykhailo Illich in Nova Husarivka, Kharkiv Oblast, Ukraine. Mykhailo's leg was amputated following a cluster munition incident in September 2022.

© L. Hutsul/HI, September 2025

The initial Vientiane Action Plan (2011–2015) included these services across several victim assistance actions, while the Dubrovnik Action Plan (2016–2020) addressed the core services of Article 5 within broader actions related to strengthening national capacity, reviewing service availability and quality, and integrating victim assistance into disability, poverty reduction, and other frameworks. In contrast, the Lausanne Action Plan (2021–2026) consolidated the clinical and therapeutic aspects of Article 5 within a single pillar on service provision.

Action 34 of the Lausanne Action Plan committed States Parties to provide first-aid and long-term medical care to cluster munition victims, as well as to ensure victims can access adequate rehabilitation, psychological, and psychosocial support services as part of a broader public health approach. The plan's reference to a public health approach indicates that these services should be organized through national health systems, referral mechanisms, and accessible service networks, rather than delivered primarily through separate victim assistance projects. While this public health framework explicitly called for the integration of victim assistance into national health systems, it has yet to translate into measurable improvements on the ground. In many contexts, national health systems have lacked the capacity to address victims' needs and fulfill victim assistance obligations. In fact, in several countries, the capacity of the national health systems themselves has declined.

STATE PARTIES WITH VICTIM ASSISTANCE OBLIGATIONS

Victim assistance obligations under Article 5 are ongoing and remain irrespective of the presence of cluster munition contamination. Albania, BiH, Croatia, Guinea-Bissau, and Montenegro have fulfilled their Article 4 clearance obligations, but continue to have Article 5 obligations towards cluster munition victims. Similarly, although Sierra Leone has had no

known contaminated area, that does not eliminate the obligation to provide victim assistance in the case of cluster munition victims who were casualties from attacks.¹⁶

States Parties that have reported responsibility for cluster munition victims¹⁷

Afghanistan	Lao PDR
Albania	Lebanon
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	Mauritania
Chad	Montenegro
Croatia	Sierra Leone
Guinea-Bissau	Somalia
Iraq	South Sudan

Article 5 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions also stipulates that any differences in the treatment of cluster munition victims with disabilities, as compared to other individuals with disabilities, must be predicated solely on their specific needs.¹⁸

¹⁶ In its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report for calendar year 2025, Sierra Leone reiterated that it does not have “specific victims of cluster munition [*sic*].” Sierra Leone Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report (for calendar year 2025), Form H. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/DatabaseArticle7CCM. However, Sierra Leone reportedly has cluster munition victims from attacks during the intervention of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1998 and 1999 during Sierra Leone’s civil war. See, HI, Circle of Impact: *The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities* (Brussels: HI, May 2007), p. 54, bit.ly/MonitorHICircleofImpact2007; and statement of Sierra Leone, Accra Regional Conference on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Accra, 28–30 May 2012, bit.ly/SierraLeoneStatementMay2012. In 2024, Convention on Cluster Munitions reporting continued to note Sierra Leone as having cluster munition victims. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Sierra Leone: Country Profile,” updated 29 October 2024, bit.ly/SierraLeoneCCMProfile.

¹⁷ Not all States Parties with cluster munition casualties recorded on their territory have acknowledged the application of the Convention on Cluster Munitions obligation regarding victim assistance. Cluster munition casualties have been reported in Colombia and Mozambique, but neither have themselves reported any cluster munition victims and therefore do not recognize the application of the obligation to assist victims under the convention. **Colombia:** As identified in Case No. 12.416 (Santo Domingo Massacre v. the Republic of Colombia) heard before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), 17 civilians were killed and 27 were injured during a cluster munition attack in Santo Domingo, Colombia, on 13 December 1998. All casualties occurred at the time of the attack and no unexploded submunition casualties were reported in Colombia. Colombia later ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which entered into force for the country on 1 March 2016. In November 2017, the Supreme Court of Colombia upheld the decision of IACHR case, Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, regarding redress for cluster munition victims of the attack in 1998. The IACHR prescribed measures for remedy that are essentially consistent with the victim assistance obligations of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. IACHR, “Case of The Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia (Preliminary objections, merits and reparations): Judgement of November 30, 2012,” 30 November 2012, bit.ly/IACHRColombia30Nov2012. See also, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Colombia, Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre,” undated, bit.ly/ICRCSantoDomingo2012. **Mozambique:** Casualties that occurred in Mozambique due to cluster munition attacks by Rhodesia were likely predominantly Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) forces. Previously, Mozambique reported on victim assistance efforts under the Convention on Cluster Munitions and stated that “additional surveys are needed to identify victims of cluster munitions.” See, for example, Mozambique Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reports (for calendar years 2010 and 2014), Form H. No such surveys were reported. However, in its most recent Article 7 report from 2020, Mozambique said that “at the moment there is no evidence of victims of cluster munitions.” Mozambique Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form H.

¹⁸ Including medical, rehabilitative, psychological, or socio-economic needs. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Article 5.2.e. This is also relevant to international humanitarian law, including Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions, with regard to wounded military personnel and direct participants in hostilities: “There shall be no distinction among them founded on any grounds other than medical ones.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, Article 7.2., bit.ly/GenevaProtocolII.

Some victim assistance efforts have reached family members of people killed by cluster munitions as well as those who survived direct harm from cluster munitions. Assistance to so-called “indirect victims” is, however, far less common than assistance provided to survivors and persons with disabilities.

Research indicates that victim assistance, as defined in the Convention on Cluster Munitions and in humanitarian disarmament more broadly, has contributed to making more resources available to survivors, as well as persons with disabilities, and in some instances other people with similar needs as cluster munition victims.¹⁹

Following Lebanon’s accession to the Mine Ban Treaty in May 2026, Lao PDR remains the only country with victim assistance obligations that is bound by the Convention on Cluster Munitions but that is not also party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Every other state with these obligations is bound by both frameworks and as such has victim assistance commitments under the respective treaties and action plans.²⁰ As a result, these States Parties have overlapping victim assistance obligations and commitments and must report on implementation through separate, but similar, reporting mechanisms.

IMPLEMENTATION OF VICTIM ASSISTANCE IN STATES PARTIES

From 2021, victim assistance efforts under Article 5 continued amid increasing pressure on national systems. States Parties reported progress despite persistent barriers to services, including the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, insecurity and armed conflict, humanitarian and economic crises, displacement, weakened health systems, and funding constraints. Reductions in international cooperation and assistance, including US funding cuts, further affected service delivery and sustainability in some affected countries.

MEDICAL CARE

In States Parties, medical responses for cluster munition victims included first-aid, field trauma care, emergency evacuation, transport, immediate medical treatment, and longer-term healthcare. Cluster munition survivors frequently require extensive medical care as a result of blast-related trauma sustained at the time of the incident. Injuries commonly include penetrating fragment and blast-related injuries, burns, traumatic amputation, eye injuries, and hearing loss due to the detonation. Ongoing care for traumatic amputation includes staged surgical revision. Burn injuries often require grafting and reconstructive surgery. Blast-related eye injuries, which affect a significant proportion of survivors, can require ongoing treatment after the incident, as can hearing impairment resulting from primary blast injury.

In the acute phase, rather than delivering clinical psychological interventions, psychological first-aid provided shortly after the incident, typically by first responders, health workers, or family members, focuses on ensuring safety, addressing basic needs, and reconnecting the survivor with family and immediate support.

¹⁹ See, Bonnie Docherty and Alicia Sanders-Zakre, “The origins and influence of victim assistance: Contributions of the Mine Ban Treaty, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Convention on Cluster Munitions,” *International Review of the Red Cross*, Vol. 105, No. 922, November 2022, pp. 252–277, [bit.ly/IRRC922-Nov2022](https://www.icrc.org/ihl-nr/commentary/article/105-no-922-november-2022); ICBL-CMC, “Fact Sheet: Victim Assistance Since Entry Into Force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” September 2012, [bit.ly/ICBLCMCfactsheetVASep2012](https://www.icbl-cmc.org/fact-sheet-victim-assistance-since-entry-into-force-of-the-convention-on-cluster-munitions); ICBL-CMC, “Equal Basis 2014: Access and Rights in 33 Countries,” December 2014, [bit.ly/ICBLCMCEqualBasis2014](https://www.icbl-cmc.org/equal-basis-2014); ICBL-CMC, “Equal Basis 2015: Inclusion and Rights in 33 Countries,” 2 December 2015, [bit.ly/ICBLCMCEqualBasis2015](https://www.icbl-cmc.org/equal-basis-2015); and ICBL-CMC, “Frameworks for Victim Assistance,” 3 December 2013 and November 2018, [bit.ly/ICBLCMC-VA3Dec2013](https://www.icbl-cmc.org/frameworks-for-victim-assistance) and [bit.ly/ICBLCMC-VANov2018](https://www.icbl-cmc.org/frameworks-for-victim-assistance).

²⁰ The Mine Ban Treaty will enter into force for Lebanon on 1 November 2026.

However, in many affected communities, particularly those nearer to cluster munition remnant contaminated areas, medical care remained unavailable or inadequate during the reporting period.

In **Lao PDR**, emergency and continuing medical care were coordinated and/or provided through the health ministry.²¹ In 2025, survivors received medical support through the Victim Assistance Fund implemented by JSI Research & Training Institute, Inc. (JSI).²² Previously, World Education Laos had partnered with the National Regulatory Authority for UXO/Mine Action Sector in Lao PDR (NRA) to administer medical funds for victims.²³ According to a survey covering 2020–2024, survivors often paid for treatment, including medical care and spiritual or traditional healing, as out-of-pocket expenses—sometimes paying ongoing interest on a loan. Some survivors of ERW incidents faced delays in accessing timely and appropriate medical care and appropriate transport. Delays in reaching health facilities were also due to survivors being brought home first to arrange for money or transport to medical services.²⁴

In **Afghanistan**, an extensive survey on access to emergency medical care published by the non-governmental organization (NGO) EMERGENCY in 2025 demonstrated that Afghanistan's healthcare system remains critically under-resourced, with limited access to emergency, surgical, and trauma care services. Facilities lack staff and equipment; referral

and transport are limited. Gaps in services are especially notable in rural areas.²⁵ Many clinics and hospitals in Afghanistan shut down in the last few years due to lack of funding and consequently the number of patients in remaining facilities significantly increased.²⁶

In **Lebanon**, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) implemented repairs and maintenance in several primary healthcare centers, improving access to essential health services for conflict-affected populations.²⁷ Formal state-offered victim assistance services were lacking, but charity organizations reportedly provided limited emergency financial aid and distribution of medicine.²⁸ The ICRC supported emergency response in Lebanon by training emergency personnel in the treatment of weapon-related injuries.²⁹



A DanChurchAid (DCA) staff member marks a BLU-63 submunition discovered in South Lebanon near a banana plantation.

© Rashad Siblini/DCA, February 2026

²¹ Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H.

²² World Education became a division of John Snow, Inc./JSI Research & Training Institute, Inc. (JSI) in 2023. JSI, "Expertise: World Education," undated, bit.ly/JSIWorldEducation; and Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H.

²³ "US extends support for UXO accident victims," *Vientiane Times*, 9 December 2024, bit.ly/VientianeTimes9Dec2024.

²⁴ JSI, "Antecedents, Accidents, and Impacts: A Mixed-Methods Study of Adult and Child Survivors of 2020–2024 UXO Accidents in Lao PDR," December 2025, bit.ly/JSILaoUXODec2025.

²⁵ EMERGENCY, "Access to Emergency, Critical, and Operative Care in Afghanistan: Perspectives from Afghan People and Healthcare Workers in 11 Provinces," June 2025, bit.ly/AfghanistanEMERGENCYJune2025.

²⁶ ITF Enhancing Human Security, "Annual Report 2025," undated [2026], p. 85, bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2025.

²⁷ ICRC, "Lebanon: Operational Facts and Figures - 2026," 21 April 2026, bit.ly/ICRCLebanon21Apr2026.

²⁸ Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H.

²⁹ ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, pp. 447–448, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

PHYSICAL REHABILITATION

Survivors of cluster munition incidents often acquire long-term impairments resulting in disabilities that require complex rehabilitation. Despite ongoing efforts, States Parties continued to face significant challenges in 2025 in ensuring adequate, accessible, and affordable rehabilitation, especially in remote or rural areas. Needs remained particularly high and the situation was fragile in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Lebanon, where large numbers of cluster munition victims require services and support. Where services were reported to be available in several countries, bureaucracy sometimes hampered access, and gaps often persisted in staffing, geographic coverage, and long-term follow-up.

In **Lao PDR**, rehabilitation services are available via the national Center for Medical Rehabilitation, operated jointly by the Ministry of Health and Cooperative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE), but the sector continued to face difficulties due to a lack of local resources and coordination capacity. In addition, coordination mechanisms were not fully integrated into broader systems. An implementation assessment of strategic goals for 2021–2024 found that, in all, only 322 ERW survivors received assistance in that period, representing just 6% of the planned target group comprising over 5,000 individuals with assistance needs.³⁰ According to another recent multi-year survey, long-term recovery support has remained limited, with few survivors (and no children) reporting access to rehabilitation services.³¹ In 2025, only 31 survivors received physical rehabilitation, representing a 90% decrease from the number of survivors accessing rehabilitation services in 2024.³² In the first quarter of 2025, it was reported that the main multi-year victim assistance support project in Lao PDR was forced to shut down following an 80% reduction in staff as a result of US funding cuts and the corresponding effects on implementation.³³

In **Iraq**, the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA), through the Ministry of Health, distributed mobility aids and assistive devices, but local resources could not meet demand.³⁴ The ICRC supported state-run physical rehabilitation centers in cooperation with the Ministry of Health. Physical rehabilitation services, including prostheses, were provided free of charge to persons assessed as eligible at the centers. The ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Program in Iraq moved toward sustainable, locally led support in 2025, including by strengthening national procurement mechanisms. By the end of the year, the program had ended direct service provision, transferring care and operations to local authorities and actors.³⁵

In **Afghanistan**, rehabilitation centers supported by international donors offered prosthetics, physiotherapy, and vocational training, but services remained concentrated in certain provinces and were strained due to a lack of financial resources. The Ministry of Public Health funded physical rehabilitation services at centers in Kabul and Khost, while NGOs and other ministries supported services in 20 provinces.³⁶ Afghanistan's humanitarian crisis, restrictions on women, forced returns, and pervasive insecurity undermined program sustainability, while ongoing high numbers of mine/ERW casualties pushed local service networks past their capacity. The ICRC supported rehabilitation centers in seven provinces. The program continued efforts to localize services and transfer responsibilities to Afghan staff.³⁷

30 Lao PDR, "(Draft 5) 10th Five-Year National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2026–2030)," 8 November 2025, p. 40, bit.ly/LaoPDRDevelopment2026-2030.

31 JSI, "Antecedents, Accidents, and Impacts: A Mixed-Methods Study of Adult and Child Survivors of 2020–2024 UXO Accidents in Lao PDR," December 2025, bit.ly/JSILaoUXODec2025.

32 Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reports (for calendar years 2024 and 2025), Form H.

33 Email from Olivier Bauduin, UXO Program Advisor, US Embassy in Vientiane, 7 July 2026; and Talisker Scott Hunter, "In Laos, USAID Freeze Hampers Vital Bomb Removal Efforts," *The Diplomat*, 31 March 2025, bit.ly/TheDiplomat31March2025.

34 Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form H.

35 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 40, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025.

36 Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form H.

37 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 30, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025.

In **Lebanon**, the previous large level operation of civil society organizations, charities, and private providers in the rehabilitation sector has mostly ceased to function as a result of multiple shocks to health financing and infrastructure following the 2019 economic crisis.³⁸ The number of rehabilitation services are far fewer than before 2021 and are now unevenly distributed. Those that exist are mainly in cities and availability is very scarce in rural areas. In a 2023 survey, just over half of the rehabilitation users surveyed reported that services were not available.³⁹ Large numbers of Syrian refugees also increased the need for prosthetic and rehabilitation services. Lebanon reported in 2025 a “lack of interest of organizations working in the field of mine action in seriously assisting victims, as they are concerned with clearance operations, as it provides them with money.”⁴⁰

In **Albania, BiH, and Croatia**, rehabilitation in 2025 was part of broader social strategies and rehabilitation frameworks.⁴¹ However, in **BiH**, rehabilitation support for survivors remained fragmented. Survivors relied mainly on NGOs, local health and social services, and survivor networks for information and referrals. Access varied by location and financial resources, with those in rural areas facing particular barriers. Gaps persisted in prosthetics, specialized rehabilitation, psychosocial support, transport, and coordination. Although approximately 60 community-based rehabilitation centers reportedly exist, many lack specialized staff or equipment tailored to the complex needs of mine survivors and amputees.

In several Sub-Saharan African states—**Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and South Sudan**—rehabilitation services exist but remained limited by inadequate national capacity. Provision of services was further hampered by the distance from areas where survivors live, shortages of trained personnel and materials, and insufficient funding. Services were often concentrated in capital cities or a small number of centers, with outreach needed to reach remote areas. International support from partners remained important for service delivery, provision of assistive devices, technical support, and operations. In **Guinea-Bissau**, in particular, physical rehabilitation was not included as a priority under national health development policy, resulting in major shortages of physiotherapy materials at the national rehabilitation center.⁴²

PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT

Psychological services continued to be an area of significant need. Psychosocial support for cluster munition survivors was available in several States Parties during the reporting period, although access and quality varied widely and reporting on the availability of such services remained limited.

In **Afghanistan**, psychosocial support was carried out by three NGOs and coordinated by the Ministry of Public Health. Services included mental health support, counseling, and peer-to-peer support. Activities were limited and occurred in the capital Kabul, as well as in Baghlan, Uruzgan, and Kunar provinces.⁴³

³⁸ Habib Abdo, “Who killed solidarity? The political economy of health financing collapse in Lebanon and fragile states,” *National Defense Magazine*, Issue 133, April 2026, bit.ly/NationalDefenseMagazine133-Apr2026; and Rouham Yamout, Joanna Khalil, Joanna Raven, Fouad M. Fouad, and Wesam Mansour, “Navigating turbulence: analyzing the resilience of Lebanon’s healthcare system in a multi-crisis scenario,” *Health Research Policy and Systems*, Vol. 23, Article 120, 6 October 2025, bit.ly/HealthResearchPolicySystems6Oct2025.

³⁹ HI, “Rehabilitation in Lebanon,” September 2023, bit.ly/HILebanonSep2023.

⁴⁰ Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form H.

⁴¹ Albania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form H; Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/DatabaseArticle7MBT; and Croatia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J.

⁴² Aguinaldo Ampa, “World Clubfoot Day: Quelelé Motor Rehabilitation Center Calls for Help from Authorities,” *O Democrata Guiné-Bissau*, 3 June 2025, bit.ly/ODemocrataGB3Jun2025.

⁴³ Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form H.

In **Albania, BiH, and Croatia**, mental health psychological and psychosocial support was made available as part of a broader state rehabilitation package regulated through public health legislation and planning.

In Sub-Saharan African States Parties, national systems lacked capacity and resources. **Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and South Sudan** all have limited mental health and psychosocial support. In **South Sudan**, psychosocial services were not widely available through government structures, so survivors primarily accessed limited services via the ICRC or local NGOs. No formal peer-to-peer support system exists.⁴⁴ A new National Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Strategic Plan (2025–2029), shaped by assessments that identified the needs of mine/ERW victims and persons with disabilities, including psychosocial support, was reported to have been implemented in conflict-affected areas of South Sudan.⁴⁵

Lebanon reported no victim assistance services, including no psychological support.⁴⁶

SOCIO-ECONOMIC INCLUSION

Action 35 of the Lausanne Action Plan committed States Parties to facilitate the educational and socio-economic inclusion of cluster munition victims. Such measures could take the form of employment referrals, access to micro-finance, livelihood support, and rural development and social protection programs.

During the reporting period, socio-economic inclusion persisted as a critical gap for cluster munition victims, including through vocational training, employment support, micro-credit, and income-generating activities. Access to inclusive education and opportunities for social inclusion, including sport, leisure, and cultural activities, was also heavily constrained.

In **Afghanistan**, economic reintegration support remained limited and was provided through some victim assistance projects. The Danish Refugee Council and ICRC emergency victim assistance activities included immediate livelihood packages and economic reintegration services. The ICRC also provided vocational training and loans to survivors and other persons with disabilities. However, due to reduced funding, the ICRC limited its support in some districts. UN Women funded economic reintegration services alongside physical rehabilitation in Kabul.⁴⁷

In **BiH**, funding was available to support capacity-building and employment opportunities for persons with disabilities, including survivors.⁴⁸ **Iraq** noted the provision of monthly salaries for survivors based on the degree of disability. The Iraqi Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, in collaboration with the Commission for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Special Needs, provided socio-economic assistance, training, vehicles, sabbatical leave, and education.⁴⁹

Croatia reported that project activities for small scale investment opportunities for entrepreneurs were finalized during 2024, but it did not provide an update on activities

⁴⁴ South Sudan Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), 4 April 2025.

⁴⁵ Committee on Victim Assistance, “South Sudan, Preliminary Observation: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance,” Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025, bit.ly/SouthSudanVACCommitteeJune2025.

⁴⁶ Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form H.

⁴⁷ Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form H.

⁴⁸ Committee on Victim Assistance, “Bosnia and Herzegovina, Preliminary Observation: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance,” Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026, bit.ly/BiH-VACCommitteeJune2026.

⁴⁹ Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form H.

for economic reintegration for 2025.⁵⁰ **Lao PDR** only reported that the survivor-led NGO Quality of Life Association provided some 100 education scholarships.⁵¹ In **South Sudan**, economic inclusion services were very limited and in some areas there was no access to services.⁵² Social protection cash assistance was available for vulnerable persons in some communities, but rarely reached persons with disabilities. Some organizations continued to provide microcredit and economic empowerment training.⁵³

VICTIM ASSISTANCE IN STATES NOT PARTY

Victim assistance services were available to some degree in most states and areas with cluster munition casualties in 2025, including in states not party to the convention. In countries where there were also new cluster munition attacks, however, conflicts and insecurity hindered vital victim assistance access and weakened health systems. Services were most severely impacted in countries outside the convention that have experienced recent casualties from attacks and new contamination, including in Myanmar, Syria, and Ukraine.

In Myanmar, increased armed conflict since 2021 has resulted in damage to health infrastructure and a rise in casualty numbers, both of which have placed severe strain on already limited services. As a result, access to medical care, rehabilitation, and broader support



Cluster munition survivor Mr. Volodymyr stands in the yard of his home near Zarazhne village, Kharkiv Oblast, Ukraine. Injured in a cluster munition strike on Kharkiv city in February 2022, he suffered permanent nerve damage and loss of feeling in his left leg.

© C. Wright/ICBL-CMC/Hi, July 2025

remained insufficient to address the growing needs for victim assistance.⁵⁴ The political situation and conflict have also halted progress in implementing disability rights policies and further hindered access to services.⁵⁵

In Syria, significant gaps in services persisted, and survivors continued to face challenges in obtaining care, including essential services, due to inadequate resources.⁵⁶ Amidst the rise in post-conflict mine/ERW casualties in the country overall, the Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) in Syria reported shortfalls in victim assistance of all types including emergency care, rehabilitation, prosthetics and orthotics, psychosocial support, and economic inclusion services, which were not available to many survivors, particularly outside main cities. Survivors in rural areas often had to travel long distances to reach services, resulting in transport and other costs that many households could not meet. Continued

underinvestment in victim assistance limited rehabilitative options for survivors and persons with disabilities and is hampering the country's conflict recovery process.⁵⁷ Administrative

⁵⁰ Croatia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form H.

⁵¹ Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form H.

⁵² Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, NMAA, 4 April 2025.

⁵³ South Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 28.

⁵⁴ ICBL-CMC, "Myanmar/Burma Country Report 2025," December 2025, bit.ly/ICBLCMCMyanmarDec2025.

⁵⁵ Tual Sawn Khai, Minhaz Farid Ahmed, and Muhammad Asaduzzaman, "Examining the vulnerability of persons with disabilities in Myanmar pre and post-COVID-19 and military coup," *Disability & Society*, Vol. 40, Issue 2, 2 June 2024, pp. 521–522, bit.ly/DisabilitySociety2Jun2024; Vibhu Mishra, "Children and amputees bear brunt of Myanmar's deadly landmine epidemic," *UN News*, 22 November 2024, bit.ly/UNnews22Nov2024; and Insight Myanmar, "Episode #374: It Takes All Of Us," 3 August 2025, bit.ly/InsightMyanmar3Aug2025.

⁵⁶ Syria Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR), "Restoring safety, rebuilding lives: The impact of mine action across Syria," 4 April 2026, bit.ly/SyriaMAAoR4Apr2026.

⁵⁷ Syria MAAoR, "Situation Update No.6: 2025-A Year in Review," 8 December 2025, bit.ly/SyriaMAAoR8Dec2025.

constraints and ongoing barriers to importing specialized equipment continued to limit victim assistance, and other pillars of mine action.⁵⁸

In Ukraine, emergency medical care, rehabilitation, and psychosocial support services expanded following the full-scale invasion by Russia in 2022. However, access to victim assistance has remained constrained by damage to infrastructure, shortages of personnel and funding, geographic and security-related disparities in service provision, weak referral and information systems, and socio-economic barriers. Insecurity, fragmented coordination, and short-term funding have continued to undermine the continuity and sustainability of services.⁵⁹

States not party Cambodia and Vietnam are also among the countries with the most significant numbers of cluster munition victims in need of assistance and support.⁶⁰ Both have recognized the need to assist cluster munition victims and to provide information on their victim assistance efforts.⁶¹

VICTIM ASSISTANCE STANDARDS

Under Action 32 of the Lausanne Action Plan, States Parties committed to consider IMAS 13.10 on Victim Assistance when integrating victim assistance into broader strategies and plans. IMAS 13.10 recognizes victim assistance as a pillar of mine action, while clarifying that the mine action sector's role is primarily to support national systems through data collection, identification, referral, information-sharing, and coordination. National mine action authorities and centers can, and should, play a role in monitoring and facilitating multisectoral efforts to address the needs of cluster munition survivors. National authorities should also facilitate the inclusion and participation of survivors and indirect victims of cluster munitions in the development of relevant national legislation and policies. IMAS 13.10 notes that national mine action authorities are well placed to gather data on victims and their needs, provide information on services, and refer victims for support. States Parties have continued to adapt these standards for their practical application in national contexts.

Iraq officially adopted a new national standard fully aligned with IMAS 13.10 guidelines in 2023.⁶² Lao PDR was updating national victim assistance standards in line with IMAS 13.10.⁶³ Lebanon has a dedicated national standard, NMAS 13.10 on victim assistance, based

58 Aida Burnett-Cargill, "Syria Explosive Ordnance Incidents Result in 2,343 Casualties," LinkedIn post, 4 July 2026, bit.ly/LinkedInBurnettCargill4Jul2026.

59 HI, "Enhancing Victim Assistance in the context of Explosive Ordnance and Explosive Weapons in Ukraine," November 2025, bit.ly/HIUkraineNov2025; and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "The Guide on Implementation of Model of Victim Assistance in Mine Action in Ukraine," 18 December 2024, bit.ly/UNUkraine18Dec2024.

60 See, Annex I: "Oslo progress report: Monitoring progress in implementing the Vientiane Action Plan between the Second and Third Meetings of States Parties" in Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Final document. Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 11–14 September 2012," 15 October 2012, p. 15, docs.un.org/en/CCM/MSP/2012/5; and Annex I: "Lusaka progress report: Monitoring progress in implementing the Vientiane Action Plan between the Third and Fourth Meetings of States Parties" in Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Final document. Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 10–13 September 2013," 23 September 2013, p. 15, docs.un.org/en/CCM/MSP/2013/6.

61 Both have reported on their implementation efforts in accordance with the convention's specific requirements of planning, coordination, and the integration of victim assistance into rights-based frameworks, such as the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Statement of Cambodia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 12 September 2012, bit.ly/CambodiaStatement12Sep2012; and statement of Vietnam, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 15 September 2011, bit.ly/VietnamStatement15Sep2011. Vietnam stated that it is "among the countries most affected by cluster munitions and other explosive remnants of war."

62 HI, "Towards an effective implementation of the Lausanne Action Plan: operationalizing International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 13.10 on Victim Assistance in Mine Action: the case of Iraq," side event, Convention on Cluster Munitions Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 12 September 2023.

63 Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form H.

on IMAS 13.10.⁶⁴ BiH reported in 2025 that it needs to adopt IMAS 13.10 to revise the roles and responsibilities of mine action in victim assistance.⁶⁵

REPORTING

Under Article 7 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties have an obligation to report on implementation of their Article 5 victim assistance obligations. As of July 2026, Guinea-Bissau had not yet submitted a report for calendar year 2025, and the report submitted by Chad did not cover 2025 victim assistance implementation and activities. Sierra Leone made a reference to its obligations under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in its annual update for calendar year 2025 but did not provide updates on developments regarding the implementation of its victim assistance obligations.

REPORTING ON CRPD IMPLEMENTATION AND VICTIM ASSISTANCE

The preamble of the Convention on Cluster Munitions makes reference to the CRPD and the protections it seeks to promote.⁶⁶ The CRPD complements Article 5 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and provides a broader human rights framework that can contribute to implementing victim assistance.⁶⁷

Cluster munition victims who are persons with disabilities, most often survivors, fall within the scope of the CRPD and are entitled to those rights. However, unless a casualty has an enduring impairment, or family members of casualties are themselves persons with disabilities, their rights and needs are not covered by the CRPD—unlike under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Therefore, the CRPD covers many, but not all, cluster munition victims.

States Parties have been encouraged to provide Article 7 reporting updates on victim assistance “drawing on reports submitted under the CRPD as appropriate.”⁶⁸ CRPD reporting occurs less frequently than annual Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reporting and therefore does not adequately reflect recent developments in victim assistance implementation. States Parties to the CRPD are required to submit an initial report on implementation of the convention within two years of its entry into force, followed by periodic reports every four years.

⁶⁴ Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form H.

⁶⁵ Committee on Victim Assistance, “Bosnia and Herzegovina, Preliminary Observation: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance,” Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025, bit.ly/BiHVACCommitteeJune2025.

⁶⁶ The preamble of the Convention on Cluster Munitions states: “Bearing in mind the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which, *inter alia*, requires that States Parties to that Convention undertake to ensure and promote the full realisation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all persons with disabilities without discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability.”

⁶⁷ CRPD, Articles 3 and 4, corresponding to Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), Articles 5(1) and 5(2)(b)–(c), requiring victim assistance to be provided in accordance with applicable human rights law and through necessary national laws, policies, plans, and budgets; CRPD, Article 5, corresponding to CCM, Article 5(2)(e), on non-discrimination among cluster munition victims and between cluster munition victims and persons with injuries or disabilities from other causes; CRPD, Articles 6 and 7, corresponding to CCM, Article 5(1), on age- and gender-sensitive assistance; CRPD, Article 9, corresponding to CCM, Articles 5(1) and 5(2)(h), on accessible medical care, rehabilitation, psychological support, and social and economic inclusion; CRPD, Article 11, corresponding to CCM, Article 5(1), on assistance in situations of risk and humanitarian emergencies; CRPD, Articles 19, 24, 27, and 28, corresponding to CCM, Article 5(1), on social and economic inclusion; CRPD, Article 25, corresponding to CCM, Article 5(1), on medical care; CRPD, Article 26, corresponding to CCM, Articles 5(1) and 5(2)(h), on rehabilitation; CRPD, Article 31, corresponding to CCM, Articles 5(1) and 5(2)(a), on collecting reliable relevant data and assessing victims’ needs; CRPD, Article 32, corresponding to CCM, Articles 5(2)(d) and 6(7), on mobilizing and providing international cooperation and assistance for victim assistance; and CRPD, Article 33, corresponding to CCM, Articles 5(2)(c), (f), and (g), on coordination, focal points, monitoring, and consultation with and active involvement of victims and their representative organizations. See, CRPD, 13 December 2006, bit.ly/CRPD13Jul2006; and Convention on Cluster Munitions, 30 May 2008, Articles 5 and 6.

⁶⁸ Dubrovnik Action Plan, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 11 September 2015, Action 4.3, bit.ly/DubrovnikActionPlan.

States Parties with victim assistance obligations: Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) ratification and Article 35 reporting status

Country	Ratified/acceded to CRPD	First Article 35 report submitted	Most recent CRPD Article 35 report/status
Afghanistan	18 September 2012	1 December 2020	Initial report only; no concluding observations yet
Albania	11 February 2013	28 May 2015	Initial report reviewed in 2019; no subsequent report submitted
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	12 March 2010	17 April 2015	Combined second and third periodic report submitted in October 2021
Chad	20 June 2019	4 April 2023	Initial report pending consideration
Croatia	15 August 2007	27 October 2011	Combined second to fourth periodic report submitted in December 2021
Guinea-Bissau	24 September 2014	5 December 2024	Initial report submitted
Iraq	20 March 2013	19 August 2015	Initial report reviewed in 2019; no subsequent report submitted
Lao PDR	25 September 2009	25 May 2016	Initial report reviewed in 2022; no subsequent report submitted
Lebanon	5 June 2025	Not yet due	Initial report due July 2027
Mauritania	3 April 2012	31 January 2017	Initial report reviewed in 2023; no subsequent report submitted
Montenegro	2 November 2009	13 March 2014	Initial report reviewed in 2017; no subsequent report submitted
Sierra Leone	4 October 2010	29 August 2020	List of issues adopted in March 2025; dialogue expected in August 2027
Somalia	6 August 2019	Not submitted	Initial report due September 2021; more than four years overdue
South Sudan	5 February 2024	Not submitted	Initial report due May 2026

Since Lebanon acceded to the CRPD in 2025, all of the 14 States Parties with victim assistance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions are also party to the CRPD. As of July 2026, 11 of them had submitted an initial Article 35 report, while BiH and Croatia had also submitted subsequent combined periodic reports. Somalia and South Sudan had not yet submitted an initial report. Lebanon's initial Article 35 report is due in 2027. Although there are some gaps and delays in annual Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reporting, CRPD reporting occurs even less frequently and may not reflect recent developments in victim assistance implementation.

Following are some examples of reporting updates on the situation of persons with disabilities more broadly with respect to the realization of their rights as elaborated in the CRPD.

As **Lebanon** only recently acceded to the CRPD in 2025, the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) reported that persons with disabilities in Lebanon have been struggling for decades in the absence of the application of its disability law, which has been in place since 2000.⁶⁹

In a recent example of relevant CRPD Article 35 reporting, **Guinea-Bissau**—in its initial report submitted in 2024, a decade after it joined that convention—demonstrated major gaps in addressing the rights of persons with disabilities, including weak disability data, poverty, limited accessibility, barriers to education and health services, and insufficient rehabilitation funding. Preparation of the report included consultation with disability organizations, including the national association of mine victims. The report highlighted the critical role of the national rehabilitation center, while noting that it has received insufficient funding from the health ministry. It also noted that persons with disabilities continue to face barriers to education, employment, and healthcare.⁷⁰

As a party to the CRPD, the European Union regularly reports on the situation of persons with disabilities in European Union Candidate countries. A recent assessment by the European Commission indicates that even in those Convention on Cluster Munitions States Parties with functioning systems, much remains to be done to address the rights of victims in accordance with CRPD obligations.

In **Albania**, the legal and institutional framework on the rights of persons with disabilities is incomplete and only partially compliant with the CRPD; implementation and enforcement need to be improved. Limited action has been taken to tackle discrimination against persons with disabilities and to improve accessibility.⁷¹ In **BiH**, persons with disabilities are among the most vulnerable members of society. While the legal and institutional framework is largely aligned with the CRPD, the lack of dedicated funds prevents improvements. A significant number of recommendations and observations by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities—received in 2017—remain unaddressed. Persons with disabilities have inadequate services, especially in health and education.⁷² In **Montenegro**, the legal and institutional framework for the rights of persons with disabilities also remains incomplete. Persons with disabilities cannot fully exercise their rights and thus continue to face multiple forms of discrimination.⁷³

CONTAMINATION FROM CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS

GLOBAL CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION

Since the convention entered into force more than 15 years ago, the number of contaminated States Parties has fallen from 16 in 2011 to 11 in 2026, demonstrating the progress achieved in implementing the convention's clearance obligations. By contrast, the overall number of contaminated states and other areas has remained broadly stable, fluctuating between 26 and 32 over the same period. This reflects not only the emergence of new contamination in states not party, but also changes over time in the evidence used to identify and report contaminated areas. At the same time, States Parties in particular have significantly improved their understanding of the extent and location of cluster munition remnant

⁶⁹ Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC), "Annual Report 2025," 22 April 2026, p. 23, bit.ly/LMACAnnualReport2025.

⁷⁰ Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, "Initial report submitted by Guinea-Bissau under article 35 of the Convention, due in 2016," 8 October 2025, docs.un.org/CRPD/C/GNB/1.

⁷¹ European Commission, "Albania 2025 Report," 4 November 2025, bit.ly/ECAAlbania4Nov2025.

⁷² European Commission, "Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024 Report," 30 October 2024, bit.ly/ECBiH30Oct2024.

⁷³ European Commission, "Montenegro 2025 Report," 4 November 2025, bit.ly/ECMontenegro4Nov2025.

contamination. In the convention's early years, contamination estimates in many affected states were incomplete or largely based on historical strike records, community reports, and limited survey data. By 2016, the Cluster Munition Monitor noted that the extent of contamination remained unknown in some of the most heavily affected countries, including Iraq and Lao PDR, while several States Parties still had only a limited understanding of the location or scale of contamination and were undertaking survey efforts to better define the problem.⁷⁴ Over the following years, systematic survey, improved information management, and a growing emphasis on evidence-based planning resulted in progressively more reliable contamination baselines and more realistic planning assumptions for future clearance operations.

This trend continued during the five-year implementation period of the Lausanne Action Plan, during which States Parties further improved their understanding of the extent and location of contamination through survey, while new use of cluster munitions also generated additional contamination in several countries. Consequently, changes in reported contamination during the review period reflected both improvements in evidence-based baseline definition and the emergence of new contamination.

As of July 2026, a total of 29 states and other areas are known to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants. Of these contaminated states, 11 are States Parties, one is a signatory, and 15 are states not party. Two other areas are also known to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants.

Cluster munition remnant contamination remains concentrated in a relatively small number of heavily affected states. Lao PDR and Vietnam continue to account for the largest known and suspected contaminated areas globally, reflecting the enduring legacy of extensive historical use.



DanChurchAid (DCA) marks and clears the remains of an ammunition depot in South Lebanon, targeted by Israeli airstrikes in 2025. Chinese A-09 submunitions were ejected during the strike, contaminating the area.

© Rashad Siblini/DCA, July 2025

⁷⁴ CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2016* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, 1 September 2016), bit.ly/CMMonitorReports.

Estimated cluster munition remnant contamination (as of 31 December 2025)⁷⁵

Massive (more than 1,000km ²)	Large (100–1,000km ²)	Medium (10–99km ²)	Small (less than 10km ²)
Lao PDR Vietnam	Cambodia Iraq Ukraine	Azerbaijan Chile Mauritania Syria Yemen	Afghanistan Armenia Chad <u>Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)</u> Ethiopia Germany Iran <i>Kosovo</i> Lebanon Libya Mali Myanmar Russia Serbia Somalia South Sudan Sudan Tajikistan <i>Western Sahara</i>

Note: States Parties are indicated in **bold**; signatories are underlined; and other areas are in *italics*.

By contrast, several countries and other areas have less than 10km² of cluster munition remnant contamination remaining, yet progress in clearing these areas has remained limited. Remaining contamination is often located in difficult terrain (e.g., Lebanon and Tajikistan) characterized by steep slopes, rocky ground, dense vegetation, or other physical conditions that constrain access and reduce clearance productivity; insecure environments (e.g., Libya and Somalia); politically sensitive areas (e.g., Western Sahara); or protected areas where environmental restrictions complicate clearance operations (e.g., Germany). Progress has also been constrained by persistent funding shortfalls, including in Afghanistan, Chad, and Mauritania, as well as weak baseline data or limited national mine action capacity, including in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Libya, and Somalia.⁷⁶

At the same time, contamination continued to evolve as a result of new use. Use (or possible use) of cluster munitions in 2025 and 2026 is believed or suspected to have resulted in new contamination in States Parties Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Mali, and in states not party Cambodia, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, Russia, and Ukraine (see *New Use section* in *Ban Policy*).

In addition, State Party Nigeria identified individual submunitions. However, at the time of publication, it remained unclear whether these were isolated finds or indicative of broader area contamination.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Contamination figures are based on data collected and analyzed by Mine Action Review, an independent project of NPA. NPA is a member of the ICBL-CMC. Mine Action Review provided the Monitor with the contamination and land release data used in this chapter under a Memorandum of Understanding. Mine Action Review's country profiles and additional information are available at www.mineactionreview.org.

⁷⁶ For more information, see the relevant Mine Action Review country profiles at www.mineactionreview.org.

⁷⁷ Email from Edwin Faigmane, Chief Mine Action Programme, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 26 April 2026.

In signatory DRC, limited contamination has consistently been reported over the past decade, although a nationwide survey to establish the full extent of contamination has yet to be initiated.⁷⁸

Among states not party, Cambodia and Vietnam remain the countries most heavily affected by cluster munition remnants globally. Cambodia's contamination baseline is relatively well established, while the overall extent of contamination in Vietnam is still uncertain despite ongoing survey and clearance efforts.⁷⁹ Contamination is also believed to be significant in Ukraine, although the full extent remains undetermined due to the scale of contamination, ongoing insecurity and access constraints, and the absence of comprehensive survey data.⁸⁰ In a number of countries, including in Azerbaijan, Iran, Libya, Myanmar, Russia, Syria, and Yemen, contamination continues to be either undefined or poorly defined, and has not been comprehensively surveyed.⁸¹ By contrast, remaining contamination in Serbia, and in other areas Kosovo and Western Sahara, is relatively limited and well defined, with land release activities continuing to reduce the extent of known contamination.⁸²

Possible cluster munition contamination may also exist in Colombia, Kuwait, and the United Kingdom (UK).⁸³ In Colombia, past use of cluster munitions by the air force has been acknowledged, but no survey has been conducted to confirm whether any contamination remains.⁸⁴ In Kuwait, cluster munition remnants dating from Iraq's 1990 invasion continue to be discovered regularly, although the extent of any remaining contamination has not been established.⁸⁵ In the UK, while no contamination is reported on land, cluster munitions remain among the ammunition contained in the wreck of the *SS Richard Montgomery* in the Thames Estuary.⁸⁶



Warning signs on the road to Aleppo in A'zaz District, Syria, alert civilians to the danger posed by cluster munition remnants and other unexploded ordnance. White Helmets staff advise onlookers not to touch or remove suspicious objects.

© G. Diffidenti/ICBL-CMC, August 2025

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- ⁷⁸ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Joseph Lukongola, Head of Operations, Congolese Mine Action Center (Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines, CCLAM), 28 March 2025.
 - ⁷⁹ For further information on cluster munition contamination in Cambodia and Vietnam, see the relevant Mine Action Review country profiles at www.mineactionreview.org.
 - ⁸⁰ For further information on cluster munition contamination in Syria and Ukraine, see the relevant Mine Action Review country profiles at www.mineactionreview.org.
 - ⁸¹ For further information on cluster munition contamination in Azerbaijan, Iran, Libya, Myanmar, Russia, Syria, and Yemen, see the relevant Mine Action Review country profiles at www.mineactionreview.org.
 - ⁸² For further information on cluster munition contamination in Kosovo, Serbia, and Western Sahara, see the relevant Mine Action Review country profiles at www.mineactionreview.org.
 - ⁸³ Countries where contamination is considered only "possible" are not included in the total number of affected states used in this overview.
 - ⁸⁴ Carlos Andrés Soler Palomino, "Technical Study of the cluster munitions used by the Colombian Air Force: strategic guidelines for the compliance with Article 4 of the Oslo Convention," Postgraduate School of the Colombian Air Force, 2021.
 - ⁸⁵ See, for example, "Citizen finds cluster munitions from the invasion in a desert area," *Crimes and Courts Electronic Journal*, 5 November 2024, bit.ly/CCKWT5Nov2024; Sebastian Castelier and Aladdin Elbarbary, "Killer mines in Kuwait keep Gulf War alive and deadly," *Al Jazeera*, 28 November 2023, bit.ly/KuwaitAlJazeera28Nov2023; and Mubarak Al-Tunaib, "Rain reveals 4 cluster bombs in Bar Kabd," *Al-Anba*, 7 January 2022, bit.ly/AlAnba7Jan2022.
 - ⁸⁶ United Kingdom (UK) Maritime and Coastguard Agency, "Report on the Wreck of the *SS Richard Montgomery*," May 1999, bit.ly/SSMontgomeryReport1999; and UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency, "SS Richard Montgomery: background information," updated 11 March 2026, bit.ly/MontgomeryMaritimeCoastguardAgency.

STATES PARTIES' PROGRESS IN ESTABLISHING ACCURATE CONTAMINATION BASELINES

In line with Action 18 of the Lausanne Action Plan—which calls on States Parties to establish accurate, evidence-based contamination baselines—more States Parties have invested in establishing a credible and increasingly reliable contamination baseline than was the case at the start of the Lausanne Action Plan implementation period, providing a stronger foundation for prioritization, resource mobilization, and long-term clearance planning.

Consequently, in several instances, progress in survey and baseline definition has also resulted in revised contamination estimates. For example, in Iraq and South Sudan, contamination figures increased during the five-year review period due to the identification of previously unknown hazardous areas and recalculations based on improved survey methodologies. While such increases reflect a worsening contamination picture in numerical terms, they also demonstrate strengthened national understanding of contamination and more realistic planning assumptions for future clearance operations.

Afghanistan, Iraq, Mauritania, and South Sudan all strengthened their understanding of the extent and location of contamination during the five-year review period, although survey and verification activities continued in several of these States Parties to further refine contamination estimates. In Lao PDR, the nationwide Cluster Munition Remnant Survey (CMRS) continued throughout the five years, systematically identifying direct evidence of contamination and establishing confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) to support long-term clearance planning and prioritization. By contrast, Chad had yet to complete survey of suspected contaminated areas in Tibesti Province due primarily to funding constraints and insecurity, while Somalia continued to provide limited updated information on contamination, highlighting persistent information gaps in support of evidence-based planning. Chile, Germany, and Lebanon, meanwhile, maintained comparatively well-defined contamination baselines throughout the review period.

GLOBAL PROGRESS IN RELEASING CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATED LAND

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is obliged to clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the convention. Over the past 16 years, implementation of these obligations has resulted in the release of substantial areas of cluster munition contaminated land through survey and clearance.



A Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) clearance team marks and secures a site containing BLU-61 and BLU-63 cluster munition remnants in Al Zubair, Basra Governorate, Iraq.

© Noor AL-Huda/NPA, February 2026

Since the convention entered into force 16 years ago, States Parties have made significant progress in releasing cluster munition contaminated land. A total of seven States Parties have fulfilled their Article 4 obligations and declared completion of clearance, while others have significantly reduced the extent of known contamination through increasingly evidence-based survey and clearance. At the same time, national mine action capacities and planning systems have strengthened in many affected States Parties, supporting more effective prioritization and implementation. Progress has nevertheless remained uneven, with operational output continuing to be concentrated in a relatively small number of heavily contaminated

States Parties, while others have faced persistent challenges related to insecurity, funding shortfalls, difficult operating environments, and limited operational capacity.

The Lausanne Action Plan reinforced these efforts by placing greater emphasis on evidence-based land release, prioritization, and implementation planning. During the plan's five-year implementation period, States Parties increasingly applied survey to support more targeted and efficient land release, although progress continued to vary considerably between affected States Parties.

STATES PARTIES THAT HAVE COMPLETED CLEARANCE

Under the Lausanne Action Plan, only State Party BiH completed clearance, in August 2023.⁸⁷ No State Party has completed clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas since.

In all, a total of 11 States Parties have completed clearance of cluster munition remnants as required by the convention, with Albania, Guinea-Bissau, Palau, and Zambia finishing clearance before entry into force.

States Parties that have completed clearance of cluster munition remnants

State Party	Year of completion
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	2023
Croatia	2020
Montenegro	2020
Mozambique	2016
Norway	2013
Republic of the Congo	2012
Grenada	2012
Palau	2010
Zambia	2010
Albania	2009
Guinea-Bissau	2008

RELEASE OF CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATED LAND IN STATES PARTIES IN 2025

In 2025, States Parties with clearance obligations released a combined total of 113.98km² of hazardous area through clearance, technical survey, and non-technical survey and destroyed 64,898 cluster munition remnants—primarily unexploded submunitions.⁸⁸

The land release total for 2025 represents an increase of over 15% compared to the land release figures reported in 2024.⁸⁹ While Afghanistan, Chile, Germany, Lao PDR, and Mauritania released less land in 2025 than in 2024, the land release rate increased in 2025 for Iraq, Lebanon, and South Sudan. Chad and Somalia did not release any cluster munition contaminated land in 2025, as was the case in 2024.

⁸⁷ BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F; and Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Country profiles: Bosnia and Herzegovina," updated 25 June 2024, bit.ly/CCMBiHProfile.

⁸⁸ The contamination and land release figures presented in this report are rounded to the nearest hundredth. Land release figures are based on data collected and analyzed by Mine Action Review, an independent project of NPA. NPA is a member of the ICBL-CMC. Mine Action Review provided the Monitor with the contamination and land release data used in this chapter under a Memorandum of Understanding. Mine Action Review's country profiles and additional information are available at www.mineactionreview.org.

⁸⁹ Land release total for all States Parties in 2025: 113.98km². Land release total for all States Parties in 2024: 98.57km². For further information on individual countries' progress, see the relevant Mine Action Review country profiles at www.mineactionreview.org.

Cluster munition remnant land release by States Parties in 2025⁹⁰

State Party	2025	
	Land release (km ²)	Cluster munition remnants destroyed
Afghanistan	0.32	404
Chad	0	0
Chile	0	0
Germany	0.85	779
Iraq	39.06	3,665
Lao PDR	67.32	55,808
Lebanon	1.85	2,482
Mauritania	0.81	52
Somalia	0	0
South Sudan	3.78	1,708
Total	113.98	64,898

RELEASE OF CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATED LAND IN SIGNATORIES, STATES NOT PARTY, AND OTHER AREAS IN 2025

Signatories, states not party, and other areas affected by cluster munition remnants also continued to release hazardous area through survey and clearance activities in 2025. However, progress and data availability remained uneven.

No release of cluster munition contaminated land was reported by signatory DRC or by states not party Ethiopia and Sudan. Compared with 2024, the amount of land released increased in states not party Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Libya, Syria, Tajikistan, and Ukraine, and in other area Western Sahara, while it decreased in states not party Serbia and Vietnam, and in other area Kosovo. No land release data for cluster munition contaminated areas was available for states not party Iran and Yemen. Cambodia and Vietnam together accounted for the majority of reported land release among states not party, while Azerbaijan also reported significant progress.⁹¹

FIVE-YEAR REVIEW OF STATES PARTIES' PROGRESS TOWARDS ARTICLE 4 COMPLETION

Progress towards fulfilling Article 4 clearance obligations during the five-year period of the Lausanne Action Plan remained heavily concentrated in a small number of States Parties with large contamination. Furthermore, the majority of States Parties with clearance obligations submitted extension requests during that period: 10 affected States Parties (Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Chile, Germany, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Somalia) submitted a total of 14 extension requests, with Chad submitting three requests and Chile and Mauritania each submitting two.

⁹⁰ The contamination and land release figures presented in this report are rounded to the nearest hundredth. Cluster munition remnants destroyed include items destroyed during explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks. For further information on individual countries' progress, see the relevant Mine Action Review country profiles at www.mineactionreview.org.

⁹¹ For further information on individual countries' progress, see the relevant Mine Action Review country profiles at www.mineactionreview.org.

Although extension requests have increasingly reflected more realistic implementation planning informed by improved survey data and a better understanding of the extent of contamination, their submission has regrettably become routine—rather than the exceptional measure originally envisaged by the convention—due to persistent challenges such as reduced international funding, insecurity, environmental constraints, and limited operational capacity. In the case of Chile, insufficient prioritization of its obligations under the convention also appears to have been a contributing factor.

Together, the two most heavily contaminated States Parties, Lao PDR and Iraq, accounted for the vast majority of cluster munition remnant land release reported by States Parties between 2021 and 2025.⁹²

As in previous years, **Lao PDR** continued to account for by far the largest amount of cluster munition remnant land release globally. The State Party is implementing its second Article 4 deadline extension through July 2030. However, with survey still ongoing, the full extent of the massive contamination has not yet been established. Lao PDR does not expect to complete clearance of all cluster munition remnants within the current extension period and foresees the need for further extensions beyond 2030.⁹³ In addition to the sheer scale of contamination, challenges to further increasing clearance output include securing sufficient and predictable funding, maintaining operational capacity, and addressing contamination in remote and mountainous areas.⁹⁴

Iraq also maintained steady progress throughout the five-year period, recording a new land release high in 2025, with all reported operations in cluster munition contaminated land taking place in the heavily contaminated southern governorates.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, with extensive contamination remaining and current operational capacity below the level envisaged in its extension request, Iraq is not on track to meet its November 2028 deadline unless survey and clearance capacity is strengthened significantly.⁹⁶

States Parties Chile and Mauritania, despite having medium levels of contamination, generally reported very limited or no clearance output during the review period.⁹⁷

Chile only initiated and reported clearance of cluster munition contaminated land for the first time in 2023—at an army base and three Chilean Air Force training ranges—following completion of survey activities.⁹⁸ Since then, no further clearance has been conducted, although Chile reported the release of 8.1km² of CHA through technical survey in 2024. In the same year, Chile submitted a fourth Article 4 deadline extension request to complete clearance of the remaining contaminated areas by December 2028, citing delays in securing the financial



A Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) staff member exposes an unexploded submunition during battle area clearance near Mount Qualaman, Syria, close to the Lebanese border. The area is primarily contaminated by cluster munition remnants.

© Sean Sutton/NPA, December 2025

⁹² For further information on progress in Iraq and Lao PDR, see the relevant Mine Action Review country profiles at www.mineactionreview.org.

⁹³ Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), Part B: Detailed Narrative, 10 June 2024, p. 25, bit.ly/LaosArt4ExtRequest2024.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 3–4 and 9–13.

⁹⁵ Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form F, p. 30.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁹⁷ For further information on progress in Chile and Mauritania, see the relevant Mine Action Review country profiles at www.mineactionreview.org.

⁹⁸ Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, p. 6; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentin Segura, Head of International Cooperation Department, Chile Undersecretary of Defense, 6 May 2024.

resources, equipment, and operational capacity required to conduct clearance operations.⁹⁹ With no land release reported in 2025 and implementation dependent in part on additional national and international funding, Chile remains off track to meet its revised deadline.

Mauritania reported clearance of 0.81km² of its remaining cluster munition contaminated areas in the Tiris Zemmour Region in the north of the country bordering Western Sahara in 2025—a positive development from the last few years, during which the State Party reported nil or only minimal clearance outputs. However, its overall land release output in 2025 remained below that reported for 2024, when Mauritania also released cluster munition contaminated land through survey.¹⁰⁰ Since the Second Review Conference, it has submitted two successive Article 4 deadline extension requests due to insufficient funding and operational capacity.¹⁰¹ The current third extension period, through 1 August 2028, acknowledges that completion by that date will depend on Mauritania's ability to mobilize the resources necessary to implement its workplan.¹⁰² As of July 2026, no progress in securing additional resources had been reported and with the current clearance performance, the State Party is not expected to meet its current Article 4 deadline.

Among States Parties with relatively small areas of contamination remaining, only Germany and Lebanon reported cluster munition clearance in each of the five years under review. In Afghanistan, clearance output declined steadily following the Taliban's takeover in August 2021, amid a reduction in international funding. Chad made no progress in surveying suspected cluster munition contaminated areas despite submitting three Article 4 extension requests. Somalia did not report any clearance throughout the review period, while South Sudan's Article 4 clearance obligations only took effect in February 2024.¹⁰³

Afghanistan's release of cluster munition contaminated land has continuously decreased over the past five years, and in 2025, the State Party submitted its second Article 4 extension request, seeking an additional three years to complete clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas by March 2029.¹⁰⁴ Afghanistan reported that it was working to mobilize the resources required to clear the remaining contamination within the requested extension period, including plans to allocate a portion of the national budget to release some cluster munition contaminated areas in 2026, while strengthening operational capacity through the development of a new national standard for CMRS and associated training for mine action organizations. At the same time, Afghanistan emphasized that international funding for mine action, including cluster munition clearance, had drastically declined or ceased altogether following the Taliban's takeover in August 2021. The 2025 US foreign assistance freeze and subsequent termination of US-funded cluster munition clearance further reduced operational capacity, a concern reiterated in Afghanistan's official reporting for 2025.¹⁰⁵ Nevertheless, unlike in 2024—when Afghanistan only canceled suspected hazardous area

⁹⁹ Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 13 December 2024, bit.ly/ChileArt4ExtRequest2024; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentin Segura, Head of International Cooperation Department, Chile Undersecretary of Defense, 17 March 2025.

¹⁰⁰ For further information on Mauritania's progress, see the Mine Action Review country profile for Mauritania at www.mineactionreview.org.

¹⁰¹ Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions First Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 30 June 2021, bit.ly/MauritaniaCCMArt4ExtRequest2021; Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 5 July 2023, bit.ly/MauritaniaCCM2Art4ExtRequest2023; and Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 19 March 2025, bit.ly/MauritaniaArt4ExtRequest2025.

¹⁰² Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 19 March 2025, pp. 2 and 15–16, bit.ly/MauritaniaArt4ExtRequest2025.

¹⁰³ For further information on progress in Afghanistan, Chad, Germany, Lebanon, Somalia, and South Sudan, see the relevant Mine Action Review country profiles at www.mineactionreview.org.

¹⁰⁴ Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Analysis and Draft Decision of Afghanistan's Deadline Extension Request under Article 4.1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," 25 August 2025, p. 2, docs.un.org/en/CCM/MSP/2025/3.

¹⁰⁵ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, Directorate of Mine Action Coordination for Afghanistan (DMAC), 2 April 2025; and Afghanistan Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form F, pp. 25–26.

(SHA) through non-technical survey and did not report any clearance of cluster munition contaminated land—Afghanistan reported clearing contaminated land in 2025.¹⁰⁶ However, if reports of new cluster munition contamination resulting from Pakistan's use of cluster munitions are confirmed (see *New Use section in Ban Policy*), land release efforts will need to increase significantly between 2026 and 2028 for Afghanistan to meet the deadline set out in its extension request.¹⁰⁷

Cluster munition remnant land release by States Parties: 2021–2025¹⁰⁸

Ranking	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
1	Lao PDR 46.68km ²	Lao PDR 50.72km ²	Lao PDR 56.67km ²	Lao PDR 71.7km ²	Lao PDR 67.32km ²
2	Iraq 34km ²	Iraq 31.26km ²	Iraq 19.06km ²	Iraq 12.08km ²	Iraq 39.06km ²
3	Chile 33.84km ²	Afghanistan 3.54km ²	Chile 1.44km ²	Chile 8.1km ²	South Sudan 3.78km ²
4	Afghanistan 3.65km ²	Mauritania 2.67km ²	Afghanistan 1.03km ²	South Sudan 3.57km ²	Lebanon 1.85km ²
5	Lebanon 1.24km ²	Lebanon 1.48km ²	Germany 0.87km ²	Germany 1.21km ²	Germany 0.85km ²
6	BiH 1.22km ²	Germany 1.34km ²	Lebanon 0.85km ²	Mauritania 1.13km ²	Mauritania 0.81km ²
7	Germany 0.85km ²	BiH 1.32km ²	BiH 0.54km ²	Lebanon 0.45km ²	Afghanistan 0.32km ²
8	Chad 0.74km ²	Chile 0km ²	Chad 0km ²	Afghanistan 0.33km ²	Chad 0km ²
9	Mauritania 0.18km ²	Somalia 0km ²	Mauritania 0km ²	Chad 0km ²	Chile 0km ²
10	Somalia 0km ²	Chad N/R	Somalia 0km ²	Somalia 0km ²	Somalia 0km ²

Note: BiH=Bosnia and Herzegovina; N/R=not reported.

Chad did not progress on comprehensive survey to identify areas requiring clearance throughout the five-year review period. In 2021, Chad reported that all known cluster munition contamination had been cleared, though suspected contamination in Tibesti Province still required survey.¹⁰⁹ Since then, Chad has submitted three successive Article 4 deadline extension requests to conduct these activities, yet no progress has been reported due to a lack of financial resources.¹¹⁰ The third extension request, submitted in January 2026,

¹⁰⁶ See the Mine Action Review country profile for Afghanistan at www.mineactionreview.org.

¹⁰⁷ Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Analysis and Draft Decision of Afghanistan's Deadline Extension Request under Article 4.1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," 25 August 2025, p. 2, docs.un.org/en/CCM/MSP/2025/3; response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 1 April 2026; and Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form F.

¹⁰⁸ BiH completed clearance in August 2023, while South Sudan's Article 4 clearance obligations only took effect in February 2024. As a result, BiH did not report land release activities from 2024 onwards, while South Sudan was not yet required to report on land release activities between 2021 and 2023. South Sudan figures are therefore only included for 2024 and 2025. Data on land release is drawn from estimates and calculations provided by Mine Action Review. For further information on individual countries' progress, see the relevant Mine Action Review country profiles at www.mineactionreview.org.

¹⁰⁹ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibril Brahim, Coordinator, National High Commission for Demining (Haut-Commissariat National au Déminage, HCND), 18 June 2021; and Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form F.

¹¹⁰ Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions First Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 10 June 2022, bit.ly/ChadArt4ExtRequest30May2022; and Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 10 June 2024, bit.ly/ChadArt4ExtRequest2024.

seeks an extension through October 2030, to be considered by States Parties at the Third Review Conference in September 2026. The request includes a resource mobilization plan and budget for the proposed non-technical survey, but implementation remains dependent on securing external donor funding.¹¹¹

Germany maintained relatively consistent land release output at the cluster munition contaminated former military training area in Wittstock, northwest of Berlin. Progress remained limited, however, due to the technically complex nature of the remaining contamination and environmental constraints, including the site's protected conservation status and restrictions on controlled burning required to make densely vegetated areas accessible for clearance.¹¹² Germany is implementing its second Article 4 extension period, through 1 August 2030, and is expected to meet this deadline.¹¹³

Status of Article 4 progress to completion (as of July 2026)

State Party	Current deadline	Extension period (number of request)	Original deadline	Status
Afghanistan	1 March 2029	4 years (1 st) 3 years (2 nd)	1 March 2022	Behind target
Chad	1 October 2026	13 months (1 st) 2 years (2 nd)	1 September 2023	Requested 4-year extension until 1 October 2030
Chile	1 December 2028	1 year (1 st) 1 year (2 nd) 3 years (3 rd) 30 months (4 th)	1 June 2021	Behind target
Germany	1 August 2030	5 years (1 st) 5 years (2 nd)	1 August 2020	On target
Iraq	1 November 2028	5 years (1 st)	1 November 2023	Behind target
Lao PDR	1 August 2030	5 years (1 st) 5 years (2 nd)	1 August 2020	Expected to request further extensions beyond 2030
Lebanon	1 May 2030	5 years (1 st) 4 years (2 nd)	1 May 2021	Behind target
Mauritania	1 August 2028	2 years (1 st) 2 years (2 nd) 2 years (3 rd)	1 August 2022	Behind target
Somalia	1 March 2030	4 years (1 st)	1 March 2026	Progress to target uncertain
South Sudan	1 February 2034	N/A	1 February 2034	Progress to target uncertain

Note: N/A=not applicable.

¹¹¹ Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 7 July 2026, bit.ly/ChadArt4ExtRequest2026.

¹¹² Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form F, p. 21.

¹¹³ Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 10 May 2024, bit.ly/GermanyArt4ExtRequest2024.

Lebanon continued land release activities throughout the review period, contributing to a reduction in legacy cluster munition contamination. However, progress was disrupted by renewed conflict in southern Lebanon from late 2023 onwards, which restricted mine action operations in general, diverted resources to emergency response activities, and also resulted in new cluster munition contamination.¹¹⁴ In addition, clearance was affected by declining funding, Lebanon's prolonged economic crisis, and the fact that much of the remaining contamination is located in difficult terrain.¹¹⁵ Consequently, Lebanon submitted a second Article 4 deadline extension request in November 2024, seeking additional time through May 2030 to address the remaining contamination.¹¹⁶

Somalia has not released any cluster munition contaminated land over the past five years. In December 2024, Somalia submitted its first extension request to its initial 2026 deadline, seeking four additional years to complete survey and clearance by 1 March 2030.¹¹⁷ It reported access restrictions due to ongoing security issues, constrained and further decreasing financial resources, as well as limited technical resources, as the primary reasons for insufficient progress to date.¹¹⁸

South Sudan's release of cluster munition contaminated areas has been relatively consistent over the past few years, including in 2024, the first year in which it was formally bound by Article 4 clearance obligations. However, in 2025, the State Party achieved a modest increase in the release of cluster munition contaminated land.¹¹⁹ If it maintains its current rate of progress, South Sudan remains on track to meet its Article 4 clearance deadline in 2034. South Sudan is the only State Party still working towards its original Article 4 deadline following the convention's entry into force for the country in February 2024.



A Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) staff member clears cluster munition contaminated land near Vavyaove village in Mykolaiv Oblast, Ukraine. Clearance operations are allowing farmers to regain access to their fields.

© C. Wright/ICBL-CMC, July 2025

RISK EDUCATION

OBLIGATIONS OF STATES PARTIES REGARDING RISK EDUCATION

Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions requires each State Party to conduct risk reduction education to ensure civilians living in or around contaminated areas are aware of the risks posed by cluster munition remnants.

¹¹⁴ Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Charbel Njeim, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 14 March 2025.

¹¹⁵ Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; LMAC, "LMAC Annual Report 2024," undated, p. 7, bit.ly/LMACAnnualReport2024; and World Bank Group, "Macro Poverty Outlook: Lebanon," 10 April 2025, p. 2, bit.ly/LebanonWorldBank10Apr2025.

¹¹⁶ Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2024, bit.ly/LebanonArt4ExtRequest2024; and Lebanon response to questions posed by the Convention on Cluster Munitions Analysis Group for Article 4 Extension Requests, 23 April 2025, bit.ly/CCMArt4Lebanon23Apr2025.

¹¹⁷ Somalia Convention on Cluster Munitions First Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 4 December 2024, bit.ly/SomaliaArt4ExtRequest2024.

¹¹⁸ Somalia Convention on Cluster Munitions First Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 3 April 2025, p. 2, bit.ly/SomaliaArt4ExtRequest2025; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Hussein Ahmed, Project Manager, UNMAS, 26 May 2025.

¹¹⁹ See the Mine Action Review country profile for South Sudan at www.mineactionreview.org.

The Lausanne Action Plan further emphasizes the need for tailored, context-specific risk education that prioritizes those most at risk, while taking into account age, gender, disability, and other diversity factors. This section assesses whether implementation during the five-year review period reflected these commitments, while also considering broader developments in risk education since the convention entered into force.

In the 16 years since the convention entered into force in 2010, risk education has evolved significantly in both policy and practice. What was once often understood primarily as awareness-raising through safety messages has developed into a more comprehensive and professionalized approach aimed at influencing behavior, reducing risk, and supporting community protection. This evolution has been reflected in increasingly integrated and context-specific approaches to risk education.

During the five-year implementation period of the Lausanne Action Plan, this evolution has been particularly evident. States Parties increasingly sought to strengthen institutional delivery through schools, national authorities, community structures, and humanitarian coordination mechanisms, while expanding links with humanitarian response, education, health, development, and victim assistance initiatives.

However, reporting remained largely output-focused, with relatively little information provided on the outcomes of risk education activities, such as changes in knowledge, behavior, or exposure to risk. As a result, it remained difficult to assess the effectiveness of risk education beyond the scale of implementation.

REACHING THOSE MOST AT RISK

As of the end of 2025, risk education had been implemented in all States Parties with cluster munition contamination, except Chad, Chile, and Germany. Chad reported that no risk education activities had been carried out due to a lack of funding.¹²⁰ In Chile and Germany, contamination is confined to military areas that are inaccessible to civilians.¹²¹



Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) staff members deliver an interactive risk education session to children outside their school in Yarmouk, Damascus Governorate, Syria.

© Sean Sutton/NPA, December 2025

Access constraints, insecurity, displacement, and declining funding continued to hinder the delivery of risk education in several States Parties in 2025. Conflict-affected and contaminated areas remained difficult to reach in Lebanon, Somalia, and South Sudan, while seasonal flooding and prolonged rainy seasons further restricted access in South Sudan and Lao PDR.¹²² Population displacement complicated the identification and sustained engagement of at-risk groups, particularly in Lebanon.¹²³ Several States Parties also reported significant funding shortfalls that reduced operational capacity, limited outreach, and curtailed the number of implementing partners.

¹²⁰ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Bechir Niam Oumda, Head of Risk Education Department, HCND, 14 May 2026.

¹²¹ Response to Monitor questionnaire by María Pía Von Chrismar, Head of the International Relations Division, Chile Undersecretary of Defense, 10 April 2026; and Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form G.


¹²² Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Ali Makki, EORE Section Head, LMAC, 1 April 2026; by Hussein Ahmed, Project Manager, UNMAS, 5 April 2026; and by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, NMAA, 24 April 2026; and Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form G.

¹²³ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ali Makki, EORE Section Head, LMAC, 1 April 2026.

Economic pressures continued to contribute to risky behavior during the reporting period. Several States Parties noted that livelihood needs led people to enter hazardous areas despite known risks. Agricultural workers in Lebanon were reported to engage in risky behavior because of economic pressures, while South Sudan highlighted the growing involvement of children in scrap metal collection due to economic hardship.¹²⁴ These factors reinforced the need for risk education to be integrated within broader humanitarian, livelihood, and protection activities in order to address the underlying drivers of risk-taking behavior.

Across affected States Parties, children remained particularly vulnerable across many contexts and continued to be the largest group of risk education beneficiaries. States Parties continued to emphasize child-focused approaches, including school-based activities, peer education, child-friendly materials, and the development of dedicated risk education resources tailored to children. While several States Parties identified boys as facing heightened risk due to gendered livelihood roles, greater mobility, and behaviors such as herding livestock or collecting scrap metal, and handling explosive items out of curiosity, beneficiary data indicate that risk education programs generally reached girls and boys in broadly equal numbers. This likely reflects the increasing use of school-based, community-wide, and integrated delivery approaches, which aim to reach all children living in affected communities rather than only those considered at highest risk. Similarly, beneficiary data for adults showed broadly comparable numbers of women and men reached through risk education activities in several States Parties, despite reporting that particular livelihood-related risks often affected men disproportionately. The reporting, however, did not provide sufficient information to explain these patterns or to assess the extent to which beneficiary profiles reflected deliberate targeting strategies or the broader delivery modalities employed.

Risk education beneficiaries in cluster munition affected States Parties in 2025, by age and gender¹²⁵



All States Parties that reported conducting risk education activities in 2025 provided sex- and age-disaggregated beneficiary data. This represents a significant advancement compared to earlier reporting under the convention, where beneficiary data was often reported only in aggregate form or not reported at all.

¹²⁴ Ibid.; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, NMAA, 24 April 2026.

¹²⁵ The data used for this Monitor analysis includes beneficiaries reached through interpersonal risk education activities (if reporting was sufficiently disaggregated to identify the type of activity conducted) in States Parties Afghanistan, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Somalia, and South Sudan. Where possible, only beneficiaries reached through risk education activities specifically targeting cluster munition contaminated areas were included in the analysis.

Progress in reporting sex- and age-disaggregated risk education beneficiary data has improved the ability to assess who is receiving risk education, providing a stronger basis for assessing whether activities are reaching those most at risk. However, Mauritania was the only State Party providing disability-disaggregated beneficiary data for 2025.¹²⁶ In addition, reporting did not always make clear whether beneficiary figures relate specifically to risk education delivered in cluster munition contaminated areas or included activities addressing other explosive ordnance threats. Despite the improved availability of sex- and age-disaggregated data, these remaining reporting gaps continued to limit a comprehensive assessment of whether risk education was being delivered in line with the Lausanne Action Plan's commitment to provide tailored, context-specific, age-, gender-, and disability-sensitive risk education to populations most at risk of cluster munition remnants.

FROM AWARENESS-RAISING TO COMMUNITY PROTECTION

Since the Convention on Cluster Munitions entered into force in 2010, and particularly in the last five years during the implementation period of the Lausanne Action Plan, risk education has evolved from a largely standalone awareness-raising activity into a core component of efforts to protect civilians from the risks posed by cluster munitions, mines, and explosive remnants of war (ERW). While its primary objective remains to reduce casualties and promote safer behavior, risk education has become increasingly integrated into broader responses addressing the needs of communities affected by contamination, displacement, and insecurity.

One manifestation of this evolution has been the growing use of CPP approaches in active and recent conflict settings.¹²⁷ In several cluster munition affected countries, risk education has been delivered alongside CPP activities aimed at helping civilians understand and mitigate risks arising from ongoing hostilities, explosive weapons use, displacement, damaged infrastructure, and contamination, including from cluster munitions.

Examples of this approach can be found not only in conflict-affected States Parties such as Lebanon, where the LMAC integrated CPP approaches into its response to the escalation of hostilities in 2023–2024, but also in states not party experiencing active conflict such as Myanmar and Ukraine.¹²⁸ In these contexts, risk education is increasingly combined with broader preparedness and protection measures aimed at reducing civilian harm and supporting safe movement, return, and access to services.

Although CPP remains an emerging concept that falls outside the Convention's explicit framework and obligations and is not yet broadly reflected in treaty reporting, it has received growing attention within the mine action sector and in related policy discussions. Recent efforts to develop dedicated technical guidance, common definitions, and training materials suggest that CPP is gradually becoming more formalized within sector practice.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form G.

¹²⁷ HI, "Saving Lives in Conflicts: Risk Education and Conflict Preparedness to Protect Civilians in EWIPA Settings," August 2025, bit.ly/HI-CPPAug2025.

¹²⁸ Ibid.; and email from Matthieu Laruelle, Programme Manager, EORE, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), 20 May 2026.

¹²⁹ This was discussed at side event sessions of the 28th and 29th International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors and United Nations Advisers, 9 April 2025 and 22 April 2026. "Protecting civilians in active conflict," GICHD, YouTube.com, 20 May 2025, bit.ly/GICHD-NDMApr2025; and "Emergency Risk Education During and After Conflict: Evidence, Innovations, and What Works," GICHD, YouTube.com, 28 April 2026, bit.ly/GICHD-NDMApr2026. See also, Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) in the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM)," 16 July 2024, p. 3, bit.ly/CCM-EORE16July2024; Explosive Ordnance Risk Education Advisory Group (EORE AG), "Minutes of the EORE AG Meeting," 30 January 2026, pp. 2–3, bit.ly/EORE-AG30Jan2026; and EORE AG, "Minutes of the EORE AG Meeting," 1 July 2025, pp. 3–4, bit.ly/EORE-AG1Jul2025.

This reflects a recognition that civilians in active-conflict settings face overlapping risks from explosive ordnance contamination, displacement, and the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, requiring protection measures that extend beyond traditional risk education messaging. For example, while risk education provides advice on recognizing and avoiding explosive hazards, CPP equips communities with practical measures to prepare for and respond to active attacks, such as identifying safe shelter options, planning evacuation procedures, or adapting movement patterns during periods of shelling or airstrikes. Delivering risk education and CPP together therefore enables communities to manage both contamination risks and the immediate protection threats associated with ongoing conflict. As States Parties are not required to report separately on CPP activities, and current reporting does not generally distinguish between traditional risk education and CPP approaches, it remains difficult to assess the extent to which CPP has been adopted, formally integrated into national mine action frameworks, or incorporated into operational practice.



A DanChurchAid (DCA) staff member introduces the organization's risk education team to children at an orphanage in Eastern Equatoria, South Sudan.

© Noe Falk Nielsen/DCA, May 2026

INCREASING INTEGRATION INTO BROADER HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Rather than being delivered solely as a standalone intervention or as part of land release operations, risk education was increasingly combined with humanitarian and development programs and services during the five-year review period. In parallel, closer linkages were established between risk education and victim assistance. This reflects growing recognition that reducing harm from cluster munitions, mines, and ERW requires coordinated approaches that combine prevention, protection, and assistance, while addressing the broader vulnerabilities faced by affected communities.

For 2025, several States Parties and states not party that are affected by cluster munitions reported continued efforts to integrate risk education into formal and informal education systems. **Afghanistan** reported that national strategies sought to mainstream risk education into school curricula, teacher training programs, protection frameworks, disaster risk reduction initiatives, and broader humanitarian and development planning.¹³⁰ Risk education has also been increasingly linked to victim assistance, with survivors engaged as peer educators and messaging designed to address the needs of persons with disabilities and other at-risk groups.¹³¹ Afghanistan further reported efforts to institutionalize risk education through national ministries, education networks, child protection programs, and community-based approaches.¹³²

South Sudan similarly highlighted the importance of integrating risk education within broader humanitarian assistance programs to maximize reach and efficiency amid funding reductions and operational constraints. Examples included delivering risk education alongside child protection, education, and livelihood activities, or conducting risk education sessions during food distributions to reach vulnerable populations.¹³³

¹³⁰ Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form G.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmad Zia Nizami, Senior EORE/Victim Assistance (VA) Manager, DMAC, 1 April 2026.

¹³³ South Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), pp. 7–10; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, NMAA, 24 April 2026.

In Southeast Asia, **Cambodia** and **Lao PDR** continued to embed risk education within education systems and community structures, supporting sustained delivery through national institutions and local networks.¹³⁴ In **Myanmar**, the MA AoR likewise reported integrating risk education into multisector humanitarian responses, including protection and community-based programming, while expanding community-led and volunteer-based delivery mechanisms to expand reach to the most conflict-affected communities.¹³⁵ In **Vietnam**, integrated mine action and development initiatives combined survey and clearance with risk education, victim assistance, livelihood support, and climate-resilient rural development, while also pursuing the gradual institutionalization of risk education within schools, local governance structures, and community-based organizations.¹³⁶

In **Lebanon**, where renewed hostilities and displacement created significant access challenges, national authorities emphasized the need for closer coordination between risk education and humanitarian actors to ensure timely outreach to affected populations.¹³⁷ In **Syria**, the established coordination mechanism through the MA AoR helped connect risk education with broader humanitarian response and early recovery efforts, while facilitating coordination among national and international mine action actors.¹³⁸ In **Ukraine**, risk education was delivered alongside humanitarian and development efforts, including community resilience programming and assistance in conflict-affected areas, while further cross-sector integration was seen as necessary to expand coverage and address drivers of risk-taking behavior.¹³⁹

The increasing emphasis on integration has also encouraged greater reliance on community-based delivery mechanisms. Several affected states reported using community focal points, peer educators, teachers, local authorities, and civil society organizations to deliver risk education, reflecting efforts to strengthen local ownership, improve access to hard-to-reach populations, and maintain continuity when security conditions restrict movement. Such approaches have become increasingly important as operators seek to sustain outreach despite declining funding and reduced operational capacity.

The growing integration of risk education into broader humanitarian and development initiatives also reflects a continuous shift towards institutionalizing risk education within national systems and cross-sectoral responses. This trend is supported by ongoing efforts to professionalize the sector, including the adoption in 2026 of competency-based standards and qualification frameworks that are helping to build capacity beyond the mine action community and enabling a wider range of actors to incorporate risk education into their work.¹⁴⁰ As funding constraints increasingly affect mine action programs, integration into broader systems and funding streams is emerging as an important means of sustaining risk education delivery while supporting States Parties in implementing their convention obligations.¹⁴¹

¹³⁴ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Pheap Eng, Director of Public Relations Department, Cambodia Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), 2 April 2026; and Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form G.

¹³⁵ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Oo Kyaw Win, Child Protection Officer, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 13 May 2026.

¹³⁶ UNDP, "Mid-Term Review Report: Korea – Viet Nam Peace Village Project (KVPVP)," March 2026, pp. 13–16, bit.ly/UNDPVietnamMar2026.

¹³⁷ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ali Makki, EORE Section Head, LMAC, 1 April 2026.


¹³⁸ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Basel Awad, EORE Lead, UNMAS, 27 May 2026.

¹³⁹ Ukraine MA AoR, "Overview," undated, bit.ly/UkraineMAAoR; and GICHD, "Mapping of the Explosive Ordnance Risk Education Sector in Ukraine," 9 September 2024, pp. 10 and 14, bit.ly/GICHDUkraine9Sep2024.

¹⁴⁰ UNMAS, "Test and Evaluation Protocol 12.10/01/2026: Competency standards for explosive ordnance risk education practitioners," First edition, 16 January 2026, bit.ly/EORECompetency16Jan2026.

¹⁴¹ Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) in the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM)," 16 July 2024, p. 3, bit.ly/CCM-EORE16July2024.

CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION



CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES

MAP KEY


Number of casualties recorded from cluster munitions in 2025

- 1–9
- 10–99
- 100–999
- 1000+

Callout Data:

Country	Casualties
Russia	1000+
Ukraine	1000+
Afghanistan	1000+
Myanmar	1000+
Lao PDR	1000+
Vietnam	1000+
Cambodia	1000+
Georgia	1000+
Azerbaijan	1000+
Colombia	1000+
Croatia	1000+
Libya	1000+
Chad	1000+
Sudan	1000+
Eritrea	1000+
Yemen	1000+
Ethiopia	1000+
South Sudan	1000+
Somalia	1000+
Uganda	1000+
D.R. Congo	1000+
Angola	1000+
Mozambique	1000+
Western Sahara	1000+
Mauritania	1000+
Guinea Bissau	1000+
Sierra Leone	1000+
Liberia	1000+

Number of casualties recorded from cluster munitions in 2025



DISCLAIMER:

This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.



Mechanical clearance in Saraqeb, Idlib Governorate, Syria. A HALO Trust staff member rakes through soil in search of unexploded ordnance after it has been sifted by a front loader.

© Motiea Al-Shami/The HALO Trust, October 2025

FUNDING

INTRODUCTION

For the first time, the Cluster Munition Monitor includes a funding chapter focused on support to States Parties with cluster munition contamination and Article 4 obligations. Identifying funding allocated specifically to activities addressing the impact of cluster munitions is challenging because many donors do not report funding by ordnance type. In countries with mixed contamination, operators are often funded to release land affected by all types of munitions, based on humanitarian need and land-use priorities rather than ordnance type. Risk education programs likewise often commonly address multiple hazards, while victim assistance is provided regardless of the ordnance that caused the injury. The data in this chapter draws on Article 7 reports, operator annual reports, media reporting, and responses from donors, operators, and National Mine Action Authorities to Monitor questionnaires. To identify funding used to address cluster munition remnant contamination, donor data was cross-checked against Mine Action Review questionnaire responses from country-based operators, which identified donors that supported land release on cluster munition remnant contaminated land.

Article 6 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions establishes each State Party's right to request and receive assistance from other States Parties in meeting its obligations under the treaty. States Parties in a position to do so are required to provide technical, material, and financial support to countries affected by cluster munitions. These international cooperation and assistance provisions are essential to the convention's success as many affected states lack the means to fulfil their obligations in a comprehensive and timely manner without external support.

Adopted at the Second Review Conference in 2021, the Lausanne Action Plan has guided States Parties over the past five years and underscored the importance of international cooperation and assistance in achieving the convention's obligations fully and on time.¹ In addition to emphasizing the need for States Parties to support affected States Parties, the

¹ Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Working Paper on Elements for the Vientiane Capital Action Plan: Submitted by the President," 30 March 2026, bit.ly/WorkingPaperVCAP30Mar2026; and Lausanne Action Plan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Review Conference, Geneva, 21 September 2021, bit.ly/LausanneActionPlan.

plan highlights the importance of national ownership and the need to share experiences, best practices, and opportunities for cooperation, including through country coalition mechanisms.

As the convention approaches its Third Review Conference in September 2026 and the adoption of a new five-year action plan, this chapter provides an overview of the financial contributions made in 2025 by both affected countries and international donors to address the impacts of cluster munition remnants.² It also documents progress and trends since 2021 in line with the cooperation and assistance commitments of the Lausanne Action Plan.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS

In 2025, approximately US\$116 million in international and national funding was provided to address the impact of cluster munition contamination.³ International funding totaled approximately \$74 million, provided to four affected States Parties. National funding provided by affected States Parties totaled almost \$42 million, with the majority (\$33.2 million) provided by Germany for clearance of its own cluster munition remnant contamination. In other affected states, however, national contributions generally supported the operational costs of mine action authorities rather than clearance activities specifically.

In 2025, 15 States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions provided funding to affected States Parties to address the impacts of cluster munitions.⁴ Three states not party—plus several United Nations (UN) organizations, private donors, and foundations—also provided financial support.⁵ However, funding for affected States Parties to the Convention was unevenly distributed, with the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) receiving the most international support for cluster munition-related activities in 2025. Iraq, Lebanon, and South Sudan received only modest support, while five States Parties faced funding gaps and constraints.

Lao PDR, the State Party with the most significant levels of cluster munition remnant contamination, was the largest recipient of international funding in 2025, receiving a total of \$51.7 million for land release, risk education, victim assistance, and capacity-building. This reflected both its high level of contamination and its comparatively broad donor base, including continued strong support from the United States (US) and several States Parties to the convention.⁶ Lao PDR has maintained a high level of support since 2021, and consistently appeared in the list of top 10 recipients of international support for mine action over the past five years.⁷

² The figures in this report are presented in United States dollars (US\$), rounded to the nearest hundred thousand or million. However, calculations of totals and percentages are made prior to rounding figures; as such, the rounded numbers presented in this document may not add up precisely to the totals listed, and percentages may not add up to 100%.

³ The figure is approximate due to the challenges of disaggregating funding specifically for activities addressing the impact of cluster munition contamination, as outlined in the introduction to this chapter.

⁴ States Parties contributing funds to activities to address the impacts of cluster munitions in 2025 were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Slovenia, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (UK).

⁵ States not party contributing funds to activities to address the impacts of cluster munitions in 2025 were: South Korea, Türkiye, and the United States (US).

⁶ Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form I. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/DatabaseArticle7CCM. Lao PDR has the highest level of contamination by cluster munition remnants, resulting from aerial attacks carried out by the US from 1964–1973. To a lesser extent, the country is contaminated by other explosive remnants of war (ERW), including some landmine contamination. International operators are not accredited to clear landmines in Lao PDR, although can remove individual mines during clearance activities. The majority of ordnance cleared each year by international operators are cluster munition remnants. See Impact section (this report) and International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), “Country Profiles: Lao PDR: Impact,” updated 28 December 2025, bit.ly/LaoCountryProfile.

⁷ International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), *Landmine Monitor 2025* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, December 2025), bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports.

South Sudan received around \$8.1 million for the release of cluster munition contaminated land, some of which also included antipersonnel mines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).⁸ Lebanon received \$7.8 million for the survey and clearance of cluster munition remnants, and Iraq received around \$6.4 million for land release activities in the south of the country, which accounts for over 90% of the country's cluster munition contamination.⁹

The majority of international funding was provided to international organizations for survey and clearance, with risk education often integrated into the programs. While some funding was reported for victim assistance, particularly in Lao PDR, the overall amount of funding going to victim assistance remains difficult to assess, with limited reporting on this sector within mine action.¹⁰ Allocating earmarked victim assistance funding would help to ensure that victims receive the necessary support, and that it could be effectively tracked, in line with Article 5 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Afghanistan, Chad, Chile, Mauritania, and Somalia face significant funding gaps that may continue to slow survey and clearance of cluster munition contamination and affect their ability to meet Article 4 deadlines. Although Afghanistan received international mine action funding in 2025, none was specifically allocated to the survey or clearance of cluster munition remnant contamination. However, Afghanistan did deploy some teams to cluster munition contaminated sites.¹¹ No cluster munition remnant clearance took place in Somalia in 2025, largely because of insecurity, but also due to reduced international funding.¹² Chad, Chile, and Mauritania received no international funding for their mine action programs in 2025.

Shifts in donor funding affected humanitarian mine action in 2025, most notably due to the US foreign assistance freeze in February and the grant terminations that followed. The freeze disrupted the clearance of cluster munition remnants in Southeast Asia, while contract terminations reduced clearance capacity, including for cluster munition remnants, in Afghanistan, Iraq, and South Sudan, underscoring the sector's reliance on US support.¹³ The US later renewed program contracts for cluster munition clearance in Southeast Asia.¹⁴ These developments took place amid broader uncertainty over the future of mine action funding, as

- 8 Germany Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/DatabaseArticle7MBT; responses to Monitor questionnaire by Caoimh Kett, Deputy Director for Horn of Africa, Sahel and Mine Action, Irish Aid, Government of Ireland, 20 April 2026; by Faye Price, Policy Officer, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 April 2026; and by Georgia Newman, Programme Manager and Policy Officer, Demining Team, UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), 28 April 2026; and response to Mine Action Review questionnaire by Mike Rashid Fulla, Director General, National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), 28 April 2026.
- 9 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Wajdi Jaber Hyder, Administration Section Head, Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC), 1 April 2026; by Anne Karine Jähren, Senior Advisor, Section for Humanitarian Policy and Long-term Development Initiatives, Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 April 2026; and by Ingebjørg Sørensen, Senior Advisor Policy, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 26 May 2026; and email from Craig McDiarmid, Head of Basra sub-office, NPA, to Mine Action Review, 3 May 2026. See also, Mine Action Review, "Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025," 1 August 2025, p. 51, bit.ly/MARClearingCMR2025.
- 10 International funding for victim assistance tends to be supported more broadly through contributions for development and disability rights that do not specify the portion of funding that might contribute to victim assistance, or whether victims are casualties of cluster munition remnants or other ordnance.
- 11 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, Directorate for Mine Action Coordination (DMAC), 2 April 2025; and Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form F.
- 12 Response to Mine Action Review questionnaire by Alexia Bousingen, Programme Manager, The HALO Trust, 6 May 2026; and Somalia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form H. The HALO Trust was the only international operator conducting land release operations in Somalia in 2025. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and NPA closed their operations in Somalia in 2023 due to lack of funding. See also, Somalia Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 16 June 2026, p. 25, bit.ly/SomaliaArt5ExtRequestJun2026.
- 13 ICBL-CMC, "Impacts of 2025 United States Funding Cuts on Humanitarian Mine Action," 1 December 2025, bit.ly/MonitorUSFundingCuts1Dec2025.
- 14 NPA, "Norwegian People's Aid continues its work on mine clearance funded by the US authorities," updated 29 September 2025, bit.ly/NPA29Sep2025; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by mine action operators, 26 May and 2 June 2026.

other major donors also began reducing allocations and narrowing their geographic focus in response to changing political and economic priorities.¹⁵ The difficult funding environment is directly undermining the ability of affected States Parties, including those with small amounts of contamination, to meet their Article 4 obligations.

National funding provided to mine action programs is not fully reported by all affected States Parties to the convention. Germany is the only State Party to the convention that funds all its cluster munition remnants clearance program, providing \$33.2 million in 2025.¹⁶ Lebanon reported the second largest national contribution (\$7.5 million), which included supporting some operational costs for mine clearance and rapid response, but not cluster munition clearance.¹⁷ Afghanistan, Chad, and Mauritania reported small contributions to their mine action programs, mainly supporting staff salaries and operating costs of their national mine action authorities, although Mauritania also supported limited land release activities that included cluster munition remnants.¹⁸ Iraq did contribute national funding in 2025 for its mine action authority and operations, but it did not report the amount. Cluster munition clearance in oil field sites was funded by the Iraqi Ministry of Oil.¹⁹ Chile, Lao PDR, Somalia, and South Sudan reported no national financial contributions in 2025, although Lao PDR reported in-kind contributions.

Efforts to increase resource mobilization through country coalitions or the inclusion of mine action in national plans and strategies remains uneven, and only a few affected States Parties have effective mechanisms in place. Lebanon established a Mine Action Forum in 2016, specifically under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, although it has since expanded to serve the broader mine action sector.²⁰ Lao PDR has included mine action within its broader development goals, including its Sustainable Development Goals and National Socio-Economic and Development Plans, in recognition that contamination by cluster munition remnants and other unexploded ordnance (UXO) blocks development and keeps people in poverty.²¹ Afghanistan, which has seen a drop in international funding since 2021, has reported efforts to integrate mine action, risk education, and victim assistance into national development plans and health and education budgets, and to strengthen interministerial coordination to embed mine action more fully in national planning and budgeting frameworks.²² Somalia and South Sudan have also reported some attempts to include mine action within national plans and budgets, but with limited success to date.²³ Mechanisms for increasing donor engagement and coordination and building national ownership need to be strengthened further in the next five-year period, particularly for the States Parties struggling to attract national and international funding.

15 See, ICBL-CMC, "Impacts of 2025 United States Funding Cuts on Humanitarian Mine Action," 1 December 2025, bit.ly/MonitorUSFundingCuts1Dec2025; and ICBL-CMC, "Cluster Munitions in Southeast Asia: Progress, Challenges, and Priorities Ahead of the Third Review Conference," 29 May 2026, bit.ly/MonitorSEAsia29May2026.

16 Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form I.

17 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Wajdi Jaber Hyder, Administration Section Head, LMAC, 1 April 2026.

18 Email from Col. Mohamedou Baham, National Coordinator, National Humanitarian Demining Program for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD), to Mine Action Review, 17 April 2026.

19 Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form I.

20 Presentation of Lebanon, "Thematic Panel: Cooperation and Assistance: Advancing our Shared Commitments Through Strengthened Partnerships, National Mine Action Platforms and Coordinated Donor Engagement," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 15 June 2026, bit.ly/LebanonPresentation15Jun2026.

21 National Regulatory Authority for UXO/Mine Action Sector in Lao PDR (NRA), "National Strategic Plan for the UXO Sector in the Lao PDR 2021-2030: 'The Safe Path Forward III,'" 17 January 2023, pp. 4 and 7, bit.ly/LaoNRAStrategicPlan2021-2030.

22 Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form H, p. 44.

23 Somalia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form H, pp. 14–15; and South Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), pp. 38–39.

As States Parties to the convention prepare for the Third Review Conference, there is a need to ensure sustainable multi-year donor commitments and stronger national ownership and financing, ensuring that all affected States Parties receive the support required to meet their Article 4 obligations.

FUNDING TO ADDRESS CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION IN 2025

DONORS AND RECIPIENTS

Action 40 of the Lausanne Action Plan states that when in a position to do so, States Parties should provide sustainable and timely assistance to other States Parties in the implementation of their obligations under the convention, including financial, technical, and material support.

In 2025, at least 15 States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, three states not party, and a number of smaller organizations and the United Nations (UN) provided around \$74 million in funding to affected States Parties for activities to address the impact of cluster munition contamination. As the State Party with the most significant levels of cluster munition remnant contamination, Lao PDR was the largest recipient of international funding in 2025. Given the scale of cluster munition remnant contamination in Lao PDR and the presence of international and national operators in the 15 most heavily contaminated provinces, most funding was directed toward addressing this threat.²⁴

In Afghanistan, Chad, Iraq, Lebanon, Mauritania, Somalia, and South Sudan, contamination includes both landmines and cluster munition remnants, and mine action operators are often accredited and funded to clear both, making it more difficult to separate funding for cluster munition related activities from support for landmine-related work. The figures reported below for these States Parties therefore focus on land release where operators and mine action authorities indicated that most funding supported cluster munition survey and clearance. However, in some cases—including Chile and Germany—countries received no international funding, either for clearance or other mine action activities.

Lao PDR received the largest share of international funding in 2025, totaling \$51.7 million, as the State Party most heavily contaminated by unexploded submunitions.²⁵ Most of this was allocated to activities in the provinces contaminated with cluster munition remnants and other UXO. International donor funding supported land release, risk education, and victim assistance activities carried out by international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including The HALO Trust, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). In 2025, these organizations received funding from Canada, Germany, Ireland, Norway, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US.²⁶ The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement of the US Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) was by far the largest donor, accounting for around 74% of the total (\$38 million).²⁷ Ahead of the Third Review Conference, taking place in Vientiane from 14–18 September 2026, Canada funded NPA to support the Government of Lao PDR in organizing and delivering the conference.²⁸

²⁴ Fifteen of Lao PDR's 18 provinces are known to be contaminated with cluster munition remnants. Nine provinces—Attapeu, Champasak, Houaphanh, Khammouane, Luang Prabang, Salavan, Savannakhet, Sekong, and Xieng Khouang—are heavily contaminated.

²⁵ Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form I.

²⁶ Emails to Mine Action Review from Graig Guruwiro, Programme Manager, The HALO Trust, 9 May 2026; from Isabele Urumath, Grants and Communications Manager, MAG, 26 April 2026; from Reinier Carabain, Country Manager, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), 27 April 2026; and from Linh Thi Dieu Nguyen, Deputy Country Director, NPA, 4 May 2026.

²⁷ Emails from Olivier Bauduin, UXO Program Advisor, US Embassy in Vientiane, 7 and 24 July 2026.

²⁸ Email from Linh Thi Dieu Nguyen, Deputy Country Director, NPA, to Mine Action Review, 4 May 2026.

Convention on Cluster Munitions States Parties: recipients and donors in 2025²⁹

Recipient	Donors			Amount (US\$ million)
	States Parties	States not party	Other	
Lao PDR	Canada Germany Ireland Japan Luxembourg New Zealand Norway Philippines United Kingdom (UK)	South Korea Türkiye United States (US)	UNDP UNICEF Several small donors and foundations	51.7
South Sudan	Denmark Germany Ireland Japan Netherlands UK		UNMISS (UNMAS)*	8.1
Lebanon	Belgium Canada Denmark France Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Slovenia Switzerland	South Korea US	If! Foundation UNICEF UNIFIL (UNMAS)* UNOCHA	7.8
Iraq	Norway	US		6.4
Afghanistan	No international funding earmarked specifically for cluster munition remnant activities			0
Somalia	No funding allocated to cluster munition remnant activities due to insecurity			0
Chad	No international funding received			0
Chile	No international funding received			0
Mauritania	No international funding received			0
Germany	National funding only			0
Total				74.0

Note: UNDP=United Nations Development Programme; UNICEF=United Nations Children's Fund; UNIFIL=United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon; UNMAS=United Nations Mine Action Service; UNMISS=United Nations Mission in South Sudan; UNOCHA=United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

*UNMAS works as a component of UNIFIL and UNMISS, providing technical guidance, quality assurance, and operational mine action support.

²⁹ Data on international funding for mine action is based on reviews of Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reports; the annual reports of ITF Enhancing Human Security and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS); media reporting; and responses from donors, operators, and National Mine Action Authorities to the Monitor questionnaire. Data was also checked against information provided by country-based operators to Mine Action Review questionnaires. Due to the challenges associated with disaggregating funding data specifically for activities addressing the impacts of cluster munitions, these figures may not represent funding provided only to addressing cluster munition remnant contamination.

In 2025, the Lao National Unexploded Ordnance Programme (UXO Lao) received funding from Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, and the US.³⁰ Japan's Ito Supporting Comity (ISC) also provided equipment and materials to UXO Lao for risk education activities.³¹ The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which supports both UXO Lao and the National Regulatory Authority for UXO/Mine Action Sector in Lao PDR (NRA), received financial assistance from Canada, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, the Philippines, and South Korea.³² The Philippines, a new donor to Lao PDR, signed an agreement with UNDP in 2025 to support clearance and women's empowerment under the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.³³ The Government of South Korea, through the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), and in partnership with UNDP, implemented an \$11 million project from 2022–2026 to strengthen national ownership and capacity for clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. Activities included support to the NRA and the Humanitarian Demining Unit of the Lao People's Army (Unit 58).³⁴

Ireland, Norway, and Türkiye, through the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), supported victim assistance activities in Lao PDR implemented by the Cooperative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE), which provides physical rehabilitation services to people with physical disabilities, including UXO survivors.³⁵

In **South Sudan**, international funding for land release totaled around \$8.1 million in 2025. Land release was supported by Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, and the UK and was implemented by DanChurchAid (DCA), the Danish Refugee Council, MAG, and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS).³⁶ DCA and the Danish Refugee Council both reported only clearance of cluster munition remnants in 2025, and MAG and UNMAS reported clearing both cluster munition remnants and landmines.³⁷ DCA resumed clearance in June 2025, with Dutch funding expected to continue until 2030.³⁸ The Danish Refugee

³⁰ Email from the Chief of Programme Office and Public Information, Lao National Unexploded Ordnance Programme (UXO Lao), to Mine Action Review, 27 April 2026.

³¹ Vansalong Khamchaisong, "Ito Supporting Comity Provides Equipment to Support UXO Lao," UXO Lao, 19 September 2025, bit.ly/UXOLao19Sep2025.

³² Response to Monitor questionnaire by Caoimh Kett, Deputy Director for Horn of Africa, Sahel and Mine Action, Irish Aid, Government of Ireland, 20 April 2026; Canada Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J; New Zealand Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form I; and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "Lao PDR: Funding and Delivery," accessed 19 June 2026, bit.ly/UNDPLaoFunding.

³³ Bakhodir Burkhanov, "Remarks at the UN Lao PDR – the Philippines signing ceremony," UN Lao PDR, 12 March 2025, bit.ly/UNLao12Mar2025; and Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs, "Philippines contributes to United Nations in Lao PDR through Disaster Resilience, and Women, Peace and Security Projects," 16 April 2025.

³⁴ "Laos, UNDP and KOICA sign USD11 million partnership to support UXO sector in the Lao PDR," *Lao News Agency*, 10 May 2022, bit.ly/LaoNewsAgency10May2022.

³⁵ Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Caoimh Kett, Deputy Director for Horn of Africa, Sahel and Mine Action, Irish Aid, Government of Ireland, 20 April 2026; and by Anne Karine Jahren, Senior Advisor, Section for Humanitarian Policy and Long-term Development Initiatives, Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 April 2026; Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), "TİKA Provides Medical Equipment and Supplies to Laos Orthotic and Prosthetic Centers," 15 September 2025, bit.ly/TIKALao15Sep2025; and Cooperative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE), "Partners," accessed 19 June 2026, bit.ly/COPELaosPartners. COPE also receives funding from private foundations and corporate partners.

³⁶ Germany Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J; responses to Monitor questionnaire by Caoimh Kett, Deputy Director for Horn of Africa, Sahel and Mine Action, Irish Aid, Government of Ireland, 20 April 2026; by Faye Price, Policy Officer, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 April 2026; and by Georgia Newman, Programme Manager and Policy Officer, Demining Team, FCDO, 28 April 2026; and response to Mine Action Review questionnaire by Mike Rashid Fulla, Director General, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

³⁷ Responses to Mine Action Review questionnaires by Hazha. J. Rashid, Programme Officer, UNMAS/United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), 29 April 2026; by Eric Okoth, Country Director, MAG, 8 April 2026; by Hajrudin Osmanovic, Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) Operations Manager, DanChurchAid (DCA), 5 May 2026; and by Ali Assaad, HMA Operations Manager, Danish Refugee Council, 8 April 2026.

³⁸ Response to Mine Action Review questionnaire by Hajrudin Osmanovic, HMA Operations Manager, DCA, 5 May 2026.

Council received support from Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands, although German funding ended in 2025.³⁹ MAG's US-funded clearance work through PM/WRA was halted after the February 2025 stop-work order, requiring it to stand-down teams.⁴⁰ UNMAS received funding from the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), supplemented by bilateral contributions from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), but UNMISS also faced a significant annual budget reduction, including lower allocations for UNMAS and mine action.⁴¹ Risk education was integrated into the survey and clearance programs of the international organizations, and UNMAS and NPA also provided capacity-building support to the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA).⁴²

In 2025, **Lebanon** received \$8.9 million in international funding for land release, including about \$7.8 million for the survey and clearance of cluster munitions.⁴³ State Party donors were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, and Switzerland, while South Korea and the US contributed as states not party. Additional support was provided through the UN. Funding supported international operators including DCA, HI, ITF Enhancing Human Security, MAG, and NPA. MAG also received funding from the If! Foundation, a new donor in 2025.⁴⁴ Belgium and France supported the national organization Beeatoona through HAMAP-Humanitaire, while Dutch funding contributed to institutional support for the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) through UNDP.⁴⁵



A farmer has planted corn over a cluster munition in Shabriha Sour, Lebanon.

© Hasan Hamze/NPA, April 2025

International donors contributed approximately \$0.8 million to risk education activities in Lebanon, including activities integrated with clearance and survey, and initiatives implemented by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), and HAMAP-Humanitaire. With Belgian funding, HAMAP-Humanitaire implemented a project entitled Building Resilience through Inclusion, Digital Awareness and Grassroots Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (BRIDGE).⁴⁶

In Federal **Iraq**, NPA was the only international organization addressing cluster munition remnant contamination in 2025, carrying out survey, clearance, and risk education, with support

³⁹ Response to Mine Action Review questionnaire by Ali Assaad, HMA Operations Manager, Danish Refugee Council, 8 April 2026.

⁴⁰ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kathy Keary, Head of Strategic Partnerships, MAG, 2 June 2026; and response to Mine Action Review questionnaire by Eric Okoth, Country Director, MAG, 8 April 2026.

⁴¹ Response to Mine Action Review questionnaire by Hazha J. Rashid, Programme Officer, UNMAS/UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

⁴² Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Ameya Takanobu, Deputy Director, Conventional Arms Division, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 May 2026; and by Faye Price, Policy Officer, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 April 2026; and UNMAS Annual Report 2025, 17 April 2026, pp. 12–13, bit.ly/UNMASAnnualReport2025.

⁴³ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Wajdi Jaber Hyder, Administration Section Head, LMAC, 1 April 2026.

⁴⁴ Response to Mine Action Review questionnaire by Sylvain Lefort, Country Director, MAG, 10 April 2026.

⁴⁵ Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Wajdi Jaber Hyder, Administration Section Head, LMAC, 1 April 2026; and by Yves Marek, Ambassador for Mine Action, France Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2026; and Belgium Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025) Form I. Beeatoona, a Lebanese non-governmental organization (NGO) founded in 2008, established a Humanitarian Mine Action Department in 2023 and has since carried out risk education and battle area clearance activities.

⁴⁶ Belgium Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025) Form I; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Wajdi Jaber Hyder, Administration Section Head, LMAC, 1 April 2026.

from Norway and the US.⁴⁷ NPA received around \$6.4 million from Norway and the US in 2025 to address cluster munition contamination in the south of the country, where over 90% of the country's cluster munition contamination is located.⁴⁸ The Danish Refugee Council, which worked in southern Iraq on cluster munition clearance, survey, risk education, and quality assurance and control, ended its operations in July 2024, following US funding reductions.⁴⁹ Iraq has an Article 4 deadline of 1 November 2028, but the funding reduction has reduced operational capacity below the level proposed in its Article 4 deadline extension request.⁵⁰

International mine action funding to **Afghanistan** has declined since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021. By 2023, the mine action budget was 60% lower than in 2022, reducing overall capacity and weakening the country's long-established mine action program. US funding cuts in early 2025 further affected the program, including cluster munition clearance previously supported by the US.⁵¹ In 2025, Afghanistan received around \$25.2 million in international assistance for its mine action program, although no funds were specifically allocated to the survey or clearance of cluster munition contamination.⁵² However, the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and quick response teams of the Mine Action Program of Afghanistan cleared some small areas of cluster munition remnant contamination through funding from international donations to the mine action program.⁵³ Of the overall mine action budget, \$2.6 million supported risk education—which incorporated cluster munition risk—and \$0.4 million supported victim assistance.⁵⁴

Somalia received international funding for its mine action program in 2025 from several international donors including Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, and the UK.⁵⁵ However, operational capacity has decreased in recent years, with MAG and NPA closing operations in 2023 due to a lack of funding. The HALO Trust was the only international operator conducting land release in Somalia in 2025.⁵⁶ The HALO Trust reported that despite having the operational capacity to conduct cluster munition remnant survey and clearance, none took place in 2025, or in previous years, as insecurity prevented access.⁵⁷ Somalia's mine action program relies almost completely on international funding, but sustained funding shortfalls have reduced operational capacity. Somalia has reported similarly bleak funding

⁴⁷ Email from Craig McDiarmid, Head of Basra sub-office, NPA, to Mine Action Review, 3 May 2026.

⁴⁸ Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Anne Karine Jahren, Senior Advisor, Section for Humanitarian Policy and Long-term Development Initiatives, Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 April 2026; and by Ingebjørg Sørenes, Senior Advisor Policy, NPA, 26 May 2026; and email from Haitham Fattah Lafta, Head of Operations, Regional Mine Action Center for the south of the country (RMAC-South), Directorate of Mine Action (DMA), 12 July 2026.

⁴⁹ Emails from Rune Bech Persson, Head of Humanitarian Disarmament and Peacebuilding, Danish Refugee Council, 26 June 2026; and from Haitham Fattah Lafta, Head of Operations, RMAC-South, DMA, 12 July 2026.

⁵⁰ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham Fattah Lafta, Head of Operations, RMAC-South, DMA, 24 April 2026; Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form I, p. 34; and Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions First Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 23 January 2023, pp. 25–26, bit.ly/IraqArt4ExtRequestJan2023.

⁵¹ See, ICBL-CMC, “Impacts of 2025 United States Funding Cuts on Humanitarian Mine Action,” 1 December 2025, bit.ly/MonitorUSFundingCuts1Dec2025.

⁵² Response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 2 April 2025; and Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form F, pp. 25–26.

⁵³ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 2 April 2025.

⁵⁴ Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form F, p. 47.

⁵⁵ Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Faye Price, Policy Officer, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 April 2026; by Anne Karine Jahren, Senior Advisor, Section for Humanitarian Policy and Long-term Development Initiatives, Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 April 2026; and by Georgia Newman, Programme Manager and Policy Officer, Demining Team, FCDO, 28 April 2026.

⁵⁶ Somalia Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 16 June 2026, p. 25, bit.ly/SomaliaArt5ExtRequestJun2026.

⁵⁷ Response to Mine Action Review questionnaire by Alexia Bousingen, Programme Manager, The HALO Trust, 6 May 2026.

projections for 2026, raising concerns that all remaining clearance, survey, and risk education activities could be at risk.⁵⁸

Three affected States Parties—**Chad**, **Chile**, and **Mauritania**—received no international funding for the survey and clearance of cluster munitions in 2025.⁵⁹

In **Chad**, limited international funding has been the main obstacle to meeting its Article 4 deadline.⁶⁰ No international funding was received by Chad in 2025 for its mine action program.⁶¹ In 2026, Chad submitted a four-year extension request proposing survey in five departments with suspected cluster munition contamination in Tibesti Province during the first two years. The proposed budget was €115,038 (\$130,062), covering four survey teams and one risk education and victim assistance team, including a government contribution of €15,245 (\$17,236).⁶²

While **Chile** has historically financed its own cluster munition remnant clearance, a lack of funding in recent years led Chile to seek international assistance to help meet its Article 4 obligations.⁶³ In December 2024, Chile submitted a fourth Article 4 deadline extension request to clear the remaining contaminated areas by December 2028.⁶⁴ Chile sought almost \$2.7 million in international assistance over three years, including \$1.9 million for equipment upgrades and \$0.7 million for operations and other costs.⁶⁵ Chile did not secure the international funding it required in 2025 through the first half of 2026, and it has reported no cluster munition clearance since completing survey in 2023.⁶⁶

Limited international support has impacted **Mauritania's** ability to meet its Article 4 deadline. While Mauritania received some international funding from France through HAMAP-Humanitaire from 2022–2024, the project did not address the clearance of cluster munition remnants and it ended in 2025 due to lack of co-funding.⁶⁷ In its 2025 Article 4 extension request, Mauritania sought \$2.4 million in international funding for survey, clearance, and risk education, with a deadline for completion of August 2028.⁶⁸ No international funding has yet been secured, and the limited land release completed to date has been financed nationally.⁶⁹

58 Somalia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 15.

59 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ngartoloum Ahmat, Administration and Finance Department, National High Commission for Demining (Haut-Commissariat National au Déminage, HCND), 14 May 2026; Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form I; and responses to Mine Action Review questionnaire by Moussa Ali Soultani, Director of Operations and Logistics, HCND, 4 May 2026; and by Col. Mohamedou Baham, National Coordinator, PNDHD, 17 April 2026.

60 The Demining and Economic Development Project (Projet de déminage et de développement économique, PRODECO), implemented by HI and MAG, finished in April 2022. Chad has struggled to secure further funding for land release operations.

61 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ngartoloum Ahmat, Administration and Finance Department, HCND, 14 May 2026.

62 Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 7 July 2026, pp. 12–13, bit.ly/ChadArt4ExtRequest2026.

63 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentin Segura, Head of International Cooperation Department, Chile Ministry of National Defense, 17 March 2025.

64 Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 13 December 2024, bit.ly/ChileArt4ExtRequest2024; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentin Segura, Head of International Cooperation Department, Chile Ministry of National Defense, 17 March 2025.

65 Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form I, p. 8.

66 Response to Monitor questionnaire by María Pía von Chrismar, Head of International Relations Division, Chile Undersecretary of Defense, 10 April 2026.

67 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Julien Kempeneers, HAMAP-Humanitaire, 18 August 2025. In 2025, MAG received funding for the West Africa region, including Mauritania, for weapons and ammunition management.

68 Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 19 March 2025, pp. 3 and 13–15, bit.ly/MauritaniaArt4ExtRequest2025.

69 Ibid., p. 8.

INTERNATIONAL FUNDING DEVELOPMENTS IN 2025

In terms of international funding to mine action, 2025 was a somewhat tumultuous year. In January, the US administration introduced a 90-day freeze on foreign assistance to allow for a re-assessment of US aid.⁷⁰ The abrupt suspension had an immediate impact on humanitarian mine action operations, forcing land release, risk education, and victim assistance activities to be paused in several countries.

In Southeast Asia, cluster munition clearance programs were disrupted to such an extent that in February 2025, 17 former US ambassadors to the region sent a joint letter to the US Secretary of State. While recognizing the need to review foreign aid, they urged the immediate lifting of the stop-work order in affected states so that life-saving mine action activities could continue.⁷¹

The US later renewed program contracts for cluster munition clearance in Lao PDR and other Southeast Asian countries impacted by the US aerial attacks carried out between 1964 and 1973.⁷² However, contract terminations reduced clearance capacity for cluster munition contamination in Afghanistan, Iraq, and South Sudan.⁷³ In Afghanistan, the US ended funding for cluster munition clearance, while in Iraq it terminated three grants, two of them in the south, where most cluster munition remnant contamination is located.⁷⁴ In South Sudan, a US grant supporting the clearance of cluster munition contamination was also discontinued in early 2025.⁷⁵

These developments took place amid broader uncertainty over the future of mine action funding, as other major donors also began reducing allocations and narrowing their geographic focus in response to changing political priorities.⁷⁶

For several affected States Parties, including Afghanistan, Chad, Iraq, Lebanon, Mauritania, Somalia, and South Sudan, meeting Article 4 deadlines is becoming increasingly uncertain because of reduced international funding or shortfalls in funding compared to needs. As several of these States Parties have relatively small areas of contamination—less than 10km²—they could potentially complete clearance soon and within their current deadlines if sufficient funding was available.

NATIONAL FUNDING IN 2025

Under Action 38 of the Lausanne Action Plan, affected States Parties commit to allocate the resources needed to realize the convention's obligations in a timely manner and to explore possible alternatives and/or innovative sources of funding. However, national contributions to mine action are often under-reported and difficult to track.

⁷⁰ The White House (US government), "Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid," 20 January 2025, bit.ly/USWhiteHouse20Jan2025.

⁷¹ Minh Nga, "Former US ambassadors urge continued demining efforts in Southeast Asia," *VnExpress International*, 13 February 2025, bit.ly/VnExpress13Feb2025.

⁷² NPA, "Norwegian People's Aid continues its work on mine clearance funded by the US authorities," 29 September 2025, bit.ly/NPA29Sep2025; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by mine action operators, 26 May and 2 June 2026.

⁷³ ICBL-CMC, "Impacts of 2025 United States Funding Cuts on Humanitarian Mine Action," 1 December 2025, bit.ly/MonitorUSFundingCuts1Dec2025.

⁷⁴ Responses to Monitor questionnaire by international mine action operators, 31 August 2025 and 22 October 2025.

⁷⁵ Response to Monitor questionnaire by international mine action operator, 2 June 2026; and response to Mine Action Review questionnaire by Eric Okoth, Country Director, MAG, 8 April 2026.

⁷⁶ See, ICBL-CMC, "Impacts of 2025 United States Funding Cuts on Humanitarian Mine Action," 1 December 2025, bit.ly/MonitorUSFundingCuts1Dec2025; and ICBL-CMC, "Cluster Munitions in Southeast Asia: Progress, Challenges, and Priorities Ahead of the Third Review Conference," 29 May 2026, bit.ly/MonitorSEAsia29May2026.

Of the 10 States Parties with Article 4 obligations under the convention, five—Afghanistan, Chad, Germany, Lebanon, and Mauritania—reported national financial contributions to their mine action programs. Four—Chile, Lao PDR, Somalia, and South Sudan—reported no financial contributions. Iraq reported contributions but did not specify the amount.

National funding in 2025⁷⁷

Convention on Cluster Munitions State Party	Contribution (US\$ million)
Germany	33.2
Lebanon	7.5
Chad	1.0
Mauritania	0.2
Afghanistan	0.05
Chile	0
Lao PDR	0
Somalia	0
South Sudan	0
Iraq	N/R
Total	41.95

Note: N/R=not reported.

Germany has been funding the clearance of cluster munition remnants from a former military training area in Wittstock, spending a total of €173.2 million (\$195.8 million) since 2018.⁷⁸ In 2025, Germany provided €29.4 million (\$33.2 million) to support clearance in Wittstock.⁷⁹ In November 2023, Germany submitted a second extension request for five years until 1 August 2030. The extension requires a projected €30 million annually (a total of €150 million for the five years), bringing the overall cost of clearance at Wittstock since 2018 to around €290 million (approximately \$313.8 million).⁸⁰ The increase in costs was due to the extended clearance time required, inflation, personnel costs, and greater use of technology.

Lebanon reported a national contribution of approximately \$7.5 million to its mine action program in 2025, maintaining the same level of funding as in 2024. The contribution supported the operational costs of LMAC, the deployment of two mine clearance teams and three companies from the Lebanon Armed Forces Engineering Regiment for rapid response, risk education and victim assistance training, and advocacy activities.⁸¹ National funding did not contribute to land release of cluster munition contaminated areas.

In 2025, **Mauritania** provided approximately \$180,000 to its mine action program, in line with its updated Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline extension request for 2026–2028, which stated that the national annual allocation would be \$180,000 for each

⁷⁷ Data on national funding to mine action is based on responses to Monitor questionnaires from mine action authorities; reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports; Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports; and media reporting. See the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, www.the-monitor.org/cp.

⁷⁸ Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form I. Average exchange rate for 2025: €1=US\$1.1306. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 5 January 2026, bit.ly/USFedReserveExchangeRatesAnnual.

⁷⁹ Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form I.

⁸⁰ Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 10 May 2024, p.58, bit.ly/GermanyArt4ExtRequest2024. Average exchange rate for 2024: €1=US\$1.0820. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 6 January 2025, bit.ly/USFedReserveExchangeRatesAnnual.

⁸¹ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Wajdi Jaber Hyder, Administration Section Head, LMAC, 1 April 2026; response to Mine Action Review questionnaire by Col. Charbel Njeim, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 31 March 2026; and Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form I.

of the three years.⁸² In 2025, the funding covered the salaries of the National Humanitarian Demining Program for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD) staff, risk education, and limited survey and clearance activities, including for cluster munition remnants in Tiris Zemmour.⁸³

Afghanistan and Chad reported national financial contributions to support staff salaries and running costs of their national mine action authorities. **Chad** reported a national contribution of XAF 567,638,600 (approximately \$1 million) for staff salaries at the National High Commission for Demining (Haut-Commissariat National au Déminage, HCND).⁸⁴ The Government of **Afghanistan** provided around \$50,000 to cover the salaries for 18 Directorate for Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) staff members for 12 months.⁸⁵ Afghanistan also reported that the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled Affairs (MoMDA) provided a \$35–\$70 monthly pension to people with war-related disabilities, and that the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) allocated funding for physical rehabilitation services.⁸⁶

Chile, Lao PDR, Somalia, and South Sudan reported no national funding in 2025. Although **Chile** has previously funded cluster munition clearance, including deminers' salaries, health and evacuation costs, and air and land transport, no state contribution was provided in 2024 or 2025.⁸⁷ **Lao PDR**, which has previously reported an annual national contribution of \$5,000 for the offices of the NRA, only reported in-kind contributions in 2025, including salaries and accommodation for the Humanitarian Demining Unit of the Lao People's Army (Unit 58).⁸⁸ **South Sudan** contributed no national financial support for land release or risk education.⁸⁹ The government does support the NMAA, although in previous years it was reported that the government had not provided for staff salaries.⁹⁰ In **Somalia**, a lack of approved mine action legislation and recognition by the Federal Government of the Somali Explosives Management Agency (SEMA) as a government institution prevented SEMA from accessing state funding in 2025, as has been the case since 2015.⁹¹ The government provides the land for SEMA offices and reportedly covers utility costs for SEMA's national office in Mogadishu, along with several regional offices.⁹²

Iraq received national funding for the salaries and operating costs of the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA). Four Ministry of Defence military engineering teams were deployed to survey and clear cluster munition contamination, while national funding also supported risk

82 Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 19 March 2025, p. 14, bit.ly/MauritaniaArt4ExtRequest2025.

83 Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2026, p. 26; and email from Col. Mohamedou Baham, National Coordinator, PNDHD, to Mine Action Review, 17 April 2026.

84 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ngartoloum Ahmat, Administration and Finance Department, HCND, 14 May 2026. Exchange rate for 31 December 2025: XAF 100=US\$0.17933. Oanda, bit.ly/OandaCurrencyConverter.

85 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Karimullah Danish, Chief of Analysis and Evaluation, DMAC, 1 April 2026; and Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form I. In its Article 7 report, Afghanistan reported that DMAC salaries and office expenses totaled around \$40,000 annually, although the figure provided by DMAC in response to the Monitor questionnaire was \$50,000. The figure provided directly by DMAC has been used in this report.

86 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Karimullah Danish, Chief of Analysis and Evaluation, DMAC, 1 April 2026; and Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2026), p. 18.

87 Response to Monitor questionnaire by María Pía von Chrismar, Head of International Relations Division, Chile Undersecretary of Defense, 10 April 2026.

88 Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form I.

89 South Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 38; and response to Mine Action Review questionnaire by Mike Rashid Fulla, Director General, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

90 South Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 23.

91 Statement of Somalia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/SomaliaStatement16Jun2026.

92 Somalia Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 16 June 2026, p. 25, bit.ly/SomaliaArt5ExtRequestJun2026.

education for affected communities and victim registration and assistance at rehabilitation centers.⁹³ Survey and clearance of oil field sites, conducted by commercial operators, was funded by the Ministry of Oil.⁹⁴ The total amount contributed from these sources in 2025 was not reported. Iraq reported annual government funding of \$3.9 million to the DMA in 2021 and 2022 and had anticipated a similar level of funding during its 2024–2028 extension period, although the actual amount has not been confirmed.⁹⁵

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

The inequitable distribution of international financing among States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, combined with limited national ownership and contributions in some countries, demonstrates the need to strengthen resource mobilization efforts in affected States Parties over the next five years. The Lausanne Action Plan called for enhanced international cooperation and assistance through mechanisms such as country coalitions to promote targeted and regular dialogue and coordination among affected States Parties, donors, and operators. Integrating mine action into broader development frameworks can also strengthen national ownership and encourage sustained national funding.

Lebanon illustrates how a national authority can support effective dialogue with donors, operators, and other stakeholders. Established in 2016 under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the Lebanon Mine Action Forum has since expanded to serve the broader mine action sector. Its experience shows the importance of clear objectives, strong national ownership, and regular review of action points. Initially convened twice a year, the forum now meets annually at a higher level, supported by technical working group meetings throughout the year.⁹⁶

In **Lao PDR**, the government has long included mine action within broader development goals. This commitment led to the creation in 2016 of an 18th Sustainable Development Goal, “Lives Safe from UXO.” Mine action and the clearance of unexploded ordnance are also incorporated into Lao PDR’s five-year National Socio-Economic Development Plans, including the draft 10th plan (2026–2030).⁹⁷ The UXO Sector Working Group, operating under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is the main coordination mechanism for the sector in Lao PDR, although funding is not its main focus.⁹⁸ International support for mine action in 2025 included funding from the Philippines explicitly tied to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.⁹⁹



A Humanity & Inclusion (HI) clearance site in Houaxieng village, Houaphanh Province, Lao PDR. BLU-26 submunitions and other explosive remnants of war were located and destroyed during the clearance operations.

© HI, September 2025

⁹³ Email from Haitham Fattah Lafta, Head of Operations, RMAC-South, DMA, 12 July 2026; and Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form I.

⁹⁴ Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form I.

⁹⁵ Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions First Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 11 April 2023, pp. 40–41, bit.ly/IraqCCMArt4ExtRequest2023R.

⁹⁶ Presentation of Lebanon, “Thematic Panel: Cooperation and Assistance: Advancing our Shared Commitments Through Strengthened Partnerships, National Mine Action Platforms and Coordinated Donor Engagement,” Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 15 June 2026, bit.ly/LebanonPresentation15Jun2026.

⁹⁷ Lao PDR, “(Draft 5) 10th Five-Year National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2026–2030),” 8 November 2025, bit.ly/LaoPDRDevelopment2026-2030.

⁹⁸ Email from Olivier Bauduin, UXO Program Advisor, US Embassy in Vientiane, 7 July 2026.

⁹⁹ Bakhodir Burkhanov, “Remarks at the UN Lao PDR – the Philippines signing ceremony,” UN Lao PDR, 12 March 2025, bit.ly/UNLao12Mar2025; and Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs, “Philippines contributes to United Nations in Lao PDR through Disaster Resilience, and Women, Peace and Security Projects,” 16 April 2025.

Afghanistan reported efforts to integrate mine action, risk education, and victim assistance into national development plans, as well as into health and education budgets. It has also sought to strengthen interministerial coordination so as to embed mine action more fully in national planning and budgeting frameworks. The DMAC and the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) have engaged with the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA), the Deputy Prime Minister of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Finance to support the inclusion of mine action into national budgets. DMAC submitted a budget of approximately \$1 million to the Ministry of Finance, expecting funding to be allocated in mid-2026.¹⁰⁰ The World Bank was also reported to have taken steps to address ERW contamination through its funded projects in Afghanistan.¹⁰¹

In 2025, the Government of **Somalia** launched the National Transformation Plan (NTP) 2025–2029, which requires government entities and sectoral interventions, including mine action, to align with its strategic priorities.¹⁰² Somalia's Article 4 extension request, approved at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in September 2025, stated that it was aligned with the NTP.¹⁰³ However, without formal government recognition of the mine action authority, this alignment is unlikely to increase national funding for mine action in the short term.

South Sudan reported that the NMAA's plan had been included in the annual plan of the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare, but no budget was released. Its National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 is intended to support resource mobilization, although a detailed resource mobilization plan has not yet been developed.¹⁰⁴

Clearly, mechanisms for increasing engagement with donors and building national ownership can be strengthened further. States Parties facing difficulties in attracting national and international funding could benefit by learning from countries that have demonstrated stronger national leadership, established regular coordination forums, or integrated mine action into national strategies and policies. Regular engagement with donors, UN agencies, and international and national organizations, combined with better integration into humanitarian and development frameworks, could support more targeted and effective financing to address the impact of cluster munitions.

¹⁰⁰ Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form H, p. 44.


¹⁰¹ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Karimullah Danish, Chief of Analysis and Evaluation, DMAC, 1 April 2026.

¹⁰² Somalia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form H, pp. 14–15.

¹⁰³ Somalia Convention on Cluster Munitions First Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 3 April 2025, bit.ly/SomaliaArt4ExtRequest2025.

¹⁰⁴ South Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), pp. 38–39.

FUNDING TO ADDRESS CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION IN STATES PARTIES: 2025





Yosef, a landowner, harvests crops on his formerly contaminated field in Idlib Governorate, Syria. "We can finally cultivate the land," he says. Located on a former frontline, the field was contaminated with cluster munitions and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).

© G. Diffidenti/ICBL-CMC, August 2025

STATUS OF THE CONVENTION

2008 CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Under Article 15, the convention was open for signature from 3 December 2008 until its entry into force on 1 August 2010. Since the convention's entry into force, states can no longer sign it but can join through a one-step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16(2), the convention is open for accession by any state that has not signed. In the following list of states, the first date is signature; the second date is ratification. Accession is indicated with (a).

As of 1 August 2026, there were 112 States Parties and 12 signatories.

STATES PARTIES

Afghanistan 3 Dec 08; 8 Sep 11
 Albania 3 Dec 08; 16 Jun 09
 Andorra 9 Apr 13 (a)
 Antigua and Barbuda 16 Jul 10; 23 Aug 10
 Australia 3 Dec 08; 8 Oct 12
 Austria 3 Dec 08; 2 Apr 09
 Belgium 3 Dec 08; 22 Dec 09
 Belize 2 Sep 14 (a)
 Benin 3 Dec 08; 10 Jul 17
 Bolivia 3 Dec 08; 30 Apr 13
 Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 08; 7 Sep 10
 Botswana 3 Dec 08; 27 Jun 11
 Bulgaria 3 Dec 08; 6 Apr 11
 Burkina Faso 3 Dec 08; 16 Feb 10

Burundi 3 Dec 08; 25 Sep 09
 Cabo Verde 3 Dec 08; 19 Oct 10
 Cameroon 15 Dec 09; 12 Jul 12
 Canada 3 Dec 08; 16 Mar 15
 Chad 3 Dec 08; 26 Mar 13
 Chile 3 Dec 08; 16 Dec 10
 Colombia 3 Dec 08; 10 Sep 15
 Comoros 3 Dec 08; 28 Jul 10
 Congo, Republic of 3 Dec 08; 2 Sep 14
 Cook Islands 3 Dec 08; 23 Aug 11
 Costa Rica 3 Dec 08; 28 Apr 11
 Côte d'Ivoire 4 Dec 08; 12 Mar 12
 Croatia 3 Dec 08; 17 Aug 09
 Cuba 6 Apr 16 (a)

Czech Republic 3 Dec 08; 22 Sep 11
 Denmark 3 Dec 08; 12 Feb 10
 Dominican Republic 10 Nov 09; 20 Dec 11
 Ecuador 3 Dec 08; 11 May 10
 El Salvador 3 Dec 08; 10 Jan 11
 Eswatini 13 Sep 11 (a)
 Fiji 3 Dec 08; 28 May 10
 France 3 Dec 08; 25 Sep 09
 Gambia 3 Dec 08; 11 Dec 18
 Germany 3 Dec 08; 8 Jul 09
 Ghana 3 Dec 08; 3 Feb 11
 Grenada 29 Jun 11 (a)
 Guatemala 3 Dec 08; 3 Nov 10
 Guinea 3 Dec 08; 21 Oct 14
 Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 08; 29 Nov 10
 Guyana 31 Oct 14 (a)
 Holy See 3 Dec 08; 3 Dec 08
 Honduras 3 Dec 08; 21 Mar 12
 Hungary 3 Dec 08; 3 Jul 12
 Iceland 3 Dec 08; 31 Aug 15
 Iraq 12 Nov 09; 14 May 13
 Ireland 3 Dec 08; 3 Dec 08
 Italy 3 Dec 08; 21 Sep 11
 Japan 3 Dec 08; 14 Jul 09
 Lao PDR 3 Dec 08; 18 Mar 09
 Lebanon 3 Dec 08; 5 Nov 10
 Lesotho 3 Dec 08; 28 May 10
 Liechtenstein 3 Dec 08; 4 Mar 13
 Luxembourg 3 Dec 08; 10 Jul 09
 Madagascar 3 Dec 08; 20 May 17
 Malawi 3 Dec 08; 7 Oct 09
 Maldives 27 Sep 19 (a)
 Mali 3 Dec 08; 30 Jun 10
 Malta 3 Dec 08; 24 Sep 09
 Mauritania 19 Apr 10; 1 Feb 12
 Mauritius 1 Oct 15 (a)
 Mexico 3 Dec 08; 6 May 09
 Moldova 3 Dec 08; 16 Feb 10
 Monaco 3 Dec 08; 21 Sep 10
 Montenegro 3 Dec 08; 25 Jan 10
 Mozambique 3 Dec 08; 14 Mar 11
 Namibia 3 Dec 08; 31 Aug 18
 Nauru 3 Dec 08; 4 Feb 13
 Netherlands 3 Dec 08; 23 Feb 11
 New Zealand 3 Dec 08; 22 Dec 09
 Nicaragua 3 Dec 08; 2 Nov 09
 Niger 3 Dec 08; 2 Jun 09
 Nigeria 12 Jun 09; 28 Feb 23
 Niue 6 Aug 20 (a)
 North Macedonia 3 Dec 08; 8 Oct 09
 Norway 3 Dec 08; 3 Dec 08
 Palau 3 Dec 08; 19 Apr 16
 Palestine 2 Jan 15 (a)
 Panama 3 Dec 08; 29 Nov 10
 Paraguay 3 Dec 08; 12 Mar 15
 Peru 3 Dec 08; 26 Sep 12
 Philippines 3 Dec 08; 3 Jan 19
 Portugal 3 Dec 08; 9 Mar 11
 Rwanda 3 Dec 08; 25 Aug 15
 Saint Kitts and Nevis 13 Sep 13 (a)
 Saint Lucia 15 Sep 20 (a)
 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
 23 Sep 09; 29 Oct 10
 Samoa 3 Dec 08; 28 Apr 10
 San Marino 3 Dec 08; 10 Jul 09
 Sao Tome and Principe 3 Dec 08; 27 Jan 20
 Senegal 3 Dec 08; 3 Aug 11
 Seychelles 13 Apr 10; 20 May 10
 Sierra Leone 3 Dec 08; 3 Dec 08
 Slovakia 24 Jul 15 (a)
 Slovenia 3 Dec 08; 19 Aug 09
 Somalia 3 Dec 08; 30 Sep 15
 South Africa 3 Dec 08; 28 May 15
 South Sudan 3 Aug 23 (a)
 Spain 3 Dec 08; 17 Jun 09
 Sri Lanka 1 Mar 2018 (a)
 Sweden 3 Dec 08; 23 Apr 12
 Switzerland 3 Dec 08; 17 Jul 12
 Togo 3 Dec 08; 22 Jun 12
 Trinidad and Tobago 21 Sep 11 (a)
 Tunisia 12 Jan 09; 28 Sep 10
 United Kingdom 3 Dec 08; 4 May 10
 Uruguay 3 Dec 08; 24 Sep 09
 Vanuatu 5 Sep 25 (a)
 Zambia 3 Dec 08; 12 Aug 09

SIGNATORIES

Angola 3 Dec 08
 Central African Republic 3 Dec 08
 Cyprus 23 Sep 09
 Democratic Republic of the Congo
 18 Mar 09
 Djibouti 30 Jul 10
 Haiti 28 Oct 09

Indonesia 3 Dec 08
 Jamaica 12 Jun 09
 Kenya 3 Dec 08
 Liberia 3 Dec 08
 Tanzania 3 Dec 08
 Uganda 3 Dec 08

STATES NOT PARTY

Algeria
 Argentina
 Armenia
 Azerbaijan
 Bahamas
 Bahrain
 Bangladesh
 Barbados
 Belarus
 Bhutan
 Brazil
 Brunei Darussalam
 Cambodia
 China
 Dominica
 Egypt
 Equatorial Guinea
 Eritrea
 Estonia
 Ethiopia
 Finland
 Gabon
 Georgia
 Greece
 India
 Iran
 Israel
 Jordan
 Kazakhstan
 Kiribati
 Korea, North
 Korea, South
 Kuwait
 Kyrgyzstan
 Latvia
 Libya
 Lithuania [withdrew on 6 Mar 25]

Malaysia
 Marshall Islands
 Micronesia
 Mongolia
 Morocco
 Myanmar/Burma
 Nepal
 Oman
 Pakistan
 Papua New Guinea
 Poland
 Qatar
 Romania
 Russia
 Saudi Arabia
 Serbia
 Singapore
 Solomon Islands
 Sudan
 Suriname
 Syria
 Tajikistan
 Thailand
 Timor-Leste
 Tonga
 Türkiye
 Turkmenistan
 Tuvalu
 Ukraine
 United Arab Emirates
 United States
 Uzbekistan
 Venezuela
 Vietnam
 Yemen
 Zimbabwe

CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE FOR THE ADOPTION OF A CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

DUBLIN 19-30 MAY 2008

CCM/77

CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

The States Parties to this Convention,

Deeply concerned that civilian populations and individual civilians continue to bear the brunt of armed conflict,

Determined to put an end for all time to the suffering and casualties caused by cluster munitions at the time of their use, when they fail to function as intended or when they are abandoned,

Concerned that cluster munition remnants kill or maim civilians, including women and children, obstruct economic and social development, including through the loss of livelihood, impede post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, delay or prevent the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, can negatively impact on national and international peace-building and humanitarian assistance efforts, and have other severe consequences that can persist for many years after use,

Deeply concerned also at the dangers presented by the large national stockpiles of cluster munitions retained for operational use and *determined* to ensure their rapid destruction,

Believing it necessary to contribute effectively in an efficient, coordinated manner to resolving the challenge of removing cluster munition remnants located throughout the world, and to ensure their destruction,

Determined also to ensure the full realisation of the rights of all cluster munition victims and *recognising* their inherent dignity,

Resolved to do their utmost in providing assistance to cluster munition victims, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as providing for their social and economic inclusion,

Recognising the need to provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance to cluster munition victims and to address the special needs of vulnerable groups,

Bearing in mind the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which, *inter alia*, requires that States Parties to that Convention undertake to ensure and promote the full realisation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all persons with disabilities without discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability,

Mindful of the need to coordinate adequately efforts undertaken in various fora to address the rights and needs of victims of various types of weapons, and *resolved* to avoid discrimination among victims of various types of weapons,

Reaffirming that in cases not covered by this Convention or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law, derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience,

Resolved also that armed groups distinct from the armed forces of a State shall not, under any circumstances, be permitted to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party to this Convention,

Welcoming the very broad international support for the international norm prohibiting anti-personnel mines, enshrined in the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,

Welcoming also the adoption of the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and its entry into force on 12 November 2006, and *wishing* to enhance the protection of civilians from the effects of cluster munition remnants in post-conflict environments,

Bearing in mind also United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1612 on children in armed conflict,

Welcoming further the steps taken nationally, regionally and globally in recent years aimed at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the global call for an end to civilian suffering caused by cluster munitions and *recognising* the efforts to that end undertaken by the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Cluster Munition Coalition and numerous other non-governmental organisations around the world,

Reaffirming the Declaration of the Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, by which, *inter alia*, States recognised the grave consequences caused by the use of cluster munitions and committed themselves to conclude by 2008 a legally binding instrument that would prohibit the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, and would establish a framework for cooperation and assistance that ensures adequate provision of care and rehabilitation for victims, clearance of contaminated areas, risk reduction education and destruction of stockpiles,

Emphasising the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalisation and its full implementation,

Basing themselves on the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, in particular the principle that the right of parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, and the rules that the parties to a conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly direct their operations against military objectives only, that in the conduct of military operations constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects and that the civilian population and individual civilians enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

ARTICLE 1

General obligations and scope of application

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:
 - a. Use cluster munitions;
 - b. Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster munitions;
 - c. Assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
2. Paragraph 1 of this Article applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to explosive bomblets that are specifically designed to be dispersed or released from dispensers affixed to aircraft.
3. This Convention does not apply to mines.

ARTICLE 2

Definitions

For the purposes of this Convention:

1. “**Cluster munition victims**” means all persons who have been killed or suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss, social marginalisation or substantial impairment

of the realisation of their rights caused by the use of cluster munitions. They include those persons directly impacted by cluster munitions as well as their affected families and communities;

2. **“Cluster munition”** means a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions. It does not mean the following:
 - a. A munition or submunition designed to dispense flares, smoke, pyrotechnics or chaff; or a munition designed exclusively for an air defence role;
 - b. A munition or submunition designed to produce electrical or electronic effects;
 - c. A munition that, in order to avoid indiscriminate area effects and the risks posed by unexploded submunitions, has all of the following characteristics:
 - i. Each munition contains fewer than ten explosive submunitions;
 - ii. Each explosive submunition weighs more than four kilograms;
 - iii. Each explosive submunition is designed to detect and engage a single target object;
 - iv. Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-destruction mechanism;
 - v. Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-deactivating feature.
3. **“Explosive submunition”** means a conventional munition that in order to perform its task is dispersed or released by a cluster munition and is designed to function by detonating an explosive charge prior to, on or after impact;
4. **“Failed cluster munition”** means a cluster munition that has been fired, dropped, launched, projected or otherwise delivered and which should have dispersed or released its explosive submunitions but failed to do so;
5. **“Unexploded submunition”** means an explosive submunition that has been dispersed or released by, or otherwise separated from, a cluster munition and has failed to explode as intended;
6. **“Abandoned cluster munitions”** means cluster munitions or explosive submunitions that have not been used and that have been left behind or dumped, and that are no longer under the control of the party that left them behind or dumped them. They may or may not have been prepared for use;
7. **“Cluster munition remnants”** means failed cluster munitions, abandoned cluster munitions, unexploded submunitions and unexploded bomblets;
8. **“Transfer”** involves, in addition to the physical movement of cluster munitions into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over cluster munitions, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing cluster munition remnants;
9. **“Self-destruction mechanism”** means an incorporated automatically-functioning mechanism which is in addition to the primary initiating mechanism of the munition and which secures the destruction of the munition into which it is incorporated;
10. **“Self-deactivating”** means automatically rendering a munition inoperable by means of the irreversible exhaustion of a component, for example a battery, that is essential to the operation of the munition;
11. **“Cluster munition contaminated area”** means an area known or suspected to contain cluster munition remnants;
12. **“Mine”** means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle;
13. **“Explosive bomblet”** means a conventional munition, weighing less than 20 kilograms, which is not self-propelled and which, in order to perform its task, is dispersed or released by a dispenser, and is designed to function by detonating an explosive charge prior to, on or after impact;
14. **“Dispenser”** means a container that is designed to disperse or release explosive bomblets and which is affixed to an aircraft at the time of dispersal or release;
15. **“Unexploded bomblet”** means an explosive bomblet that has been dispersed, released or otherwise separated from a dispenser and has failed to explode as intended.

ARTICLE 3

Storage and stockpile destruction

1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with national regulations, separate all cluster munitions under its jurisdiction and control from munitions retained for operational use and mark them for the purpose of destruction.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster munitions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article as soon as possible but not later than eight years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party. Each State Party undertakes to ensure that destruction methods comply with applicable international standards for protecting public health and the environment.
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster munitions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article within eight years of entry into force of this Convention for that State Party it may submit a request to a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such cluster munitions by a period of up to four years. A State Party may, in exceptional circumstances, request additional extensions of up to four years. The requested extensions shall not exceed the number of years strictly necessary for that State Party to complete its obligations under paragraph 2 of this Article.
4. Each request for an extension shall set out:
 - a. The duration of the proposed extension;
 - b. A detailed explanation of the proposed extension, including the financial and technical means available to or required by the State Party for the destruction of all cluster munitions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and, where applicable, the exceptional circumstances justifying it;
 - c. A plan for how and when stockpile destruction will be completed;
 - d. The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions held at the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party and any additional cluster munitions or explosive submunitions discovered after such entry into force;
 - e. The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions destroyed during the period referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article; and
 - f. The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions remaining to be destroyed during the proposed extension and the annual destruction rate expected to be achieved.
5. The Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension. The States Parties may decide to grant a shorter extension than that requested and may propose benchmarks for the extension, as appropriate. A request for an extension shall be submitted a minimum of nine months prior to the Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference at which it is to be considered.
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention, the retention or acquisition of a limited number of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions for the development of and training in cluster munition and explosive submunition detection, clearance or destruction techniques, or for the development of cluster munition counter-measures, is permitted. The amount of explosive submunitions retained or acquired shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for these purposes.
7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention, the transfer of cluster munitions to another State Party for the purpose of destruction, as well as for the purposes described in paragraph 6 of this Article, is permitted.
8. States Parties retaining, acquiring or transferring cluster munitions or explosive submunitions for the purposes described in paragraphs 6 and 7 of this Article shall submit a detailed report on the planned and actual use of these cluster munitions and explosive submunitions and their type, quantity and lot numbers. If cluster munitions or explosive submunitions are transferred to another State Party for these purposes, the report shall include reference to the receiving party. Such a report shall be prepared for each year during which a State Party retained, acquired or transferred cluster munitions or explosive submunitions and shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations no later than 30 April of the following year.

ARTICLE 4

Clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants and risk reduction education

1. Each State Party undertakes to clear and destroy, or ensure the clearance and destruction of, cluster munition remnants located in cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control, as follows:
 - a. Where cluster munition remnants are located in areas under its jurisdiction or control at the date of entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, such clearance and destruction shall be completed as soon as possible but not later than ten years from that date;
 - b. Where, after entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, cluster munitions have become cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control, such clearance and destruction must be completed as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the end of the active hostilities during which such cluster munitions became cluster munition remnants; and
 - c. Upon fulfilling either of its obligations set out in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, that State Party shall make a declaration of compliance to the next Meeting of States Parties.
2. In fulfilling its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article, each State Party shall take the following measures as soon as possible, taking into consideration the provisions of Article 6 of this Convention regarding international cooperation and assistance:
 - a. Survey, assess and record the threat posed by cluster munition remnants, making every effort to identify all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control;
 - b. Assess and prioritise needs in terms of marking, protection of civilians, clearance and destruction, and take steps to mobilise resources and develop a national plan to carry out these activities, building, where appropriate, upon existing structures, experiences and methodologies;
 - c. Take all feasible steps to ensure that all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians. Warning signs based on methods of marking readily recognisable by the affected community should be utilised in the marking of suspected hazardous areas. Signs and other hazardous area boundary markers should, as far as possible, be visible, legible, durable and resistant to environmental effects and should clearly identify which side of the marked boundary is considered to be within the cluster munition contaminated areas and which side is considered to be safe;
 - d. Clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control; and
 - e. Conduct risk reduction education to ensure awareness among civilians living in or around cluster munition contaminated areas of the risks posed by such remnants.
3. In conducting the activities referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, each State Party shall take into account international standards, including the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
4. This paragraph shall apply in cases in which cluster munitions have been used or abandoned by one State Party prior to entry into force of this Convention for that State Party and have become cluster munition remnants that are located in areas under the jurisdiction or control of another State Party at the time of entry into force of this Convention for the latter.
 - a. In such cases, upon entry into force of this Convention for both States Parties, the former State Party is strongly encouraged to provide, *inter alia*, technical, financial, material or human resources assistance to the latter State Party, either bilaterally or through a mutually agreed third party, including through the United Nations system or other relevant organisations, to facilitate the marking, clearance and destruction of such cluster munition remnants.

- b. Such assistance shall include, where available, information on types and quantities of the cluster munitions used, precise locations of cluster munition strikes and areas in which cluster munition remnants are known to be located.
5. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to clear and destroy or ensure the clearance and destruction of all cluster munition remnants referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article within ten years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, it may submit a request to a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the clearance and destruction of such cluster munition remnants by a period of up to five years. The requested extension shall not exceed the number of years strictly necessary for that State Party to complete its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article.
6. A request for an extension shall be submitted to a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference prior to the expiry of the time period referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article for that State Party. Each request shall be submitted a minimum of nine months prior to the Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference at which it is to be considered. Each request shall set out:
 - a. The duration of the proposed extension;
 - b. A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including the financial and technical means available to and required by the State Party for the clearance and destruction of all cluster munition remnants during the proposed extension;
 - c. The preparation of future work and the status of work already conducted under national clearance and demining programmes during the initial ten year period referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and any subsequent extensions;
 - d. The total area containing cluster munition remnants at the time of entry into force of this Convention for that State Party and any additional areas containing cluster munition remnants discovered after such entry into force;
 - e. The total area containing cluster munition remnants cleared since entry into force of this Convention;
 - f. The total area containing cluster munition remnants remaining to be cleared during the proposed extension;
 - g. The circumstances that have impeded the ability of the State Party to destroy all cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control during the initial ten year period referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, and those that may impede this ability during the proposed extension;
 - h. The humanitarian, social, economic and environmental implications of the proposed extension; and
 - i. Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.
7. The Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors referred to in paragraph 6 of this Article, including, *inter alia*, the quantities of cluster munition remnants reported, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension. The States Parties may decide to grant a shorter extension than that requested and may propose benchmarks for the extension, as appropriate.

Such an extension may be renewed by a period of up to five years upon the submission of a new request, in accordance with paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of this Article. In requesting a further extension a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken during the previous extension granted pursuant to this Article.

ARTICLE 5

Victim assistance

1. Each State Party with respect to cluster munition victims in areas under its jurisdiction or control shall, in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, adequately provide age and gender-sensitive assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for their social and economic inclusion. Each State Party shall make every effort to collect reliable relevant data with respect to cluster munition victims.

2. In fulfilling its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article each State Party shall:
 - a. Assess the needs of cluster munition victims;
 - b. Develop, implement and enforce any necessary national laws and policies;
 - c. Develop a national plan and budget, including timeframes to carry out these activities, with a view to incorporating them within the existing national disability, development and human rights frameworks and mechanisms, while respecting the specific role and contribution of relevant actors;
 - d. Take steps to mobilise national and international resources;
 - e. Not discriminate against or among cluster munition victims, or between cluster munition victims and those who have suffered injuries or disabilities from other causes; differences in treatment should be based only on medical, rehabilitative, psychological or socio-economic needs;
 - f. Closely consult with and actively involve cluster munition victims and their representative organisations;
 - g. Designate a focal point within the government for coordination of matters relating to the implementation of this Article; and
 - h. Strive to incorporate relevant guidelines and good practices including in the areas of medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as social and economic inclusion.

ARTICLE 6

International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance.
2. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties affected by cluster munitions, aimed at the implementation of the obligations of this Convention. Such assistance may be provided, *inter alia*, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organisations or institutions, non-governmental organisations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis.
3. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision and receipt of clearance and other such equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.
4. In addition to any obligations it may have pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 4 of this Convention, each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants and information concerning various means and technologies related to clearance of cluster munitions, as well as lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants and related activities.
5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions, and shall also provide assistance to identify, assess and prioritise needs and practical measures in terms of marking, risk reduction education, protection of civilians and clearance and destruction as provided in Article 4 of this Convention.
6. Where, after entry into force of this Convention, cluster munitions have become cluster munition remnants located in areas under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, each State Party in a position to do so shall urgently provide emergency assistance to the affected State Party.
7. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the implementation of the obligations referred to in Article 5 of this Convention to adequately provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for social and economic inclusion of cluster munition victims. Such assistance may be provided, *inter alia*, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organisations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organisations or on a bilateral basis.
8. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance to contribute to the economic and social recovery needed as a result of cluster munition use in affected States Parties.

9. Each State Party in a position to do so may contribute to relevant trust funds in order to facilitate the provision of assistance under this Article.
10. Each State Party that seeks and receives assistance shall take all appropriate measures in order to facilitate the timely and effective implementation of this Convention, including facilitation of the entry and exit of personnel, materiel and equipment, in a manner consistent with national laws and regulations, taking into consideration international best practices.
11. Each State Party may, with the purpose of developing a national action plan, request the United Nations system, regional organisations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental institutions to assist its authorities to determine, *inter alia*:
 - a. The nature and extent of cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control;
 - b. The financial, technological and human resources required for the implementation of the plan;
 - c. The time estimated as necessary to clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control;
 - d. Risk reduction education programmes and awareness activities to reduce the incidence of injuries or deaths caused by cluster munition remnants;
 - e. Assistance to cluster munition victims; and
 - f. The coordination relationship between the government of the State Party concerned and the relevant governmental, intergovernmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the plan.
12. States Parties giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programmes.

ARTICLE 7

Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, on:
 - a. The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9 of this Convention;
 - b. The total of all cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 3 of this Convention, to include a breakdown of their type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type;
 - c. The technical characteristics of each type of cluster munition produced by that State Party prior to entry into force of this Convention for it, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by it, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of cluster munitions; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information that may facilitate the clearance of cluster munition remnants;
 - d. The status and progress of programmes for the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities for cluster munitions;
 - e. The status and progress of programmes for the destruction, in accordance with Article 3 of this Convention, of cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, with details of the methods that will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;
 - f. The types and quantities of cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, destroyed in accordance with Article 3 of this Convention, including details of the methods of destruction used, the location of the destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards observed;
 - g. Stockpiles of cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, discovered after reported completion of the programme referred to in sub-paragraph (e) of this paragraph, and plans for their destruction in accordance with Article 3 of this Convention;

- h. To the extent possible, the size and location of all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of cluster munition remnant in each such area and when they were used;
 - i. The status and progress of programmes for the clearance and destruction of all types and quantities of cluster munition remnants cleared and destroyed in accordance with Article 4 of this Convention, to include the size and location of the cluster munition contaminated area cleared and a breakdown of the quantity of each type of cluster munition remnant cleared and destroyed;
 - j. The measures taken to provide risk reduction education and, in particular, an immediate and effective warning to civilians living in cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control;
 - k. The status and progress of implementation of its obligations under Article 5 of this Convention to adequately provide age- and gender- sensitive assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for social and economic inclusion of cluster munition victims and to collect reliable relevant data with respect to cluster munition victims;
 - l. The name and contact details of the institutions mandated to provide information and to carry out the measures described in this paragraph;
 - m. The amount of national resources, including financial, material or in kind, allocated to the implementation of Articles 3, 4 and 5 of this Convention; and
 - n. The amounts, types and destinations of international cooperation and assistance provided under Article 6 of this Convention.
2. The information provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the previous calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.
 3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

ARTICLE 8

Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.
2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to a matter of compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information that would assist in clarifying the matter.
3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.
4. Pending the convening of any Meeting of States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.
5. Where a matter has been submitted to it pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article, the Meeting of States Parties shall first determine whether to consider that matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. If it does so determine, the Meeting of States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means further

to clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6 of this Convention.

6. In addition to the procedures provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5 of this Article, the Meeting of States Parties may decide to adopt such other general procedures or specific mechanisms for clarification of compliance, including facts, and resolution of instances of non-compliance with the provisions of this Convention as it deems appropriate.

ARTICLE 9

National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

ARTICLE 10

Settlement of disputes

1. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention, the States Parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of their choice, including recourse to the Meeting of States Parties and referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court.
2. The Meeting of States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties concerned to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

ARTICLE 11

Meetings of States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider and, where necessary, take decisions in respect of any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
 - a. The operation and status of this Convention;
 - b. Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
 - c. International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6 of this Convention;
 - d. The development of technologies to clear cluster munition remnants;
 - e. Submissions of States Parties under Articles 8 and 10 of this Convention; and
 - f. Submissions of States Parties as provided for in Articles 3 and 4 of this Convention.
2. The first Meeting of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year of entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.
3. States not party to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organisations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed rules of procedure.

ARTICLE 12

Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.
2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
 - a. To review the operation and status of this Convention;
 - b. To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11 of this Convention; and
 - c. To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Articles 3 and 4 of this Convention.
3. States not party to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organisations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed rules of procedure.

ARTICLE 13

Amendments

1. At any time after its entry into force any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations no later than 90 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.
2. States not party to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organisations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed rules of procedure.
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to all States.
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for States Parties that have accepted the amendment on the date of deposit of acceptances by a majority of the States which were Parties at the date of adoption of the amendment. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

ARTICLE 14

Costs and administrative tasks

1. The costs of the Meetings of States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not party to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 of this Convention shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
3. The performance by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of administrative tasks assigned to him or her under this Convention is subject to an appropriate United Nations mandate.

ARTICLE 15

Signature

This Convention, done at Dublin on 30 May 2008, shall be open for signature at Oslo by all States on 3 December 2008 and thereafter at United Nations Headquarters in New York until its entry into force.

ARTICLE 16

Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State that has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

ARTICLE 17

Entry into force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

ARTICLE 18

Provisional application

Any State may, at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force for that State.

ARTICLE 19

Reservations

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

ARTICLE 20

Duration and withdrawal

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating withdrawal.

3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.

ARTICLE 21

Relations with States not Party to this Convention

1. Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this Convention to ratify, accept, approve or accede to this Convention, with the goal of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention.
2. Each State Party shall notify the governments of all States not party to this Convention, referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, of its obligations under this Convention, shall promote the norms it establishes and shall make its best efforts to discourage States not party to this Convention from using cluster munitions.
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention and in accordance with international law, States Parties, their military personnel or nationals, may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.
4. Nothing in paragraph 3 of this Article shall authorise a State Party:
 - a. To develop, produce or otherwise acquire cluster munitions;
 - b. To itself stockpile or transfer cluster munitions;
 - c. To itself use cluster munitions; or
 - d. To expressly request the use of cluster munitions in cases where the choice of munitions used is within its exclusive control.

ARTICLE 22

Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

ARTICLE 23

Authentic texts

The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of this Convention shall be equally authentic.

GLOSSARY

Battle area clearance (BAC) – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

Clearance – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mines/ERW from a specified area to a specified depth.

Cluster bomb – Air-dropped cluster munition.

Cluster munition – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, a cluster munition is “a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions.” Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (or bomblets, from fixed dispensers) over a wide area. Submunitions are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.

Cluster munition remnants – These include abandoned cluster munitions, unexploded submunitions, and unexploded bomblets, as well as failed cluster munitions. Abandoned cluster munitions are unused explosive submunitions or whole cluster munitions that have been left behind or dumped. Cluster munitions are also a type of ERW.

Confirmed hazardous area (CHA) – An area where the presence of landmines, submunitions or bomblets, or other ERW contamination has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of unexploded ordnance.

Convention on Cluster Munitions – An international convention adopted in May 2008 and opened for signature in December 2008, which entered into force on 1 August 2010. The UN Secretary-General is the depository. The convention prohibits the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions. It also requires stockpile destruction, clearance, and victim assistance.

Diversity – A term that refers to the different aspects that make up a person’s social identity, for example: age, (dis)ability, faith, and ethnicity, among others.

Dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) – A type of cluster munition that can be used against both personnel and material targets, including armor.

Explosive remnants of war (ERW) – Under Protocol V of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Landmines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

Gender – A term that refers to the range of characteristics, norms, behaviors, and roles associated with women, men, girls, and boys, as well as their relationships with each other, and that are socially constructed. As a social construct, gender varies according to socio-economic, political, and cultural contexts, and can change over time.

Humanitarian mine action – All activities aimed at significantly reducing or completely eliminating the threat and impact of mines/ERW upon civilians and their livelihoods. This includes the survey, mapping and marking, and clearance of contaminated areas; capacity-building and coordination; risk education; victim assistance; stockpile destruction; and ban advocacy.

Interoperability – In relation to Article 21 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, interoperability refers to joint military operations with states not party to the convention.

International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) – Standards issued by the UN to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, establishing principles, and in some cases defining international requirements and specifications.

Intersectionality – A concept that captures the consequences of two or more combined systems of discrimination, and addresses the manner in which they contribute to creating layers of inequality.

Land release – The process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and remove all presence and suspicion of mines/ERW with minimum possible risk. This involves the identification of hazardous areas, the cancellation of land through non-technical survey, the reduction of land through technical survey, and the clearance of mine/ERW contaminated areas.

Mine action center – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some mine action centers also implement mine action activities.

Non-state armed group (NSAG) – For the Monitor's purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.

Non-technical survey – The collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to better define where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey activities typically include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking information from central institutions and other relevant sources, as well as field studies of the suspected area.

Oslo Process – The diplomatic process undertaken from 2006–2008 that led to the negotiation, adoption, and signing of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Persons with disabilities – Those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual, or sensory impairments, which in interaction with various barriers, may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.

Risk education (also known as risk reduction education and awareness in the Convention on Cluster Munitions and more broadly as Explosive Ordnance Risk Education, EORE) – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of death and injury from explosive hazards by raising the awareness of women, girls, men, and boys in accordance with the nature of the risks and their different vulnerabilities, roles, and needs and by promoting behavioral change. This includes public information dissemination, education and training, and community liaison.

Self-destruct mechanism – Under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, an “incorporated automatically-functioning mechanism which is in addition to the primary initiating mechanism of the munition and which secures the destruction of the munition into which it is incorporated.”

Self-deactivating – Under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, automatically rendering a munition inoperable by making an essential component (e.g. a battery) non-functional.

Submunition – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition). All air-dropped submunitions are commonly referred to as “bomblets,” although the term bomblet has a specific meaning in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. When ground launched, they are sometimes called “grenades.”

Survivor – A person who has been directly injured by the explosion of a landmine, submunition, or other ERW and has survived the incident.

Suspected hazardous area (SHA) – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/ERW contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

Technical survey – The collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to better define where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Technical survey activities may include visual search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or full sub-surface search.

Unexploded submunitions and **unexploded bomblets** – Submunitions and bomblets that have failed to explode as intended at the time of use, becoming unexploded ordnance.

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) – Munitions that were used or primed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate.

Victim – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, “all persons who have been killed or suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss, social marginalization or substantial impairment of the realization of their rights caused by the use of cluster munitions. They include those persons directly impacted by cluster munitions as well as their affected families and communities.”

Victim assistance – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, data collection and needs assessment, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support, socio-economic inclusion, and laws and public policies to ensure the full inclusion and equal participation in society of mine/ERW survivors and affected families and communities.

CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR 2026



Cluster Munition Monitor 2026 examines how states are working to join and implement the ban on cluster munitions, ensure clearance of cluster munition remnants, provide risk education, and assist victims of these indiscriminate weapons. Using the Convention on Cluster Munitions as its principal frame of reference, the report focuses on calendar year 2025 with information included through July 2026 where possible. It covers cluster munition ban policy, use, production, transfers, and stockpiling globally, and contains information on developments and challenges in assessing and addressing the impact of cluster munition contamination and the needs of survivors through clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. It also reviews global trends in funding allocated towards mine action efforts in cluster munition affected countries. Country profiles published online provide additional country-specific findings on these topics.

This report was prepared by the **Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor**, the civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC).

Front Cover: A HALO Trust staff member conducts an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) task in Lahej Governorate, Yemen. The governorate is one of seven in the country believed to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants. © Paul McCann/The HALO Trust, January 2026

Back cover: A Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) staff member prepares for the demolition of cluster bombs found during clearance operations in a coffee plantation. A total of 1,662 submunitions were found and destroyed at this single clearance site in Champasak Province, Lao PDR. © Sonxay Keovongvichid/NPA, January 2026

Cover Design: Michael Sherwin — Printed and bound in Lao PDR

Content produced by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor is reviewed by members of the Monitoring and Research Committee, a standing committee of the Governance Board of the ICBL-CMC. The committee's members include Monitor editorial team leaders, ICBL-CMC staff, and expert representatives of the following organizations: the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines, DanChurchAid, Human Rights Watch, Humanity & Inclusion, and Mines Action Canada.



Landmine & Cluster Munition
MONITOR

www.the-monitor.org

ISBN 978-2-9701476-7-1



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